



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control

19980715 159

REPRODUCED BY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-037

CONTENTS

13 NOVEMBER 1989

CHINA

Qian Qichen on International Situation [Qian Qichen; QIUSHI 1 Oct]	1
UN Delegate Condemns Chemical Weapons [XINHUA 28 Oct]	4
Multiple Applications for Nuclear Energy Explored [Xue Ren; JIEFANGJUN BAO 20 Oct]	4
Li Peng Signs Radiation Protection Decree [XINHUA 1 Nov]	5
Nuclear Technology Applied to Nonmilitary Use [Huang Xiang, Zhang Yu'an; RENMIN RIBAO 30 Oct]	5
Article Views U.S., Soviet Arms Control Talks [Zhou Aiqun; RENMIN RIBAO 20 Oct]	6
Debate Over Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Viewed [Zhang Yuhe; JIEFANGJUN BAO 16 Oct]	7

EAST ASIA

AUSTRALIA

U.S. Clarification on Chemical Weapons Sought [Melbourne International 27 Oct]	9
--	---

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Nuclear Weapons 'Must Be Withdrawn' [KCNA 3 Nov]	9
Cheney's Remarks at NATO Conference Denounced [KCNA 29 Oct]	9

PHILIPPINES

Column on Aquino, U.S. Nuclear 'Conspiracy' [F. Tatad; PHILIPPINES NEWSDAY 19 Oct]	10
--	----

VIETNAM

Paper Sees U.S., NATO Blocking Disarmament [VNA 31 Oct]	11
---	----

EAST EUROPE

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Foreign, Trade Ministers Attend Pact Meeting	12
Meeting Communique Issued [ADN 27 Oct]	12
Communique Urges Arms Reductions [East Berlin Radio]	14
Modernization, Politization of Warsaw Pact Recommended [S. Karaganov; Moscow MOSCOW NEWS No 40, 8-15 Oct]	14
Warsaw Pact Withdrawal Issues	15
Primakov, Shishlin Comment [Budapest TV 30 Oct]	15
Primakov Rules Out Interference [Budapest Radio 30 Oct]	15
Aboymov on Pact Countries' Commitment [Budapest Radio]	15

ALBANIA

Pitarka Speaks on Disarmament at UN [ATA 23 Oct]	16
--	----

BULGARIA

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Session Assessed [M. Bozhilov; RABOTNICHESKO DELO 28 Oct]	16
--	----

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- NATO Session, Polish, Hungarian Events Viewed [*M. Jelinek; RUDE PRAVO 27 Oct*] 17
Upcoming Bush, Gorbachev Talks Viewed Favorably [*M. Jelinek; RUDE PRAVO 2 Nov*] 17

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

- U.S. Criticized for Rejecting Gorbachev Proposal [*A. Knack; BERLINER ZEITUNG 28-29 Oct*] . 18
NATO Criticized for Ignoring Arms Proposals
[*H. Herbell; NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 28-29 Oct*] 18
NATO Stance on Disarmament Criticized [*F. Knipping; NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 1 Nov*] 19
Representative Advocates Chemical Weapons Ban [*NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 26 Oct*] 19

HUNGARY

- Military Cooperation Pact Signed [*MTI 3 Nov*] 19
Hungarian Neutrality Prospects Examined [*Budapest Radio 4 Nov*] 20
Karpati Discusses Plans To Cut Military [*Budapest Radio 26 Oct*] 21

POLAND

- Sejm Speaker Comments on Washington Talks [*PAP*] 21

ROMANIA

- Delegate Addresses UN on Disarmament [*AGERPRES 24 Oct*] 21

LATIN AMERICA

MEXICO

- USSR's Marcha Praises Anti-Nuclear Policy [*UNOMASUNO 27 Oct*] 23

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

EGYPT

- Israeli-South Africa Nuclear Cooperation Decried [*I. Wahbi; Cairo Radio 1 Nov*] 24
Cooperation Elicits 'Concern' [*MENA*] 24
U.S. Reaction Viewed [*A. Baha' al-Din ; AL-AHRAM 30 Oct*] 24

INDIA

- Editorials Discuss Arms Reduction Proposals 25
Bush Offer Praised [*THE TIMES OF INDIA 29 Sep*] 25
Agreement at Summit 'Possible' [*THE TIMES OF INDIA 26 Sep 89*] 25

IRAN

- Early Warning-Diversion Missile System Announced [*IRNA 25 Oct*] 26

ISRAEL

- Inner Cabinet Made Decisions on Nuclear Policy [*Jerusalem Radio 26 Oct*] 26
Report on South African Nuclear Ties Refuted 26
Shamir, Ambassador Comment [*Tel Aviv Radio 26 Oct*] 26
Rabin Denies RSA Production Ties [*Tel Aviv Radio*] 27
Reports of Nuclear Ties to RSA Anger Defense Personnel
[*I. Kfir, S. Tal, S. Rosenblum, O. Me'iri, Y. Werther; HADASHOT 27 Oct*] 27
IBM Computer Said To Aid H-Bomb Program
[*H. Khashabah, M. Khalid; London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 31 Oct*] 27

JORDAN

Paper on Israel's Nuclear Power, U.S. Backing [*Amman SAWT AL-SHA'B 31 Oct*] 27

PAKISTAN

Daily Welcomes Bush Certification of Nuclear Program [*THE MUSLIM 9 Oct*] 28

SOVIET UNION

Commentary on New Conditions, Progress on Disarmament
[*M. Ponomarev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 1 Oct*] 29

SDI Funding Cuts Seen as Positive Steps to Disarmament Efforts
[*V. Lapin; SELSKAYA ZHIZN 6 Oct*] 30

Selective Policy in Renewing Strategic Weapons Recommended
[*A. Arbatov; MOSCOW NEWS 22-29 Oct*] 31

Pros, Cons of Nuclear Deterrent Doctrine Discussed
[*Y. Bandura; MOSCOW NEWS 22-29 Oct*] 32

Development of First Soviet Atomic Bomb Project 33

Project, Explosion Described [*I. Golovin; MOSCOW NEWS 15-22 Oct*] 33

Reports of Explosion Denied [*MOSCOW NEWS 15-22 Oct 89*] 38

Negotiations on Strategic Arms in Complex, Delicate Phase
[*G. Oganov; SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, 5 Oct*] 39

'Vienna Stage' of Helsinki Process Viewed [*L. Anisimov; SLOVO LEKTORA No 8, Aug*] 40

Unilateral Disarmament Needed; Military Must Use 'Common Sense'
[*P. Gladkov; MOSCOW NEWS No 36, 10-17 Sep*] 45

WEST EUROPE

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meeting Ends [*Lisbon International 25 Oct*] 47

AUSTRIA

No Legal Inquiries Into Steyr Company Arms Sale [*DER STANDARD 19 Oct*] 47

CANADA

Restatement of Canadian Arms Control Objectives [*THE TORONTO STAR 14 Sep*] 47

Arms Control Talks Offer Hope for Defense Spending Relief
[*THE GLOBE AND MAIL 28 Sep*] 48

Wyoming Meeting Helpful To Stalled Missile Talks [*THE OTTAWA CITIZEN 26 Sep*] 48

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Commentary Views Impact of Army Reduction
[*K. Feldmayer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 4 Nov*] 49

Ministry on Withdrawal of U.S. Chemical Weapons [*DPA*] 50

FINLAND

Marshal Akhromeyev: Treaty Revision Possible 50

Depends on NATO [*HELSINGIN SANOMAT 15 Sep*] 50

Neutrality Essential Issue [*HELSINGIN SANOMAT 17 Sep*] 51

FRANCE

New Nuclear Test Reported in South Pacific [AFP 1 Nov]	52
New Zealand Seismologists Report Nuclear Test	52
Mururoa Atoll Blast Detected [AFP 25 Oct]	52
Anti-Nuclear Groups Protest [Melbourne International]	53
Mobile Antiaircraft Defense System Scuttled [LE MONDE 28 Sep]	53
Details on Helios Spy Satellite Provided [J. Croize; LE FIGARO 29 Sep]	53

GREECE

Charges Filed for Transporting Radioactive Substances	54
Briton Arrested [Athens Domestic Service 11 Oct]	54
Uranium 'Destined for Libya' [ATHENS NEWS 12 Oct]	55

ITALY

Arms Export Controls Paralyze Industry [INTERARMA NEWS 19 Jul]	55
--	----

PORTUGAL

Defense Official Suggestion on NATO Weaponry [DIARIO DE NOTICIAS 14 Oct]	57
--	----

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Committee Criticizes New Antitank Missile [R. Fox; THE DAILY TELEGRAPH 18 Oct]	57
Defense Secretary on NATO, Warsaw Pact [J. Hardy; PRESS ASSOCIATION 18 Oct]	58

Qian Qichen on International Situation

HK3010112689 Beijing QIUSHI in Chinese
No 19 1 Oct 89 pp 39-42

[Article by Qian Qichen (6929 0366 3819): "Birth of New China and Development of Post-war International Situation"]

[Text] Out of the consideration of their own interests, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and other countries, all members of the anti-fascist alliance, had been working intensively before the end of World War II to plan out a post-war world structure. They declared that they would establish a "broad and permanent all-round security system" whose key idea was that a few powers with huge military force would assume the responsibility of guarding the world. However, all these powers failed to anticipate the development of the situation—the victory of the anti-fascist war greatly inspired the people of the world and all the oppressed and exploited nations, and aroused them into a raging tide of popular revolution and national liberation movement; they thus totally reformed the world's basic structure. The development of the post-war international situation can well be summed up by Comrade Mao Zedong's well-known verse, which is full of revolutionary passion: "The Four Seas are rising, clouds and waters raging, the Five Continents are rocking, wind and thunder roaring."

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that the founding of the PRC was the most significant epoch-making historical event in the post-war development of international situation. One can interpret this statement from two aspects. In the first place, China is the most populous country in the world to break through the oriental front of imperialism and take up a socialist road; the founding of the PRC greatly augmented the socialist force in the world. The emergence of a series of socialist countries comprising one-third of the world's population changed the balance of power between the socialist and capitalist camps in the world. In the next place, since China was the largest semi-feudal semi-colonial country of the world, the emancipation of China undoubtedly gave a tremendous impetus to the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Of the existing more than 130 Third World countries which accommodate three-fourths of the world's population, more than 90 gained their independence through struggle in various forms after the war. The worldwide colonial structure has completely disintegrated, and a vast number of Third World countries have emerged as a rising force to push ahead the development of history.

In the wake of the developing international struggle over the past 40 years since World War II, a relative stability based on a tripartite balance of forces between socialist countries, Western developed countries, and Third World countries was gradually established. This is the basis for the relaxation of tension in the world today.

Reviewing those days immediately after World War II in retrospect, one can find the major change in the world situation and the balance of power between different countries. The German, Italian, and Japanese fascist forces had been put to rout, the United Kingdom and France had been weakened, while the United States had its force expand to an unprecedented height, and its troops, together with its political and economic influence, crossed the Atlantic and the Pacific to enter Western Europe and the Far East. As for the Soviet Union, despite heavy losses in the war, it survived the severe test, and its troops marched out of the borders and entered Eastern and Central Europe during the counter-attack. In consequence the confrontation between the two powers came into being.

As the war ended, the anti-fascist alliance no longer existed, and the period of cold war between the East and the West featuring the U.S.-Soviet contention began. The focus of the U.S.-Soviet contention rests on Europe. After the struggle centering around the "Berlin crisis" ended in the late 1940s, East and West Germany were founded separately. Soon after West Germany joined the NATO, the Warsaw Pact Organization was established. Although no military clashes have occurred in Europe after the war, a great number of troops and arms have been deployed in such a small region, resulting in a long-term confrontation between two military blocs in Europe.

The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is particularly acute with regard to the arms race. The arms race has been going on for decades between the two superpowers that have the strongest military forces and are able to launch a world war. This arms race has been escalated constantly and extended from the land, the sea, and the air into outer space. But so far the overall military balance between the two sides has remained unchanged. Since both the superpowers are maintaining their own nuclear arsenals, which are capable of destroying the whole world several times, neither side dares to take any reckless action. Now both the United States and the Soviet Union have realized that no nuclear war should be started and, once such a war broke out, nobody would be the winner. This common understanding now serves as an important factor to prevent new world war.

The confrontation between the East and the West is reflected in military expansion and regional conflicts as well. Local wars have burst out one after another, most related to the confrontation between the East and the West. Of these local wars those in which the United States and the Soviet Union were directly involved all took place in countries around China. In the 1950s, China joined the DPRK in a fierce battle against the United States on the Korean battlefield and drove the U.S. troops back to the 38th Parallel. In the 1960s, the Vietnamese and Indochinese people, with the support of China and other justice-upholding countries, won the victory of the war against the U.S. aggressors to save

their countries. In the 1980s, with the support of peace-loving countries and peoples, the Afghan people forcefully resisted alien invaders, thus forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw all its troops from the country at last. All these cases show that, in today's world, whoever practices hegemonism and power politics with military force as his backing will meet with resolute resistance by the people and will finally be defeated without exception.

The two camps formed soon after the war, the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, and the imperialist camp, headed by the United States, have disintegrated or have been weakened in these years. Since the Soviet Union applied great-nation chauvinism to other socialist countries and violated the principle of independence and equality governing relations between socialist countries, there was a rift within the socialist camp. Sino-Soviet relations began to break in the 1960s, finally leading to the disintegration of the socialist camp. As a developing socialist country, China has steadfastly stood with the Third World and kept aloof from both the Eastern and Western blocs. China has been upholding its foreign policy of peace and independence, withstanding the pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union, opposing hegemonism, and safeguarding world peace. Thus it has emerged as an independent force not be ignored, exerting positive influence on the world situation.

After the war, the United States has tried to bring Western Europe and Japan under its control with aid and military force. In the wake of rapid economic growth, a European Economic Community was established in Western Europe in the late 1950s. Charles de Gaulle of France pursued an independent foreign policy and withdrew from NATO's plan of military integration in 1966. Western Europe has stepped up its unification and self-strengthening process, and now its economic strength is comparable to that of the United States. An enormous unified Western European internal market is expected to be built up by 1992, turning the region into a still more important force. In the meantime, Japan, which had been propped up by the United States, has risen quickly and emerged as the second economic power of the world. With a per-capita GNP exceeding that of the United States and as the world's number one creditor nation with its gold reserve and foreign trade surplus topping the world, Japan is now seeking the status of a political power.

Out of the consideration of their interests, both Western and Eastern European countries do not want to continue confrontation but are looking forward to constructive dialogue and contacts. A trend toward closer ties between Eastern and Western European is developing. And, in the wake of the increasing desire for independence among members of the two major blocs, the alliance within the NATO and the Warsaw Pact is loosening.

The United States has tried to slap together regional military blocs everywhere after the war. In this connection, the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty, the Baghdad Pact, and other bodies came into being. In doing so the United States wanted to contain socialist countries militarily and to tighten control over the signatory states. Due to changes in the situation, all these regional military blocs headed by the United States disintegrated one after another. And the ANZUS Pact established by the United States has also been weakened, as New Zealand has pursued an independent nuclear policy.

In 1961 the Nonaligned Movement was officially founded as an independent non-bloc assembly. This movement held its ninth summit this year, its membership has increased to 102 states, and it has extensive influence on international affairs. The establishment of the Group of 77 in the mid 1960s marked a new stage of the efforts of developing countries to fight for equal economic rights and a new and fair international economic order. There have also been tremendous changes in the United Nations, the largest international organization established after the war. Its membership has increased to 159 from 50 when it was founded; and the voting machine that used to be manipulated by the powers does not work any longer. The United Nations is becoming a true rostrum where the vast number of medium and small countries can air their views on international affairs.

Meanwhile, all kinds of regional political and economic cooperative organizations were set up, such as the Organization of African Unity, the ASEAN, the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, as well as cooperative organizations in Latin and Central American and the South Pacific Forum. The establishment of these organizations reflected the will of medium and small countries, which wish to cast off the superpowers' control and to associate on a voluntary basis.

The protracted arms race and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union have not enabled either side to override the other but load them with a heavy economic burden. Now the United States has lost its standing as the world's number one economic and financial power but turned out to be the world's number one debtor. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, suffering from a longstanding economic stagnation and the serious shortage of consumer goods, has found itself in dire straits. At present, the United States and the Soviet Union are still maintaining their military superiority, and the bipolar structure is still dominating the international situation. But the era when they could order others and monopolize international affairs has come to an end. A multipolar world which is formed by various forces representing different social systems, different economic modes, and varying degrees of development is taking shape and developing.

For the present, the international situation is facing a turning point. The feature of this change, as Comrade Deng Xiaoping put it, is that "the whole world is now undergoing a transition from confrontation to dialogue, from tension to detente." The international situation will possibly enter a new period favorable to the efforts to safeguard peace and to promote development.

Given the general trend of detente, one should also bear in mind that the various factors contributing to tension and turbulence have not been eliminated, hegemonism is still being practiced, the arms race shows no sign of ending, and regional conflicts have yet to be resolved. At the same time, the South-North contradiction has become more acute, and the economic gap between the South and the North is widening. In the final analysis, the failure to resolve the problem of development that the world is facing will be unfavorable to the peace and stability of the world. Therefore, the process of detente will be tortuous, and the struggle to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace will be a long-term task.

As modern science and technology are developing by leaps and bounds and are promptly turned into enormous productive forces, the focus of international competition is now shifting from the military to economic sectors. All nations, no matter what social systems they are practising and how developed they are, are carrying out reforms or economic readjustment. And they are all busy working out their new national development strategy. Some developed countries have also taken the upgrading of their economic, scientific, and technological standards as the principal means to increase their national power, to safeguard security, and to enhance their international standing. In the competition in overall national power, the rise of international economic blocs goes along with the process of international economic integration. All developed countries are actively planning to form regional economic association and regional economic blocs. Despite sharp competition between different blocs, a tendency of mutual infiltration and mutual dependence is developing. As a result, every country is involved in others' economy.

A worrisome phenomenon is that developing countries are facing deteriorating conditions for trade—their export revenue is decreasing sharply, investments in productive projects have been cut, and their debt burden is becoming heavier and heavier. Rich countries are getting richer, while poor countries are becoming poorer. This abnormal phenomenon, if it continues, will turn out to be a catastrophe for developing countries and will have an unfavorable effect on the economic growth of developed countries as well. What is more, it will bring about serious consequences unfavorable to the economic development and the political stability of the world.

In building socialism and upholding the policy of reform and opening up according to its own national conditions, China has managed to double its GNP in the past 10 years. The tremendous changes in this country with a population of 1 billion certainly influence the world.

China endorses the proposal for a South-North dialogue stated at the ninth summit of the Nonaligned Movement held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, not long ago and by a special foreign ministerial meeting of the Group of 77 held in Caracas, Venezuela, last June. The economic development of the Third World has become an urgent task which has a bearing on the world as a whole, and the establishment of a new international economic order has become a need of our times.

Despite the relaxation of the world situation today, it is still quite common that larger and stronger countries bully smaller and weaker ones, interfere in others' internal affairs, and force their ideologies and values upon others. Under certain circumstances this kind of struggle may become quite acute. One thing that merits attention is that some Westerners have excitedly interpreted the wave of reform in socialist countries as a "failure of communism" and a "bankruptcy for socialism." Some politicians have maintained that this "historical opportunity" should be used to practise the so-called "super-containment" strategy by economic, political, cultural, ideological, and other means. To put it bluntly, this is nothing but a new version of "peaceful evolution."

If any people failed to see this aspect of international situation clearly enough in the past, then they should have realized the truth through the political turmoil and the counterrevolutionary rebellion that took place in China not long ago.

Today's world is an entity full of contradictions. There are so many countries with different social systems, political systems, ideologies, values, historical backgrounds, cultural traditions, and religious faiths, and yet all these countries have to live together and make contact with each other. Then how can they get along well? The post-war historical development has shown that different countries can live in harmony only if they take a realistic attitude, tolerate the diversity of the world, restrain themselves from interfering in others' internal affairs, and show mutual respect. Therefore, the Chinese Government has consistently maintained that relations between countries be handled on the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. We believe that now it is high time for all nations to make concerted efforts to establish a new international political order on the basis of these five principles.

The world is evolving and the situation is developing. As the old saying goes: "Whosoever understands the times is a great man." Any practice that goes counter to the historical trend will, after all, fail. And every view that meets the needs of the times will, after all, win more and more extensive support and be adopted. This is the very truth that has been proven by the post-war development of international situation.

UN Delegate Condemns Chemical Weapons

*OW2810021889 Beijing XINHUA in English
0033 GMT 28 Oct 89*

[Text] United Nations, October 27 (XINHUA)—China today called for the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons (CW) and the establishment of a CW-free world.

“It is an important objective of China’s foreign policy of peace and a consistent stand of the Chinese Government to strive for a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons at an early date,” Chinese delegate Hou Zhitong told the first committee (political and security) of the current session of the U.N. General Assembly this morning.

The committee began to debate the question of banning chemical weapons today.

Hou said China is a non-CW state which neither possesses nor produces chemical weapons and also does not export chemicals to be used for manufacturing chemical weapons. It “has all along attached great importance to, and taken an active part in, the relevant multilateral international deliberations and the negotiations for a comprehensive ban and thorough elimination of chemical weapons,” he pointed out.

“The complete elimination of chemical weapons and the establishment of a world free of such weapons have become an imperative of our time,” the ambassador said. “Any formula that is designed to solve only a part of this problem can hardly free mankind from its harm and threat.”

Stating China’s position on a CW convention, the ambassador said that to ensure the authority and effectiveness of this convention, China has “consistently advocated the stipulation of strict, effective, reasonable, and practicable measures of verification, including challenge inspection.”

Commenting on the principle of verification, Hou stressed that verification should be “non-discriminatory” and “all states have equal rights to participate in the process of international verification of agreements to which they are parties.”

He also pointed out that “care should be taken to avoid abuses” and “to avoid unduly interfering with the internal affairs of state parties or other states, or jeopardizing their economic, technological, and social development.”

Multiple Applications for Nuclear Energy Explored

*HK0511082089 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 20 Oct 89 p 19*

[Report by Xue Ren (5641 0088): “A Nuclear Test Base Boldly Opens Up New Fields in Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Technology, and Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy”]

[Text] A nuclear test base opened another two factories turning out products for civilian use in September this year. That was a new action by this test base in opening up new fields in nuclear energy, nuclear technology, and peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

It is learned that by direct application of nuclear technology to production in the test base-run factories, the processing of products to render services to economic construction and people’s livelihood has been a bold attempt of the test base to open up nuclear energy, nuclear technology, and peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

The test base has presented some 100 results of scientific research since 1987. Some of the results have been awarded national prizes for important progress in science and technology; some were the first of their kind in China; others have been put into production in batches; and still others have already created marked economic results and social benefits. They have each contributed to making nuclear energy and nuclear technology bring benefits to mankind.

With the strategic shift in the guiding idea of science, technology, and industry for national defense, the test base has readjusted its scientific research and managerial structure, with a special technological development center for civilian purposes set up to be in specific charge of the selection of topics, information gathering, and organizational coordination. Eight organs of scientific research under the test base currently are doing research in this domain.

Compared with some foreign specialized research institutes in exploring nuclear energy, nuclear technology, and the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology, the test base has scored pleasing progress even in a very short time since such undertakings began. They have succeeded in developing the first “automatic apparatus for blade surface,” which is capable of observing the growing conditions of plants through analysis of the blade surface by applying optical and electronic technologies. Such apparatus can be used widely in forestry and farming and has drawn the attention of experts at exhibitions held in Beijing and Shenzhen. Transmitting lasers through optical fibers to break up blockages in human blood vessels has been proven highly effective in the treatment of heart disease, coronary heart disease, and thrombus. By adopting the technology of nuclear radiation, scientists at the test base have succeeded in developing an electronic (impulse) static electric accelerator for

detecting flaws in products, thus improving product quality by finding a solution to a most difficult problem. The newly developed lightning monitor is capable of monitoring the distance of lightning and the direction of its movement and whether it will cause danger. When this monitor is installed in civil airports as a lightning-proof device, it will have the effects of an eye and an ear. The technology of radioactive atomic analysis has already been adopted by several hospitals in Xian to analyze whether the organizational factors and elements of human cells are normal in diagnosing the nutrition, disease, and health condition of the human body....

In the course of developing the peaceful utilization of nuclear technology, the test base has widened its perspective and knowledge through social contacts and external exchanges; consequently, the test base's level of scientific research and automation have greatly improved, while its economic income has been on the rise.

Li Peng Signs Radiation Protection Decree

OW0211065889 Beijing XINHUA Domestic Service in Chinese 1309 GMT 1 Nov 89

["Local Broadcast News Service"]

[Text] Beijing, 1 Nov (XINHUA)—To step up supervision and management over protection against radioisotopes and radiation from beam installations and to ensure the health and safety of those whose work involves radiation as well as that of the public, State Council Premier Li Peng on 24 October signed into law the 44th State Council decree and promulgated the "Regulations Governing Protection Against Radioisotope and Beam Installations."

The "regulations" stipulate: From now on, the state will implement license registration in connection with radiation work. Radiation protection facilities in all radiation work places either newly built, renovated, or expanded, must be inspected and approved after completion by health, public security, and environmental protection departments and receive license registration certificates before opening for use. Those involving the emission of radioactive waste in liquid, gas, or solid form, must submit environmental impact reports to environmental protection departments at the provincial, autonomous regional, or municipal level and obtain approval from them before applying for registration.

Regarding the management of protection against radiation, the "regulations" stipulate: Administrative departments are responsible for managing the protection against radiation from units under their individual jurisdiction. Protection facilities must be installed in places making, using, or storing radioisotopes, as well as in places manufacturing or using beam facilities. Radiation signs and necessary protection security interlocking mechanisms, alarm systems, or signals must be installed at the entrances to those places.

The "regulations" also provide for specific stipulations in connection with the management of radiation accidents, supervision over radiation protection, and punishment for violating the regulations. The "regulations" state: Those who breach the regulations and cause radiation accidents with minor consequences will be dealt with by public security agencies in accordance with the "public security management and punishment regulations"; those whose radiation accidents entail grave consequences and constitute a crime will be dealt with by judicial agencies.

Nuclear Technology Applied to Nonmilitary Use

HK3010004289 Beijing CHINA DAILY (BUSINESS WEEKLY) in English 30 Oct 89 p 4

[By Huang Xiang and Zhang Yu'an]

[Text] For many Chinese, the nuclear industry inspires visions of such powerful weapons as the atom bomb or the more devastating hydrogen bomb.

However, since 1979, the industry has been transforming itself into "an ordinary profession with more and more of a civilian nature," in the words of Wang Qing, from the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC).

The CNNC official told BUSINESS WEEKLY recently the corporation, the former Ministry of Nuclear Industry, has applied nuclear technology to non-military production and developed over 1,000 products for civilian use in the past decade.

"This once purely defence industry is now making strides in such civilian fields as developing nuclear power, isotope and radiation technology, and civilian products," said Wang, division chief with the one-year-old CNNC.

The Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant, a totally domestic effort, in China's south-eastern coastal province of Zhejiang is expected to go on line by the end of 1990. The construction of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station in Guangdong Province is well underway. Wang said the research on isotope and radiation technology started in the 1950's. This research includes isotope products, nuclear instruments, accelerators, radiation technology, and the application of nuclear technology to agriculture and medical treatment.

In agriculture, for example XINHUA reports that Chinese scientists have developed 285 new strains of 23 crops and plants on 14 million hectares of land by utilizing nuclear radiation which has increased grain output by 3.5 million tons and produced profits of 5 billion yuan (\$1.3 billion).

Among the new breeds developed by radiation, "Yuanfengzhao" rice, "Lumian-1" cotton, and "Tiefeng-18" soy beans have been awarded national first class medals for invention, the XINHUA report said.

Since 1979 the corporation has been developing civilian products, a policy that applies to other defence industries as well.

The total value of civilian products this year, which is expected to be 580 million yuan (\$156 million), is six times more than a decade earlier. It now makes up one-third of the industry's output value, Wang disclosed.

During the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90), the corporation's 60 enterprises initiated 112 civilian projects, a total investment of 8880 million yuan (\$238 million). Seventy-seven of them may be completed by the end of 1990.

Major projects include a fire-arms factory, a chemical fertilizer plant, a lithium battery factory, an aluminium foil and other rolled-aluminium factory, and a soda plant.

Many of the corporation's high-tech projects are using foreign technology. Partners are from the United States, West Germany, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.

CNNC currently employs 300,000 people in 21 research institutes and 100 enterprises.

Article Views U.S., Soviet Arms Control Talks

*HK0211113089 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
20 Oct 89 p 7*

[Article by Zhou Aiqun (0719 1947 5028): "New Breakthrough in Soviet-U.S. Arms Control Talks"]

[Text] The 12th round of Soviet-U.S. Nuclear and Space Arms Control Talks (ACT) in Geneva began on 29 September. This round of ACT drew the world's special attention because, just before the ACT, which had been deadlocked for over a year, signs of new breakthrough were evident.

On 21 September 1989, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze handed Gorbachev's lengthy letter to President Bush in the White House and held a 2-day meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. Thereafter, he announced that although negotiations for a Soviet-U.S. space weapons agreement are yet to be completed, the USSR is ready to sign a treaty with the United States on cutting strategic weapons. This was received internationally as an indication that the USSR has given up the stance of linking the reduction of strategic weapons directly to the space weapons ban. This is a big concession on the part of the USSR. The USSR is also willing to negotiate for a single separate agreement on limiting sea-borne cruise missiles and promises to unilaterally dismantle the controversial Krasnoyarsk radar installation. The softened Soviet attitude is considered due to many factors.

In March 1985 when the strategic, medium-range, and space ACT began, the USSR maintained that these three kinds of weapons should be lumped together to seek a single solution. The intention was to use strategic and

medium-range weapons to put pressure on the United States to abandon the SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. The USSR then insisted that cutting strategic weapons must be coupled with restricting space arms so that agreeing to restrict space weapons should be considered a prerequisite for reducing strategic weapons. However, recent international developments and changes in Soviet internal politics has forced the USSR to vacillate between "linking" and "unlinking" several times in the past. During the Soviet-U.S. Iceland Summit, both sides had come to the point of cutting 50 percent of strategic weapons; but because of the impasse of linking that to space arms, the efforts were fruitless and agreement was not achieved. At the end of 1987, the USSR reached agreement with the United States on medium-range weapons, freeing these weapons from the "linking." In order to gain impetus to push the act forward, Gorbachev told American correspondents in 1987, before he left for the U.S. Summit, that "SDI will not be on the agenda so long as the United States observes the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [ABMT]." He has thus shown flexible tactics towards the "linking" argument. However, at the 1988 Moscow Summit, the USSR retreated to a rigid stance by saying that a strict observance of the ABMT should be a prerequisite for reaching agreement on 50 percent strategic arms cuts. Thereafter, the USSR has not yielded on the "linking".

Observers held that, in the year since the Moscow Summit, the USSR has been able to give up the "linking" principle, or U-turned, to everyone's surprise and this must have been based on their short-term as well as long-term considerations.

From a military viewpoint, the nuclear weapons held by the USSR and the United States together constitute 97 percent of the world's total and even if they cut half of these weapons, the two countries still possess over 90 percent of the total. Development of nuclear technology eventually renders a large portion of nuclear weapons obsolete, which means they can be scrapped so that military budgets can be spent on more advanced projects, increasing competitive power in the high-tech arena. Furthermore, SDI, having been strongly opposed by the USSR, has now been revamped to be smaller in scope and slower in speed. Space deployment will obviously be delayed. Even though the weapons are to be deployed sometime in the future, the reliability of SDI is still a question of debate. The USSR is also committed to its own version of Star Wars, probably as sophisticated as SDI. Therefore, under present circumstances, unlinking strategic weapon talks from a space weapons ban will not result in a threat to the safety of the USSR.

On the other hand, since President Bush assumed office, the United States has taken a careful approach to the USSR and no significant change has been seen in the relations between the two countries. In arms control, President Bush seems to pay more attention to European conventional weapons, rather than getting a strategic weapons agreement. In this regard the USSR is obviously worried. ACT is a key in Soviet-U.S. relations and

reduction of strategic weapons has been the focal point of ACT. Notwithstanding the importance of cutting European conventional weapons, talks on strategic weapons have been directly affecting Soviet-U.S. diplomacy. The USSR may view the cutting of strategic weapons as the only means of enhancing bilateral relations and maintaining thrust toward easing tensions. Hence, the USSR would make a bigger concession to demonstrate determination and sincerity in improving Soviet-U.S. relations and to see an East-West thaw, or at least to keep the same warm Soviet-U.S. relations of Reagan's time. The concession was also purposely made to create a relatively peaceful climate internationally to facilitate internal reforms.

Furthermore, the internal situation in the Soviet Union and forces are emerging resisting the reform. Apparently, the Soviet leader made this concession to score diplomatic success to compensate for poor performance of his economic reform improving his domestic situation.

Critics worldwide hold that the Soviet initiative will positively help the superpowers long-drawn-out ACT. Although the Soviet concession contains some reservations and differences between the two sides remain, after 11 rounds of talks, a foundation for the treaty aimed at cutting strategic weapons by 50 percent has been laid. The two sides will get even closer in the 12th round of ACT. Assuming no major snags occur in the negotiations, further bargaining should create a good opportunity for reaching a Soviet-U.S. agreement next year.

Debate Over Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Viewed

HK0111012189 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 16 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Zhang Yuhe (1728 3768 3109): "Is There Such a Need?—Debate in the United States Over Upgrading of Production Facilities for Nuclear Weapons Resources"]

[Text] Since an accident happened in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station of the Soviet Union, the citizens of the United States have asked the question as if by prior agreement: Is the nuclear military industry of the United States safe? The U.S. nuclear military industry, which has been regarded as secret territory since the war, has recently been revealed little by little.

After World War II, the United States has produced a total of 60,000 nuclear warheads, for which, the Department of Energy and affiliated organizations have spent \$100 billion and the Department of Defense and affiliated organizations have spent \$850 billion in the testing, production, and deploying of nuclear weapons. The nuclear military industry has a total of 17 large bases for research, design, and production in 13 states in the United States and employs 100,000 in staff. Its total budget for the fiscal year of 1989 is over \$8 billion. If this big system were to be regarded as an business enterprise, its magnitude would be second to none in the United States. Following the involvement of congressmen and

reporters, the U.S. public are surprised to learn that the potential risk of the U.S. nuclear military industry is no less than that of the Soviet Union. If no resolute measures are adopted, the disaster of Chernobyl is likely to occur in the United States at any time! Because of pressure, the U.S. Government decided that, for the sake of safety, all bases for producing nuclear weapons resources owned by the Department of Energy and its affiliated organizations, would be closed by June of 1988.

However, the Department of Energy is not easy to deal with. If you say that our facilities are old and have potential risks, they will say replace the old then and modernize all facilities. Thereupon, the Department of Energy put forward a plan in 1988: It demanded an investment of about \$10 billion for building two tritium reactors of a new type and a base for producing plutonium. The reason put forth by the Department of Energy is that, if production facilities for nuclear weapons resources are closed, it would soon result in an inadequate stock of nuclear energy for the U.S. military, thus seriously threatening U.S. nuclear deterrent strategy. It was learned that, in coordinating and by tacit agreement, the Pentagon put out a study early in 1989, stating that the stock of tritium in the United States can only last 18 months to 2 years.

Is it true that a crisis will occur in the stock of nuclear energy for the U.S. military?

It is known to all that the most important components of a nuclear weapon include fission substances, such as uranium and plutonium, and fusion substances, such as tritium. At the moment when a nuclear bomb explodes, fission occurs in uranium and plutonium through aggregation, resulting in the release of a large amount of heat energy; tritium, which is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, is formed through nuclear reaction, just like uranium. It is employed to produce and accelerate the fusion of nuclear warheads, thus releasing heat energy. Tritium is a key component of a hydrogen bomb. The explosive power produced by fission is far greater than that produced by fusion. Therefore, the use of tritium can make the volume of a nuclear warhead small and also assure high combat effectiveness. The biggest difference between tritium on one hand and uranium and plutonium on the other lies in the fact that the decay of tritium is faster and, with its annual rate of decay standing at 5.5 percent, it finishes its "half-life" in 12.3 years on average. This means that if it is allowed to develop naturally, it takes about 12 years for half of the tritium in a nuclear warhead to disappear. However, the vitality of uranium and plutonium is almost everlasting. The "half-life" of plutonium is 24,000 years, while the "half-life" of uranium, which has the ability to be fitted in a nuclear warhead, is 0.7 billion years.

The "Defense Observer" of the United States revealed recently that the U.S. current stock of uranium, which has the ability to be fitted into nuclear warheads, is 500 tons. In 1964, President Johnson declared that the

United States had absolutely adequate uranium. Since then, the United States has stopped the production of uranium. Now, the number of U.S. nuclear warheads is smaller than in 1964. Therefore, the current demand for uranium is certainly less than that at that time. Moreover, the United States has planned to retire the 700 nuclear shells deployed in Western Europe. It is estimated that between 30,000 and 45,000 kg of uranium can be recovered from them. The United States currently has 100 tons of plutonium. In January 1988, the then Energy Secretary testified in Congress, saying: The quantity of plutonium possessed by the United States "exceeded the actual needs". Obviously, the problem of inadequate plutonium or uranium does not currently exist in the United States.

Then, has a crisis occurred concerning the source of tritium in the United States? Not long after the release of the Pentagon study that tritium can only last between 18 months and 2 years, Samuel Nunn, chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee, released an investigation report in March 1989, saying: Concerning tritium, "it is very possible that it will last us another period between 18 months and 2 years." More interestingly, it is reported that the Department of Energy hopes to sell 230 grams of tritium to private enterprises and research

institutions for business use and medical scientific research in the fiscal year of 1989. Thus, the remark of inadequate supply of tritium is ridiculous. Even though there are real difficulties in the supply of tritium, various remedial measures can be used. For example, the recovery of tritium from retired nuclear warheads is one of the remedial measures.

Obviously, the Energy Department's proposal about modernizing military nuclear energy production facilities need not be carried out. Many U.S. experts pointed out: The proposal of the Department of Energy on investing \$10 billion is merely a rough estimate. According to the calculation by the U.S. General Accounting Office, the construction of the two tritium reactor projects as put forward by Department of Energy requires an investment of \$38.3 billion. Furthermore, the General Accounting Office pointed out that, currently, the United States does not urgently need to build new military nuclear energy projects but should deal with nuclear pollution. The cost for dealing with nuclear pollution requires at least \$100 billion. Therefore, people insightfully pointed out that it is better to spend money on improving the environment than on producing new fallout.

AUSTRALIA

U.S. Clarification on Chemical Weapons Sought

*BK2710083989 Melbourne Overseas Service
in English 0500 GMT 27 Oct 89*

[Text] The Australian Government wants America to clarify its policy on chemical weapons following reports the Bush administration plans to continue to produce them. Radio Australia's Canberra office says the issue is looming as one of the more lively discussion points during annual ministerial level talks between the two countries in Sydney next week.

Australia believes the American decision on continued production of nerve gas could set back negotiation for a global convention banning all chemical weapons.

The report that the Bush administration plans to continue to produce chemical weapons is reported to have taken Canberra by surprise.

NORTH KOREA

U.S. Nuclear Weapons 'Must Be Withdrawn'

*SK0311104189 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1024 GMT 3 Nov 89*

[Text] Pyongyang November 3 (KCNA)—The U.S. imperialists' nuclear weapons and aggression forces must be withdrawn from South Korea and the Korean peninsula be converted into a nuclear-free, peace zone, stresses NODONG SINMUN in a signed article today.

The U.S. imperialists who had been spinning out a long string of trash to justify their policy of South Korean occupation and their moves to turn it into a nuclear base recently made one of their servants cry that the North was developing nuclear weapons and those deployed in South Korea are to cope with this.

Recalling this, the article says:

We do not have a single nuclear weapon. We oppose the introduction of nuclear weapons into our land from foreign countries and do not want to produce them by ourselves. Nuclear weapons are not necessary for us calling for a peaceful reunification of the country.

We are struggling to eliminate the root cause of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula by having the United States' nuclear weapons withdrawn from South Korea.

It is quite nonsensical for the U.S. imperialists to claim that the nuclear weapons in South Korea are aimed to cope with the North's development of nuclear weapons.

They began deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea after the war, which were increased to about 1,000 already in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, they have systematically brought nuclear weapons of various types including neutron bombs into South Korea and have

built and expanded nuclear attack bases and nuclear depots in different parts of South Korea.

The ever more undisguised moves of the U.S. imperialists to turn South Korea into a nuclear base are designed to execute their aggressive Asia-Pacific strategy.

They seek to attack our republic and other socialist countries with nuclear weapons and expand the sphere of their domination.

The U.S. imperialists must go back to their den, taking along the nuclear weapons and all the aggression forces from South Korea, instead of trying to cover up their nuclear war provocation moves with lies.

Cheney's Remarks at NATO Conference Denounced

*SK2910085389 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0846 GMT 29 Oct 89*

["Absolute Baloney of Nuclear Maniac"—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang October 29 (KCNA)—U.S. Defense Secretary Cheney, in his speech at a NATO Defense Ministers' Conference, stressed the need to "depend on nuclear deterrent" for "peace," saying short-range nuclear missiles of NATO must not be eliminated.

Criticizing this baloney of Cheney, NODONG SINMUN in a signed commentary today brands this as a mockery of the progressive people who are fighting for world peace and security under the banner of anti-war, anti-nuke struggle.

The news analyst says:

Today world peace and security are facing a grave threat, and mankind is at the crossroad of nuclear war and peace. This is entirely because the U.S. imperialists are running amok in their nuclear war provocation moves in different parts of the world, putting spurs to their nuclear arms race.

Nevertheless, Cheney announced that they would "continue depending on nuclear deterrent," openly arguing for the advantage of nuclear weapons. This fully reveals their dark intention to more feverishly accelerate nuclear arms race behind the facade of nuclear disarmament.

The logic of Cheney, a nuclear fanatic, is applied to Korea in particular.

The U.S. imperialists have deployed in South Korea more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons of various types, built many nuclear depots and continue shipping in nuclear warheads and their delivery means there, while ceaselessly staging nuclear war gambles with the South Korean puppets. They describe all this as something like "deterrent to war."

They must discontinue nuclear arms race, immediately pull their nuclear weapons out of South Korea and other regions of the world and stop the adventurous nuclear war maneuvers.

PHILIPPINES

Column on Aquino, U.S. Nuclear 'Conspiracy'
*HK2710115589 Manila PHILIPPINES NEWSDAY
in English 19 Oct 89 p 10*

["Turn of Events" column by Francisco S. Tatad: "A Conspiracy Against Filipinos"]

[Text] Not too long ago, New Zealand declared itself nuclear-free. After taking on France for its bombing of the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* in Auckland Harbor, it banned the entry of U.S. nuclear-powered vessels in its waters. Washington reacted by cutting out Wellington from ANZUS, the security alliance among Australia, New Zealand and United States. David Lange, New Zealand's Prime Minister, instantly became persona non grata to the U.S.; on his last visit there, he could not get anyone to give him the time of day. At home, life became increasingly difficult, and last August, occasioned by some Cabinet crisis, he quit.

This is the story of a government of a small, proud country, with more sheep than people, incurring the ire of mighty Washington in the pursuit of its national interest. Lange might have foreseen the costly political consequences of his action, but he was willing to pay the price and did not lack the courage to do what had to be done.

This is the very opposite of what we are seeing here among our present leaders.

In 1986, Mrs Aquino's 48-member Constitutional Commission, swayed by arguments of a particularly persuasive group, decided to include in the Constitution two specially important provisions. One, a provision declaring the country a nuclear-free zone; two, a provision declaring an end to the regime of military bases.

Said the first: The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.

Said the second: After the expiration in 1991 of the agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.

These provisions were debated and approved by the Commission while Mrs Aquino was on her first official

visit to Washington. Wiretaps of a telephone conversation between her and her executive secretary Joker Arroyo, which had since been made public by the opposition, showed her in an extremely embarrassing situation. She had no inkling whatsoever about the two provisions, and when told about them, she could not quite grasp their far-reaching implications. Arroyo spelled them out for her.

Of the two provisions, Arroyo underscored the gravity of the anti-nuclear, more than that of the anti-bases, provision. Without nuclear weapons, he pointed out, the bases would be useless to Washington. Seeing the point, Aquino immediately blamed diplomat Philip Kaplan, the deputy chief of mission of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, for failing to adequately oversee the work of the Commission.

From her words, one gathered the impression that she herself had no idea about the things that were supposed to go into the Constitution; her only concern was that she should get a fixed term of office—until June 30, 1992—without having to go through an election. Everything else that might affect U.S. interest was left in the hands of a specific foreigner: not Stephen Bosworth, the U.S. ambassador, ironically, but Kaplan, his deputy.

It proved to be an unmitigated disaster. But there was no use crying over spilled milk, as far as the Americans were concerned. To press the issue would have shown the combined ineptitude of the President and the State Department. So to avoid it, Secretary of State Shultz and Ambassador Bosworth held her hand and told her not to worry, they could live with the provision.

There was the same anti-nuclear constraint in the Japanese Constitution, they said, but the Japanese government never insisted on enforcing it, so it has proved to be no constraint at all. Could not the same be done in the Philippines?

Mrs Aquino apparently agreed, so when some senators later sought to implement the anti-nuclear provision, the administration simply rejected the proposal saying the provision does not create a nuclear-free policy for the country, but merely permits a ban on nuclear weapons whenever the national interest, as interpreted by the President, requires it. It was the complete opposite of the meaning of the words used in the document, but it was clear to all that the regime had decided that two and one was no longer three but four.

To put the bilateral seal on this misinterpretation of the provision, Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus signed a memorandum of agreement with Shultz in Washington saying the transit and overflight of nuclear-powered ships and nuclear-armed aircraft inside Philippine territory do not constitute storage of nuclear weapons. Scandalized by this flagrant circumvention of the anti-nuclear provision, some went to the Supreme Court to question its validity on constitutional grounds. The Court upheld the memorandum.

Comes now the issue of the bases.

After three long years of saying she was keeping her options open, Mrs Aquino finally told Washington she favors extending the U.S. military presence beyond the 1991 constitutional deadline on the 1947 agreement. Without having said a single word to the Filipino people why the bases must stay despite the agreement reached in 1966 that they could, and probably should, be phased out after 1991, she seems to have fully assured Washington that every device will be used, even if it over rode the Constitution, to make sure a new bases treaty was negotiated and ratified.

To deal with a bloc that has vowed to defeat any new bases treaty in the Senate, the President has decided to use Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. as her cat's-paw to put in motion a dubious call for a referendum that would preempt the Senate in the exercise of its constitutional power to concur or not to concur in a new bases agreement.

The obvious purpose of the referendum is to make the people believe that the President wants to consult them on an issue vital to their national interest. But no such consultation can or will be carried out. The regime, working hand-in-glove with the U.S., is simply interested in a process that can be manipulated to produce the appearance of popular support for a treaty on which Mrs Aquino is unwilling to stake her popularity or her claim to leadership.

What Mrs Aquino and Mr Mitra are trying to construct is not a conspiracy with the Filipinos to put one over on the U.S. It is rather a conspiracy with the U.S. to put one over on the Filipinos. And it will most likely succeed. Because of it the U.S. military and political presence in the country will grow even stronger at precisely the time when it should begin to diminish. For many years more, Washington will continue to decide who will run the government even as Filipinos continue to believe they are electing their leaders themselves.

VIETNAM

Paper Sees U.S., NATO Blocking Disarmament

*BK3110080189 Hanoi VNA in English
0714 GMT 31 Oct 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA October 31—The army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in a commentary today criticizes the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) for deliberately creating obstacles to the disarmament process.

The paper says: "Public opinion in Europe and across the world has followed with keen interest the encouraging progress achieved hitherto in the disarmament process on a global scale by the Soviet Union and the United States, the two biggest military powers, and the practical steps in that direction conformant with the trend of our time.

"At its recent regular session in Warsaw, the paper continues," the Warsaw Treaty Organisation made several constructive proposals for continuing the disarmament process to eliminate all nuclear weapons and eventually to abolish both the Warsaw Pact and NATO by the year 2000. "The latest initiatives of the Warsaw Pact are a fresh wind across Europe, drawing strong public support on the continent and other parts of the world.

"However," the paper goes on, "NATO Secretary General M. Woerner on Oct. 25 rejected outright the Soviet Union's proposal for abolishing both the NATO and Warsaw Pact. He pleaded for the necessity of NATO's existence and urged the Soviet Union to unilaterally withdraw its troops and weapons from Eastern Europe, saying that the Warsaw Pact should be dissolved without any conditions attached.

"Thus, contrary to the expectation of the world public many obstacles still remain in the way toward disarmament. So far, the United States and NATO have not yet abandoned their intention to gain military superiority in order to materialize their dangerous schemes.

"The plot and recent acts of the United States and Western Europe have shed more light on a coordinated campaign in all fields—political, military and economic—aimed at causing more difficulties and instability in a number of socialist countries."

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Foreign, Trade Ministers Attend Pact Meeting

Meeting Communique Issued

*LD2710112889 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1005 GMT 27 Oct 89*

[Text] Warsaw (ADN)—The text of the communique of the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers Committee meeting:

1. On 26-27 October 1989 there was a scheduled meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers Committee on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.

Taking part in the meeting were: Ivan Ganev, deputy minister for foreign affairs of the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria; Gyula Horn, minister for foreign affairs of the Republic of Hungary; Oskar Fischer, minister for foreign affairs of the German Democratic Republic; Krzysztof Skubiszewski, minister for foreign affairs of the People's Republic of Poland; Ioan Totu, minister for foreign affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania; Eduard Shevardnadze, minister for foreign affairs of the USSR; and Jaromir Johanes, minister for foreign affairs of the CSSR.

Also taking part were: Khristo Khristov, minister in the ministry for foreign economic relations of the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria; Piroska Apro, deputy minister for trade of the Republic of Hungary; Kurt Fenske, state secretary in the GDR ministry for foreign trade; Marcin Swiecicki, minister for foreign economic cooperation of the Peoples Republic of Poland; Cornel Pinzaru, minister, state secretary in the ministry for foreign trade and international economic cooperation of the Socialist Republic of Romania; Aleksandr Katschanov, USSR first deputy minister for foreign economic relations; and Jan Sterba, the CSSR minister for foreign trade.

2. The ministers discussed the status and tendencies in the development of international relations. They underlined the validity of the assessments made in the documents of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty participant states on 7-8 July 1989 in Bucharest both regarding the positive tendencies in the international situation and regarding the phenomena that shape these in a complex and contradictory manner in many ways. In this connection the ministers affirm their states' resolve to continue to act for disarmament and for the consolidation of peace, security and confidence, for the democratization of intra-state relations and for the development of broad international cooperation.

3. The participants in the meeting noted that under the conditions of a contradictory situation in Europe, preconditions for a radical change in relations between the countries of the continent, the step by step overcoming of its division, and the final eradication of the remnants

of the "cold war" are maturing. One of the basic preconditions for shaping a secure, peaceful, and indivisible Europe lies in the preservation of the right of each and every people to self-determination and to the free choice of its social, political, and economic path of development without external intervention.

Of fundamental importance for the building of a common European home in the variety of the countries' social and societal orders are the unconditional respect for the inviolability of the existing borders, of territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of states and the adhering to the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, of the resolutions of the CSCE Final Acts and of the other documents adopted within the framework of the Helsinki Process.

Any attempts whatsoever to destabilize the situation, to question the borders which arose after the war, and to renew the discussion on this question, would damage the process of the strengthening of trust and security in Europe. Full respect for the rights of sovereign states, including the question of state citizenship, in agreement with obligations under international law, is necessary. The meeting pointed to the danger of the strengthening of neo-Nazism and revanchism in several countries in Western Europe.

The ministers held the opinion that it is not useful to incorporate military-political alliances into the solution of bilateral controversies. Constructive, equal dialogue between the interested countries can be the sole path toward the solution of these questions.

4. The participants in the meeting pointed to the significance of the development of the all-European process in all areas to create lasting foundations for security and for closer cooperation between all states. They are determined to contribute on all sides to the realization of the agreement reached at the Vienna meeting within the framework of the all-European process as a whole.

The ministers stressed with satisfaction the positive development in the Vienna negotiations between the 23 countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on conventional armed forces in Europe. They will act decisively so that an initial treaty on radical reductions in armed forces and conventional arms can be achieved in the coming year. This agreement could be signed by the end of 1990 at a conference of the state or government heads of Europe, the United States, and Canada. A foreign ministers meeting should precede this conference. The reductions should be implemented within 2-3 years. That will make possible a significant reduction of the level of arms and military expenditure, a release of great material and human resources for social-economic development, and the consolidation of stability and security on the continent.

The participants in the meeting spoke in support of the adoption of a complex of new measures that would include all types of military activity, including those of

the air and navy forces, in the negotiations of the 35 CSCE participant states on confidence- and security-building measures.

The creation of a center for reducing the danger of war and for preventing a surprise attack in Europe would have essential importance. The ministers expressed hope that the seminar of the 35 CSCE participant states on the question of military doctrines would serve the consolidation of trust in Europe.

The participants in the meeting supported the immediate commencement of separate negotiations on the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

5. In disarmament the allied states see the key question of today. They hold fast to the aim of eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons.

The ministers underlined the importance of the implementation of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the liquidation of missiles of intermediate- and short-range and spoke in support of the conclusion of a treaty between the USSR and the United States as quickly as possible on the 50 percent reduction of their strategic offensive weapons. It is necessary to adhere to the USSR-U.S. ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972.

The participants in the meeting pointed to the necessity of halting all nuclear weapons tests. They issued the appeal to both sides to forego the modernization of these weapons.

The ministers supported the conclusion of an international convention as quickly as possible on the complete banning and destruction of chemical weapons, and called on the participants in the Geneva negotiations to solve the remaining outstanding questions in 1990. It is important to increase the effectiveness of the work of the Geneva disarmament conference in toto.

The participants at the meeting spoke in support of commencing negotiations on naval armed forces with the participation of all interested states and primarily those who have the greatest potential at their disposal.

The ministers conducted an exchange of opinions on the proposal to create an "open skies" regime

The participants in the meeting discussed the problems of arms production conversion. They are ready to carry out international consultations on this topic.

The ministers affirmed the further validity of the positions and proposals on questions of disarmament in the statement of the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee "for a stable and secure Europe, free of nuclear and chemical weapons, for an essential reduction in armed forces, and military expenditure."

6. The ministers expressed concern over the insufficient development of all-European economic cooperation. The development of a broad economic cooperation

corresponds to the growing mutual dependency of the countries of the continent. It is a necessary precondition for the creation of a material basis for detente and for raising Europe in the perspective of a qualitatively new economic and technological level of development. This should be served by the more complete and deeper incorporation of all countries of the continent in a modern system of the international division of labor, and by world trade on the basis of the generally recognized principles and rules, including the principles of mutual advantage, of nondiscrimination and most-favored nation status. It is necessary to eliminate obstacles and limitations on the extension of relations in the economy, trade, science, technology and production, and to overcome the practice of the obstruction of its development out of political considerations.

The participants states of the Warsaw Treaty support the extension of equal bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation, including those between the economic organizations in Europe. The conference forthcoming in Bonn in 1990 should play an important role hereby.

The extension of international cooperation in environmental protection was stressed. The all-European environmental protection meeting in Sofia is called upon to give new impulses to such cooperation based on the understanding of the continent as an ecological whole. The participants at the meeting pointed to the successful course of this meeting and hope that it will end in concrete conclusions and recommendations. That would have positive effects on further development of the all-European process.

7. The participants in the meeting expressed their conviction that the complete implementation of the totality of human rights and basic freedoms in every country, and the realization of civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and other rights, regardless of race, gender, language, faith, and nationality, is an indivisible element of the process of creating an all-European home, a unified Europe in its variety.

Cooperation and objective dialogue between the states in the humanitarian area is an important account of international security and cooperation. The ministers thereby supported the extension of human contacts and cooperation in the area of information, culture, and education. They conducted an exchange of opinion on preparations for the conferences on the human dimension of CSCE in Copenhagen and Moscow and on the Krakow symposium on the European cultural heritage.

8. The participants at the meeting expressed their conviction that advances in the area of disarmament, in confidence building, and the development of cooperation, as well as in the construction of an indivisible Europe, would permit the creation of an all-European system of collective security and the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. The creation of contacts between the two alliances in many areas would serve the realization of this objective.

9. The ministers spoke in support of settling as quickly as possible existing regional conflicts and seats of tension on the path of negotiation and pointed to the necessity of continuing to strengthen the UN role in this area.

The participants at the meeting supported the comprehensive political settlement of the Afghanistan problem on the basis of national reconciliation, a unified, sovereign, and nonaligned Afghanistan, whose people have the right to determine their disunity without external intervention. They support the efforts of the Republic of Afghanistan to achieve these aims.

10. In light of the results of the 9th Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Nonaligned Countries, which was held in Belgrade, the essential contribution the Nonaligned Movement makes to the solution of current outstanding problems was stressed. The ministers underlined their states' resolve to extend and deepen the cooperation with the Nonaligned Movement.

11. At the meeting it was clear that the general desire was to continue to develop the multilateral equal cooperation of the allied states.

The meeting ended in an atmosphere of friendly mutual amity and cooperation.

The next scheduled meeting takes place in Bucharest.

Communique Urges Arms Reductions

AU2710114789 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 1100 GMT 27 Oct 89

[Text] The Warsaw Pact states advocate signing a first agreement on drastic reductions in forces and arms in Europe in 1990. They suggest in the communique on the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' meeting in Warsaw, which has just been published, that this could be done at a summit of chiefs of government and heads of state. The reductions would have to be implemented within a period of 2 to 3 years, the communique says. The communique adds that a radical change of interstate relations is taking place in Europe under contradictory conditions, which will lead to gradually overcoming the division of the continent. In this respect, every nation's right to self-determination and the free choice of its course of social development must be observed. The same holds true for the inviolability of the borders, the communique says. The full implementation of human rights and basic liberties in every country are an integral component part of an all-European home, the communique says.

Modernization, Politization of Warsaw Pact Recommended

18120008 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 40, 8-15 Oct 89 p 6

[Article by Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Director, Institute of Europe, USSR Academy of Sciences: "WTO—Where To and How"]

[Text] When talk starts up about the influence of changes in Europe on the military blocs, the Soviet reader and the majority of professional international experts immediately look at NATO. It is plagued by crises and frictions, and the leaders of the bloc discuss with alarm the consequences of the changes and the way they should react.

We aren't used to looking the same way at our own defence bloc. Sober assessments of the situation in the Warsaw Treaty Organization remain, as before, quite rare. They are mainly (in the USSR anyway) official and full of praise.

There are achievements, of course. The setting up of the WTO and its development did play its role—Europe lived in peace for decades, the policy of the West was transformed from "roll-back" and revenge to a much more flexible doctrine. The WTO was politicized—new organs were set up and consultations made deeper and broader. This process was especially rapid from the late 60s to the late 70s. Then it slowed down and was resumed again only after 1985. The organization gave support to the voice of each of its members in world politics. Through the WTO they got the possibility for collective influence on each other and on the most powerful partner—the USSR.

But now the alliance is being battered by new challenges. Disarmament has started. The feeling of external threat—one of the forces that traditionally kept military-political alliances together—is becoming weaker.

The social and political changes in Eastern Europe are proceeding at different rates. Ideological, economic, political and ecological differences between a number of countries are surfacing. The existing mechanisms are, as yet, poorly adjusted to deal with them.

We're playing for a serious error—the practical absence of good information and of a public discussion around the aims of the organization and the interests of the countries affiliated to it. The WTO doesn't have a popular base in public, scientific and political circles of the member-countries. In this sense, two generations "were lost" in the last 35 years. The public gets most information about the WTO from the West. The West isn't interested in strengthening the name and the unity of the opposite bloc. It can hardly be blamed for that. The problem lies with us.

Let's put the question as follows—is it necessary to struggle energetically for the development, strengthening and preservation of an alliance today, in conditions where confrontation is rapidly diminishing, and we, ourselves, officially call for overcoming the split of Europe into military blocs?

I think it is. Firstly, the confrontation is as yet far from being overcome. Secondly, reforms objectively carry with them an element of instability, especially in the transition period (apparently it will be a long one), and make states relatively vulnerable. They are therefore

interested in the preservation of the most stable external surroundings. Lastly, both the alliances—NATO and the WTO, born of confrontation, also have non-confrontation functions. The main thing is to provide for similar geopolitical interests. It looks like the East European countries, with less population, a lower level of development, and, as a result, less political influence than their Western neighbours, will still need for a long time (even, in the conditions of reduced confrontation) to count on the might and support of the USSR. This need may even increase, taking into account the accelerating integration processes in Western Europe.

How can the objective interests of the WTO countries be met in this situation? An active, and creative policy is needed and efforts to modernize the WTO are also urgent. The course has been outlined—the turning of the alliance from a military-political into a political-military and then—to a political organization.

To do this it is necessary to speed up the politization of the WTO on the basis of complete equality. I think that public discussion of the WTO's problems and its future is necessary. Not only diplomats, the military and scientists but broad political and public circles, too, must be drawn into discussion. The growing role of parliaments in the political life of socialist countries demands that MPs take part in this discussion. The question of setting up a parliamentary organ, attached to the WTO, must not be taken off the agenda.

It seems obvious to me that the WTO is in need of setting up permanent institutions for developing a dialogue and cooperating on a broad range of political, ecological, cultural and humanitarian problems. The scientific work of the WTO also needs radical expansion. We need new institutions not only for our own concerns, but also in order to start a dialogue with NATO and to bring both alliances into the European integration process.

The arguments in favour of a definite expansion of WTO activities must not create an impression that the author calls for perpetuating the blocs. Quite the contrary. I'm speaking about transforming our alliance into a vehicle for overcoming this split and securing stability during the time of changes. Destroying it would only jeopardize reforms.

Warsaw Pact Withdrawal Issues

Primakov, Shishlin Comment

*LD3010203889 Budapest Television Service
in Hungarian 1830 GMT 30 Oct 89*

[Text] The question of Hungary or Poland leaving the Warsaw Pact is not on the agenda, thus it is not worth pursuing this question even in theory. This is the opinion of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aboimov. He added that in any event it is the official standpoint of the governments concerned that is to be taken as authoritative.

Two high-ranking Soviet politicians spoke about the same subject in the United States: Nikolay Shishlin, CPSU spokesman, and Yevgeniy Primakov, chairman of one of the chambers of the Soviet Parliament. Andras Heltai reports on the details.

[Heltai] In a television interview, Primakov rejected the possibility that the Soviet Union would use force to impede the GDR possibly leaving the Warsaw Pact. As an example, he referred to Moscow's policy, acknowledging the changes in Poland and Hungary. The other Soviet representative, Shishlin, to the question of whether Soviet interests would be threatened by Hungary's neutrality, declared they are not afraid of the changes, and they will in any event respect Hungarian decisions. Anyway, the Soviet politicians added hurriedly, their information is that Hungary does not intend to leave the Warsaw Pact.

Primakov Rules Out Interference

*LD3010095189 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 0500 GMT 30 Oct 89*

[Text] According to prestigious Soviet politicians, the Soviet Union would not interfere if Hungary were to decide to leave the Warsaw Pact.

Academician Primakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, and Shishlin, head of a CPSU Central Committee department, outlined their opinion as members of a parliamentarian delegation that is holding talks in the United States at present. They pointed out that the Soviet party strictly abides by the principle of noninterference.

Aboimov on Pact Countries' Commitment

*LD3010200989 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 30 Oct 89*

[Text] Hungary and Poland do not want to leave the Warsaw Pact, therefore it is not worth raising this issue even in theory. This was stated by Ivan Aboimov, Soviet deputy foreign minister. The leading diplomat, accompanied by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, took part in the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' meeting, and affirmed that both Budapest and Warsaw continue to adhere to alliance commitments.

At the same time, Aboimov avoided responding to the statement made by Yevgeniy Primakov in the United States. The chairman of the Soviet Parliament said, in fact, that Hungary's leaving the eastern military bloc is possible in principle. Aboimov explained the participation of the member states' foreign trade ministers at the consultation by saying that the Warsaw Pact must more and more change into a political military organization.

ALBANIA

Pitarka Speaks on Disarmament at UN

*AU2310143689 Tirana ATA in English
1015 GMT 23 Oct 89*

["The PSR of Albania Has Endorsed and Endorses All Those Efforts Which Are in Favour of International Peace and Security"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, October 23 (ATA)—In the contributions at the First Commission of the UN General Assembly "On Disarmament", the floor was taken also by the permanent representative of the PSR [People's Socialist Republic] of Albania in UN, Bashkim Pitarka, who said among others:

Mankind continues to witness an unprecedented armament race of all kinds of weapons. The gigantic nuclear arsenals in the hands of the big imperialist powers, especially of the two superpowers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, pose a real threat to the international peace and security. Therefore in the third decade of disarmament, too, the aims and aspirations of the international public opinion remain the same: to halt the hand of those forces that keep the world and the peoples under the constant blackmail and threat of war and nuclear weapons.

This session, just as the previous year's one, is focused on some worries and preoccupations on the part of the international community in the arms race, on the dangers and threats posed by it. The tendencies towards armament, both from the quantitative and qualitative point of view, continue to be imposed and dominate over the aspirations of the peoples, carrying tensions, dangers and conflicts which one day might lead to greater confrontations.

Proceeding from the preoccupation on the dangers of the nuclear armament race, the Albanian representative said, the international public opinion is following attentively the evolution and metamorphosis of the Soviet-American dialogue in this field. The real reduction of the nuclear weapons contingents, if realised, would certainly be a positive thing, therefore the peace loving peoples and countries, which for long have persisted in such step and impose a constant pressure on the superpowers and other imperialist powers to halt the armament course and race would welcome such acts.

Further on, the Albanian representative said that the atmosphere of political and military confrontation, consequence of presence of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty blocs and the great military arsenals of the two superpowers is still prevailing on the European continent. Now, more than ever, the sensibility of the peoples for the dangers this reality poses and its negative consequences is increasing.

We, he said further on, are of the opinion that any constructive step in the right direction should start with

the elimination of the military presence of the superpowers, the dispersal of the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. This would make possible that things take a positive direction so greatly desired by the European peoples to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

Consistent in its stand towards the great problems of the time, preservation of peace and international security, complete disarmament, the Albanian representative said in conclusion, the PSR of Albania has supported and will support all those steps and efforts in favour of peace and international security and will oppose the policy which threatens the freedom, independence and sovereignty of the states and peoples, including the armament race, denouncing those who are protagonists and responsible for the armament race.

BULGARIA

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Session Assessed

*AU3110085889 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 28 Oct 89 p 4*

[Maksim Bozhilov commentary: "Evading Problems"]

[Text] The meeting of the so-called NATO Nuclear Planning Group, which ended on Wednesday in the Portuguese city of Quinta do Lago, was followed with interest and specific hopes; however, it did not bring about the necessary change in NATO's nuclear strategy.

In the course of 2 days the defense ministers of 14 of NATO's 16 states, (France is not a member of the bloc's military organization, while Ireland has observer status) discussed the alliance's future nuclear policy on the basis of the results achieved until now at the USSR-U.S. talks on control over weapons, and the prospects for a treaty on limiting conventional weapons after 1990. The group's meeting was important because it was expected to review NATO's nuclear potential after the compromise decision adopted by the bloc's state and governmental leaders in Brussels at the end of May. In the final communique the ministers of defense express "readiness to cooperate" in improving relations between East and West; however, on the basis of the declarations that accompanied this readiness, it is obvious that at least for the time being they do not intend to go any further.

According to an official NATO representative "the general atmosphere at the strategic weapons talks is very good," and significant progress has been achieved at the Vienna talks on limiting conventional weapons. However, at the same time—as Richard Cheney, U.S. secretary of defense, and Manfred Woerner, NATO general secretary, insist—the allies must not allow a decrease in their military budgets, and the United States must implement the plans to modernize tactical nuclear weapons. Despite the fact that they adhered to the establishing of stable and predictable relations between East and West,

the participants in the meeting continue to think that nuclear weapons must be maintained at a high level.

NATO's defense ministers noted the proposal contained in the statement on mutually disbanding the military-political groups in Europe made by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on Monday. However, they again did not show readiness to give a specific answer and make a decisive step toward further strengthening security in the continent.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

NATO Session, Polish, Hungarian Events Viewed

AU0111121789 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
27 Oct 89 p 6

[Milan Jelinek commentary in the "Week in the World" column]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

Half-Hearted Approach

The meeting of NATO defense ministers in Portugal provided a typical example of the Western states' approach to the question of disarmament. We appreciate the fact that NATO welcomes the changes in the situation in the world and expresses the determination to take up disarmament measures, not only verbally but also in practical terms. On the other hand, the West insists on the existence of nuclear weapons and continues to claim that their deterrent force is vital to its own security and to the preservation of peace. It has been said many times how naive this illusion is, and how dangerous its consequences are.

There is yet another aspect, however. NATO constantly urges the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact to take additional disarmament measures and it considers those taken thus far to be insufficient. It seems that the principle of reasonable compromise has not yet fully become the negotiating position of the NATO member states. The USSR and the Warsaw Pact have repeatedly expressed their readiness to continue to show good will. NATO should realize, however, that there is a limit to unilateral disarmament measures which cannot be crossed without damage to one's own security. The key idea continues to hold true that the desired results cannot be achieved by means of unilateral military disarmament measures.

The Economy Is Decisive

RUDE PRAVO has been reporting extensively and commenting on the situation in Poland and Hungary. It is possible to add that it will be the economic situation in the two countries that will determine their social development in the near future. In Poland this is already the case.

Numerous groups of working people are beginning to organize themselves politically. They protest against the disregard for their interests in the highest political places. They respond with particular concern to the possibility of state and social property being transferred to the hands of a narrow group of private entrepreneurs. In this the workers class rightly sees a threat to its fundamental interests, gains, and accomplishments, as well as a prerequisite for its social demands failing to meet with a response in the legislative and executive state bodies.

It is a fact that at the moment of reversal in the economic sphere, that is, at the moment of the economy's transfer to the platform of private ownership relations, there automatically also occurs a definitive reversal in the power and political conditions of a country.

The economic situation in Poland is catastrophic, which is a generally known fact, admitted even by its present government representatives, who had for years been organizing the strike movement which has disintegrated the Polish economy. The Hungarian economic situation is also precarious. There is no doubt that, unless the new governments succeed in bringing about a radical turn soon, new and evidently serious confrontations could surface in the political development of these countries.

Upcoming Bush, Gorbachev Talks Viewed Favorably

AU0511202889 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
2 Nov 89 p 7

[Milan Jelinek commentary: "A Pleasant Surprise"]

[Text] The news that Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, the most senior representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, will hold an unofficial meeting on 2 and 3 December on board naval vessels in the Mediterranean came as a surprise. It is necessary to say that this is a pleasant and pleasing surprise. The very preparations for this unofficial meeting belong among the best kept diplomatic secrets. It was known that both states are negotiating on holding a regular official Soviet-American meeting at the highest level next spring or summer. The U.S. and USSR foreign ministers, Baker and Shevardnadze, devoted part of their talks in Wyoming to the preparations for this meeting. It is obvious that Moscow and Washington considered that, at the present stage, it would be advantageous to hold an extraordinary meeting which would discuss the undisputed positive development in mutual relations as well as the changes taking place in the world.

Indeed, the negotiating agenda between the United States and the USSR is rather wide ranging and a shift has taken place in a number of spheres along with a rapprochement of views and a clarification of contentious issues. This concerns, first and foremost, the agreement on limiting conventional weapons systems and the size of the armed forces, an agreement which many foreign observers view optimistically. There are

mounting claims that the text of the agreement has already been drafted in its final version. There is also the agreement on eliminating chemical weapons. It is also, allegedly, just about to be completed. Moreover, the Soviet side will not lose sight of the fact that it regards developing the process of nuclear disarmament as one of the primary issues, that is, reaching an agreement on reducing the Soviet-American nuclear arsenal by 50 percent.

The United States and the USSR are closely observing a number of regional conflicts where there has also been some movement, although here there still exist differences in approaches and disparate views. There are also East-West relations in their entire multifaceted, complicated, political, economic, and cultural spectrum. In short, there is something to talk about.

The main thing is, however, to confirm once more that the method of political dialogue and of constructive discussion is the instrument which both sides consider to be most suitable for the development of mutual relations and also for solving problems of global significance. It is generally known that the level of Soviet-American relations considerably influences the international atmosphere. The growing number of meetings at the highest level can only be useful for both superpowers and for the international community as a whole.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

U.S. Criticized for Rejecting Gorbachev Proposal

AU0111183589 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG
in German 28-29 Oct 89 p 5

[Axel Knack commentary: "Naive Answer From the White House"]

[Text] He does not give up, this Gorbachev. Wherever he turns up abroad, he immediately takes a piece of paper out of his pocket which might facilitate further concrete disarmament steps. This also happened in Helsinki the day before yesterday, during his visit to Finland. This time the issue was a nuclear-free Baltic Sea. Together with all nuclear powers and, of course, the Baltic Sea littoral states, the Soviet Union wants to establish effective guarantees that this sea in the heart of Europe will be freed from this dangerous trash.

Hardly had this renewed advance by Gorbachev been disseminated by the media, Washington already had an appropriate answer. However, it is not newsworthy at all. On principle, the United States is against the establishment of nuclear-free zones, and the Baltic Sea is no exception. This is what White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said. Not at a loss for a naive justification, he added: "Most of these proposals are intended to impair NATO's capability for deterrence, while they leave Soviet nuclear weapons intact."

The demagoguery is easy to see in this case. A nuclear-free Baltic Sea would also mean a sea free of Soviet nuclear weapons. And the littoral states also include NATO countries, on whose territory there are already too many of these weapons anyway. But this was not enough. The fact that this proposal is not just a rhetorical exercise by Moscow becomes clear if one looks at Gorbachev's statements in the Finlandia Hall as a whole. He pointed out that the Soviet Union has already withdrawn from service two nuclear submarines that were stationed in the Baltic Sea. The remaining four submarines of this class are to be scrapped by the end of next year, including their missiles.

Thus, there is nothing that would "leave intact" the Soviet nuclear weapons. Or did Fitzwater not yet have the entire proposal when he responded to it? One would have to be very naive oneself to believe this.

NATO Criticized for Ignoring Arms Proposals

AU0211075689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 28-29 Oct 89 p 2

[Hajo Herbell editorial: "New Proposals, New No"]

[Text] In Helsinki Mikhail Gorbachev declared the USSR's readiness to agree with all nuclear powers and the Baltic Sea littoral states on efficient guarantees for a nuclear-free Baltic Sea. For this purpose, the Soviet Union again wants to make unilateral advance moves. Two nuclear submarines, which have so far been stationed in the Baltic Sea, have already been taken out of service. The remaining four submarines of this kind are to be scrapped by the end of 1990, including their missiles. There is also no intention to replace them with new ones.

Moscow's initiative was positively received in broad circles and understood as a stimulus to intensify and expand the disarmament process. Only Washington said quickly "no," as so often in the past. It is worth looking closely at the entire absurdity of the "justification," which was given by Marlin Fitzwater, the spokesman of the U.S. President. He stated that the Soviet step would not (!) improve Europe's security. Said he: "Most of these proposals are intended to impair NATO's capability of deterrence, while they leave the Soviet nuclear weapons intact."

People, who are turning things upside down in such a way and whose "logic" is of a kind as the one of Mr F, normally belong anywhere else but into the office of the president of a superpower. However, a few events, which are happening just now in the United States and in NATO, may make it possible to understand the above-mentioned nonsense.

On 25 October, in Almansil, Portugal, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group adopted a communique, which still insists on the strategy of deterrence (of a non-existing threat), a deterrence, "which is based on a suitable composition of appropriate and effective

nuclear and conventional arms." And in the United States, Defense Secretary Cheney urged a few days ago the increase of its armament expenditure, regardless (!) of any progress in disarmament. The United States is certainly giving a good example in this field, with higher expenditures, with increasingly more and further perfected weapons systems—one just has to think of the B-2 strategic attack bomber, new types of nuclear weapons, the infamous chemical binary weapons, and the entire futurological stuff, such as laser cannons, and killer satellites for space.

But one need not look that far away, because in the FRG things are not much different. Let us give the sole example of the Fighter 90, to which a double-digit-billion sum has been allocated. In any case, all this is not a new way of thinking, but the old, unsuitable policy of strength. And as regards in particular the cash boxes of the multinational arms companies—money is supposed to tinkle more and more melodiously in them. A change is urgently needed there....

NATO Stance on Disarmament Criticized

AU0311104689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 1 Nov 89 p 2

[Franz Knipping editorial: "Disarmament or Rearmament?"]

[Text] In the chronicles of nuclear disarmament 27 October occupies a special place. On this day the last OTR-23 missile was blown up in Saryosek in Kazakhstan. This was the completion of the destruction of 957 Soviet battle and maneuver weapons with ranges between 500 and 1,000 km. The obligation accepted in the INF Treaty to eliminate all short-range missiles within 18 months was thus fulfilled ahead of schedule. A whole class of nuclear weapons was eliminated.

With every justification this is linked with expectations, hopes and demands that the implementation of the first disarmament treaty should be followed by farther-reaching agreements as quickly as possible. In this spirit, on 27 October the Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT, for instance, called on NATO to react to the offers and advance moves of the East. The "chances for disarmament policy which now exist," the FRG paper wrote, "must not simply be dismissed as a trap set by the Kremlin politicians."

The latest NATO meeting, the one of the Nuclear Planning Group in Vilamoura, Portugal, offered the opportunity to show the flag. Meeting almost simultaneously with the destruction of the last Soviet OTR-23 missile, the defense ministers of the NATO states categorically ruled out any further zero-option. Instead, they affirmed that "as regards nuclear armed forces, land-, sea-, and air-based systems, including ground-based missiles are needed in Europe under the current circumstances and will be needed for the foreseeable future."

This was not enough; it was also agreed that the so-called modernization of Lance missiles, which is disputed within the alliance, will be continued. In fact, these are new weapons with ranges and qualities, which come very close to the weapons that are to be destroyed in line with the INF Treaty. Furthermore, a special work group was given the assignment "to find a justification for the need for nuclear weapons after an agreement in Vienna (on conventional armed forces and armaments) is reached."

Thus: There is nothing new in the West. The old thinking, the rigid adherence to the old doctrines continues. It certainly seems to be appropriate that in one of the Berlin discussion rounds last weekend a letter to NATO secretary general and the FRG defense minister was proposed. This also goes, above all, for the justification for sending this letter: In the field of disarmament, things have to start moving not only on our side but also on the other.

Representative Advocates Chemical Weapons Ban

AU3110104789 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 26 Oct 89 p 5

[ADN report: "GDR for Quick Ban on Chemical Weapons"]

[Text] New York (ADN)—The GDR has come out, without if's and but's, in favor of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons at the earliest possible time. This was stressed by GDR spokesman Peter Dietze in the debate of the first main committee of the UN General Assembly in New York. The GDR has no chemical weapons and on its territory there are no such weapons deployed, which are owned by other states. The GDR does not develop chemical weapons, nor does it have facilities for their production. It is continuing its efforts to come to an agreement on chemical weapons-free zones in central Europe. Ambassador Dietze stressed that one must not deviate from any elements of the draft of the chemical weapons convention, which have already been agreed on.

HUNGARY

Military Cooperation Pact Signed

LD0311213189 Budapest MTI in English 2044 GMT 3 Nov 89

[Text] Budapest, November 3 (MTI)—For the first time, a Warsaw Treaty and a NATO member state have signed an agreement on military cooperation. Ferenc Karpati, minister of defense, and Guy Coeme, Belgian minister of national defence, signed an agreement in Budapest on November 3 on mutual visits by military college students, military historians, Army surgeons and musicians.

At the press conference following the signing ceremony, the Belgian minister said, among other things, that the agreement was aimed to reinforce the relations between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Hungary,

and to increase confidence, as well as contribute to preserving peace in Europe. He said that the two countries could play a part in reinforcing detente and could contribute to the success of the Vienna arms control talks.

Ferenc Karpati stressed the agreement had first of all a political significance, and it provided a basis for further measures.

Hungarian Neutrality Prospects Examined

*LD0511045489 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1500 GMT 4 Nov 89*

[From the "168 Hours" program]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] For a long time, we considered our belonging to the Warsaw Pact a self-evident thing. [passage omitted] Now, it is cropping up with growing openness: Is there is a need for the Warsaw Pact? Or could certain of its sections, let us say the military organization or the political consultative body, be abolished? Could our country, perhaps, leave it? [passage omitted] What are the realities? Laszlo Lang, deputy director of the Foreign Affairs Institute, has spoke to Jozsef Laszlo:

[Begin recording] [Laszlo] How realistic is the idea that in the future, Hungary might remain a member of only the political organization, within the Warsaw Treaty Organization?

[Lang] In the current European set-up, there is a possibility for everything, and there is also a possibility for the opposite. In truth, it ought to be clarified what Hungarian neutrality would mean in the short and long term. [passage omitted]

I believe we must recognize clearly that in the short term, possible Hungarian neutrality would not result in tangible, palpable advantages. It will not mean—it has been proven historically that it cannot mean—that our military expenditures might decrease suddenly. What is more, historical experience leads us to say that our military expenditures will be more than at present, as a member of the alliance system.

It does not mean that Western Europe will hurry to embrace us; the European Community has not been hurrying to embrace Austria, nor does or could it mean that our political room for maneuver might broaden suddenly, incredibly. It cannot mean this because neutrality is also, by necessity, self-limiting.

What could neutrality bring, as something positive? Here, there would be something basic, and positive, it could yield: Namely, that it could serve as a kind of insurance bond, supported by international guarantees, against a direct Soviet intervention in our internal choosing of paths. [passage omitted]

[Lang] Swedish neutrality is not based on international guarantees, but on pursuing a policy of neutrality, which

in time has become accepted, both politically and historically. This is rather hard to imagine in the case of Hungary. I believe that in Hungary's case, at least a tacit agreement of the great powers is necessary for Hungary to be able to set forth towards real neutrality.

[Laszlo] Is there a possibility for such a tacit, or unspoken agreement by the great powers to come about in the near future? There are opinions to the effect, that among other things, this will be discussed at the next Soviet-U.S. summit, but at least the U.S. side has said that they do not want another Yalta. Thus, they do not want, without asking the East Europeans, another dividing-up process in Eastern Europe.

[Lang] Naturally, I do not believe that recognizing and guaranteeing the right for Hungary or Poland to choose their own path would be a new Yalta, but the realization of the original Yalta, which was distorted then. I feel that the protest of Western Europe and the United States against a second Yalta is somewhat hysterical and exaggerated. We like to say that the world in which we live is becoming multipolar, that is, decisions are made not only by the two great powers, regarding its basic political-military structure, yet it is still bi-polar. It would be naive to believe that the achieving of a new Hungarian status, through a separate agreement, might happen without the consent of the great powers. There exist U.S. concerns in connection with Hungary's becoming neutral. The Yalta structure of the past 40 years, which finally developed, has been comfortable for the Americans and a good number of West Europeans.

[Laszlo] Would we cause unpleasantness for West Europe, too, if we were to become neutral?

[Lang] What is interesting, and sad, for us is that we are not the ones who would cause discomfort. From a military viewpoint, Hungary is entirely uninteresting as a bridgehead, or it is more or less uninteresting. From a political viewpoint, our significance is rather small. From the viewpoint of U.S. and Soviet concerns, Hungarian neutrality is interesting as an example, a precedent. [passage indistinct]

[Laszlo] There has been mention that the great powers' guarantee would be necessary for Hungarian neutrality, but what about the neighboring countries? Would their assent be necessary?

[Lang] Naturally, the assent of the neighboring countries—not a verbal assent, but rather a taking cognizance—is necessary, in that Hungarian Neutrality cannot mean, even temporarily, a kind of lack of security, a security vacuum, in the region. If a kind of security vacuum were to emerge, stemming from the nature of states, this would strengthen the states' various aggressive tendencies.

[Laszlo] What is the chance of being able to prepare this within the Warsaw Pact? What is the chance for a political organization and a military organization developing within the Warsaw Pact, just as within NATO?

[Lang] It is an objective of official Hungarian policy to strengthen the political character of the Warsaw Pact. If by this we mean that we have to push the Warsaw Treaty Organization's military command structure into the background, then it is a correct objective. It is correct, even if we mean by this that within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, political means must be used, instead of instructions and hierarchical commands, in relations between the member-countries, in a dialogue and conflicts. If, however, we think that a political structure must be developed for the Warsaw Pact like that which exists in NATO, and if we link to this that on such a basis Hungary must endeavor for a French solution—that is, it remains a member of the political organization and will not be a member of the military organization—this comparison is somewhat lame, since France, although it is not a member of the military organization, is a full and very active member of the political organization because socially, politically, and in terms of foreign policy, it professes the same basic values as the member-countries in the military organization. It is difficult for me to imagine that a substantive political decision could be taken if, let us say, next spring there are two noncommunist premiers in the Warsaw Treaty Organization's top-level body, the political consultative body, and there are several communist party leaders, moreover, who [words indistinct], and also in principle this political consultative body has to make decisions (?with the assent) of all its members, on the basis of consensus, full agreement.

[Laszlo] Does this also mean that the Warsaw Pact's ability to function is endangered?

[Lang] It basically was an ideological organization. It was an ideological fetter, if you like. Of necessity, its ideological character will be difficult to (?maintain), owing to changes in the member-countries; as a consequence, its operation will be compelled to (?change).

[Laszlo] So what will hold it together?

[Lang] As a military alliance, it will be the military objective—that the alliance's members serve for one another, and the alliance's largest, key member serves the others: the so-called common good of security. That, naturally, is a basic function of every military alliance, and it works without an ideological connection.

[Laszlo] Perhaps military cooperation would work without the Warsaw Pact, since the individual countries have bilateral agreements.

[Lang] Yes, in the past weeks the question has arisen in international politics and among political analysts that up to now we have been able to think in terms of there being two military blocs in Europe, and that the existence of the two military blocs presupposes one another. If within NATO there exists successful political cooperation, is it not conceivable that as a consequence of gradual arms limitations, the military structure of NATO might also be cut back, although its political cooperation character might remain? And at the same

time, if the Warsaw Pact's military structure is cut back. If its ideological links are cut back, if it is left with very little to say jointly, politically then perhaps there would not exist this mutual presupposition of the existence of the two blocs? But that is a question for the future.

Karpati Discusses Plans To Cut Military

*LD2610140889 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1300 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] Hungary is planning to reduce its Armed Forces but will continue to remain a member of the Warsaw Pact. This was stressed by Ferenc Karpati, minister of defense, in a statement to the Paris paper LE FIGARO. Ferenc Karpati pointed out that in the question of neutrality one must start out not from aspirations but from reality. He stated: Democratization does not mean that Hungary's foreign policy direction will change.

POLAND

Sejm Speaker Comments on Washington Talks

*LD0311154589 Warsaw PAP in English
1343 GMT 11 Nov 89*

[Text] Washington, Nov 3—Polish Sejm Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, now on an official visit here, met on Thursday with President Bush's special adviser on arms control, Gen Edward Rowny. The two men discussed many issues related to the policy of control and reduction of armaments, mainly reduction in conventional armaments in Europe within the ongoing Vienna negotiations on reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe.

Kozakiewicz also met with majority leader at the U.S. Senate, Senator George Mitchell to discuss Poland's economic, social and political situation and also Polish-American relations.

Expressing his big interest in Polish economic problems, Mitchell stated that he was convinced that the legislative procedure concerning a Senate bill on aid for Poland and Hungary would be concluded next week. The Sejm speaker held a press conference at which he said that he attached a particular importance to the proper understanding of social, political and psychological determinants of economic reforms in Poland on the part of U.S. Administration, the Congress in particular.

ROMANIA

Delegate Addresses UN on Disarmament

*AU2410213389 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
2049 GMT 24 Oct 89*

[Text] United Nations (AGERPRES) 24/10/1989—During the debates on disarmament, an item on the agenda of the current UN General Assembly session, the Romanian permanent representative to the UN

addressed the Political and Security Committee referring to the necessity of achieving nuclear disarmament and consolidating international peace and security. It is imperiously necessary to give up the improvement of nuclear weapons, and remove the factors of imbalance through negotiations, to renounce the modernization of short-range missiles and start negotiations for their elimination from arsenals, to stop all nuclear tests. In this context the Romanian representative showed that Romania backed the amending of the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and its extension to also cover underground nuclear tests.

At the same time, the Romanian representative said, the General Assembly must renew its appeal to the USA and the USSR to conclude the accord on the reduction of their nuclear strategic arsenals by 50 percent as soon as possible.

Likewise, the speaker pointed to the importance of a call of the General Assembly that an agreement be reached as soon as possible at the Vienna negotiations on conventional weapons in Europe regarding the reduction of troops, conventional arms and military spending by at least 50 percent, in a first stage, under a strict international control.

The speaker reiterated Romania's proposal that the negotiations in Geneva, within the conference on disarmament, on the convention regarding the banning and elimination of chemical weapons be correlated with the negotiations on the elimination of nuclear arms so that they be a component of the package of measures to avoid the situations of using weapons as instruments of blackmailing and threatening states. He stressed that Romania was for the halting of the militarization of outer space and for its transformation into a common asset of the whole mankind, in an area of cooperation among all the states of the world for peaceful purposes exclusively.

The need was emphasized for the UN to pay greater attention to the utilization of the material and financial means released through disarmament for the economic and social development of states, for increasing the support granted to the developing countries.

Stress was laid on the imperative of all states' participation in the debate and settlement of disarmament-related questions imposed by the requirement of democratizing international relations and by the indivisible character of international peace and security.

MEXICO

USSR's Marcha Praises Anti-Nuclear Policy

PA0111002389 Mexico City UNOMASUNO in Spanish
27 Oct 89 p 6

[Text] Soviet Vice President Marcha I. Snegur ratified the Soviet's intention of ridding the world of the threat of nuclear war and highly praised Mexico's contribution to this crusade.

During the first working meeting between a group of Mexican legislators and a delegation of Soviet parliamentarians who are visiting Mexico, the head of the visiting delegation stated: "Mexico's position clearly reflects the very serious role it has in the process of stabilizing international relations and promoting world security."

The Soviet parliamentarians said that only through dialogue and negotiation can the world be free of nuclear arms by the year 2000. They appeared optimistic because the benefits can already be seen.

The Mexican delegation was headed by Senators Nicolas Reynes Berezaluce and Eliseo Rangel Gaspar and was comprised of eight legislators, plus PRD [Party of the Democratic Revolution] Senator Ifigenia Martinez Hernandez.

In the morning, the Soviet parliamentarians paid a courtesy visit to Guillermo Jimenez Morales, president of the Chamber of Deputies, to talk about seeking methods and systems to modernize both countries' government affairs and parliamentary work.

EGYPT

Israeli-South Africa Nuclear Cooperation Decried

*NC0111230089 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic
1240 GMT 1 Nov 89*

[Ibrahim Wahbi commentary: "What Will the Big Powers Responsible for Peace Do Regarding Israeli Nuclear Activities?"]

[Text] The cooperation between Israel and South Africa is not a new or surprising story. Both countries are in similar circumstances, adhere to racist policies, consider the original people second-class citizens, ignore the United Nations and its resolutions, and use brutal means to quell liberation movements. Moreover, Israel and South Africa have established a ring of hostilities around them fanned by their illegal behavior violating international law. Thus, it was only natural that Israel and South Africa should cooperate in all spheres, particularly in the most dangerous, the nuclear area.

The two countries constitute an axis for the production of nuclear arms and fighter aircraft based on U.S. technology. Israel is providing South Africa with this technology in return for concentrated uranium from Pretoria. Israel refused to sign the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also refused more than once to allow UN and U.S. experts to inspect its nuclear plant in Dimona. The latest incidence of Israeli involvement in missiles carrying nuclear warheads was announced by the Soviet Union, which said that Israel fired a test missile with a 1,600-km range in the Mediterranean.

Despite these public reports, the big powers responsible for world peace refuse to rivet attention on the Israeli position. This comes at a time when the two superpowers agree on reducing nuclear arms, eliminating medium-range missiles, and forging ahead with their plans for disarmament or arms limitation.

In fact, we see no reason or justification for worry or fear from rumors about the likelihood that Pakistan possess nuclear arms. We indeed see no interest in the facts regarding Israel's definite nuclear danger. The capabilities for making atomic weapons are now within the reach of many countries. Control of this potential would be difficult and even impossible, particularly if a certain country were allowed to possess this type of weapon, because every action has a reaction. Any state insisting on defying the world and possessing nuclear arms and threatening others would be met by similar insistence by its neighboring countries.

Undoubtedly, the international nuclear nonproliferation treaty will be useless if certain countries are shown forbearance in possessing such arms. Israel is persisting in defying world peace and security in its attempts to possess nuclear arms. A few years ago, the United States caught certain Israeli agents in the United States trying to smuggle nuclear technology to Israel.

What is required now is not to release warning statements to Israel about continuing this nuclear course. We demand that the international community, the United Nations, and the big powers insist on placing the Israeli atomic reactors, particularly those in Dimona, under vigilant supervision and inspection. We believe that the Pretoria-Tel Aviv axis must motivate the Arabs and Africans to close their ranks further to confront this hazard.

It remains to be said that nuclear arms and atomic bombs may be fit for wars, but liberation movements, people's struggle, and popular will cannot be confronted by this type of weapon, because they have nothing to do with conventional security theories. By its nuclear plans, Israel is destroying the hope for peace and is arousing world-wide worry. Even the closest friends of Israel are not concealing their annoyance over this behavior. (Henry Skoltky), assistant deputy under secretary for the nonproliferation of nuclear arms affairs in the national security office in the Pentagon, [title, office as heard] said before a congressional committee that the Israeli liaison with South Africa is a serious matter for the highest echelons in the Pentagon and that such cooperation is not in the interest of anyone's security. The question posed now is what the big powers that are responsible for peace will do regarding this danger.

Cooperation Elicits 'Concern'

*NC0111230889 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1400 GMT
1 Nov 89*

[Text] Cairo, 1 Nov (MENA)—Egypt has expressed its concern over international media reports that have been confirmed by official U.S. sources on cooperation between Israel and South Africa on developing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The Foreign Ministry today contacted Israeli ambassador in Cairo Shim'on Shamir and underlined Egypt's concern over these reports. It said that Israeli cooperation with South Africa constitutes a threat to African countries and the Middle East. This cooperation contradicts international efforts in general and those of the United States and the Soviet Union in particular in halting the production of this type of missile, destroying the stocks, and preventing the proliferation of warheads. An official source in the Foreign Ministry has stated that Egypt had earlier requested Israel sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

U.S. Reaction Viewed

*JN0111175689 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic
30 Oct 89 p 16*

[Untitled article by Ahmad Baha' al-Din carried within the "Diary" column]

[Text] In its issue yesterday, AL-AHRAM published a dispatch from the head of its Washington bureau Hamdi Fu'ad that President George Bush has asked for a comprehensive reassessment of U.S. policy and stands on the deployment of nuclear weapons and their technology.

This is after the exposure of Israel's cooperation with South Africa on the production of nuclear weapons and a fighter plane based on U.S. technology in exchange for enriched uranium from Pretoria. At a news conference yesterday, the U.S. President said that if the reports on the nuclear cooperation between Israel and South Africa prove to be true, relations between the United States and Israel will become complicated. He stressed that Washington vehemently opposes the transfer of such technology to a third country. A U.S. State Department spokesman said that President Bush's administration is following up the situation and will suspend the export of the technology dealing with missiles to a specific country when it fully ascertains that this country is transferring it to a third country. The U.S. spokesman said: We have voiced our concern to Israel over the issue of the transfer and deployment of these weapons. Officials are greatly concerned about the possibility of Israel's obtaining a U.S. super computer that is used for developing military research out of fear that it may use it to produce hydrogen bombs and leak its secrets to South Africa.

I believe that President Bush is truly concerned about this although I am surprised that he does not know about the 15-year-old secret. I understand President Bush's concern about the transfer of U.S. secrets to third parties in view of the impact this may have on many U.S. stands on the international level. However, the transfer of this U.S. technology only to Israel with a guarantee that it will not be leaked to a third party, has been an inconvenience to us, the Arabs. These weapons in Israel, which is not a third party, knock only at our doors, are a source of threat to us alone, and raise a hue and cry against the United States only in our region where every individual wonders in exchange for what have these things been leaked only to Israel, which is daily rejecting a U.S. initiative, idea, or advice in one form or the other?

I do not know why Israel is worried about the concern voiced by the United States, which only uses the weapon of "concern" against it, a weapon which is so ineffective.

INDIA

Editorials Discuss Arms Reduction Proposals

Bush Offer Praised

52500001 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
29 Sep 89 p 16

[Text] President Bush is to be congratulated for offering to start cutting, if Moscow reciprocates, the USA's stock of chemical weapons even before an international convention outlawing them comes into force. With Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze reiterating his country's readiness to match the offer and proceed in step with the U.S., to renounce the use of these weapons "under any circumstances," it should now be possible to overcome the problems that have held up a global ban on production, storage and trade. This will undoubtedly have positive spill-over effects in other areas, most

hopefully with respect to nuclear disarmament. All reports so far suggest that the USSR will have to make larger cuts because of its significantly bigger chemical arsenal. One of the more important aspects of the Bush offer and Soviet acceptance is that it helps to situate the issue of verification in a proper perspective. Adequate, not fool-proof verification, is all that one can hope for. This applies as much to the elimination of chemical as to nuclear weapons. While the technical difficulties of verification have been cited in the past, especially by the U.S., for going slow on disarmament, the issue is more political than technical, and should not be a serious problem if there is some degree of trust in the other side's good faith. One of the agreements reached at the recent Wyoming meeting between the U.S. and Soviet foreign ministers is to try out the concepts developed for verification by applying these to initial cuts in chemical weapons.

But there are certain deficiencies in the proposal. The U.S. and the USSR, for example, can continue production, at least for the present, of binary chemical weapons, which though less lethal than the unitary variety, are more sophisticated and more adaptable to a range of purposes and uses. A solemn declaration by the Superpowers to abjure them would make it much easier to move to a comprehensive global ban. The Soviets suggested as much. But the reluctance of Mr Bush to envisage this is tied to his view that if there is even one other country which has such a stockpile of chemical weapons, however small or crude, then the Superpowers, the USA in particular, should not completely abandon their option. This is, of course, the same old story of deterrence applied to chemical weapons instead of nuclear ones. Faith in the efficacy of deterrence and complete disarmament cannot be reconciled since deterrence creates an insoluble contradiction for disarmament. If a complete and global ban on chemical weapons is to become a reality, it will require the abandonment of such deterrence strategies.

Agreement at Summit 'Possible'

52500001 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
26 Sep 89 p 14

[Text] Mr Gorbachev, in particular, will be pleased that another summit, his first with the new American President, Mr Bush, has now been fixed for early next year. This will add to his authority at home and give him greater leverage to carry out the kind of overhaul within the CPSU that he is aiming at. Not just detente but the active cooperation of the West is what Mr Gorbachev needs if perestroika is to be a success. One of the things the Kremlin may well press for is "most favored nation" status for promoting Soviet-American trade. With Soviet Jews now being permitted to emigrate far more freely than before, the U.S. law making this a pre-condition for untendered trade is becoming increasingly irrelevant. It can no longer be doubted that Mr Gorbachev will go to great lengths in his effort to usher in a new era in East-West cooperation.

It is quite possible that this summit will crown another major arms reduction agreement now that Moscow has made a major concession on the "star wars" issue. It has, in effect, agreed not to contest for the moment the interpretation of the 1972 arms treaty which the Americans have now put forward. They claim that this allows them to pursue their "star wars" programme even though many in the West believe that it violates the spirit of the accord. The Soviet thinking seems to be that a strategic arms reduction pact of major proportions will generate its own momentum which will then make it much more difficult for the Americans to pursue their Strategic Defence Initiative. Doubts about its feasibility and misgivings about its costs are in any case diminishing support for it in the U.S. Congress. The U.S. and the USSR are both sympathetic to the idea of major cuts in strategic arms, but for different reasons. For the Soviet side, this is linked to the whole perspective of reducing military expenditure and eliminating cold war tensions. American nuclear strategists are now increasingly committed to the idea of "discriminate deterrence" in place of the old principle of maximum deterrence which was greatly weakened by the emergence of parity. In this new perspective, a suitable mix of offensive and defensive weaponry is what is required. So there is room for major cuts in offensive strategic missiles provided that the SDI programme yields the desired results. At some point, the Soviets may well have to grasp this thorny nettle since there are still no signs of rethinking in the U.S. administration on this key issue, despite one Soviet concession after another.

IRAN

Early Warning-Diversion Missile System Announced

*LD2510174189 Tehran IRNA in English
1705 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Bushehr, Oct. 25, IRNA—Iran has manufactured early warning and high precision missile diverting systems, the Navy commander revealed today while inspecting the Paykan-1 sea maneuvers off this southern port city.

Rear Admiral Muhammad Hoseyn Malekzadegan also told reporters that the naval forces were to stage two other maneuvers before the year ends (March 20, 1990). He said the military games indicate the Navy's high combat prowess.

The Paykan-1 maneuvers which started today are to be carried out in six stages over a 8,000 square km area in the central and northern Persian Gulf.

ISRAEL

Inner Cabinet Made Decisions on Nuclear Policy

*TA2610094389 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew
0900 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] Minister Ari'el Sharon has disclosed that the Inner Cabinet has held a long and extensive debate on Israel's nuclear policy. He claimed that decisions were made, which Israel follows. He reiterated that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Minister Sharon was speaking on our program "It Is All Talk."

On the political issue, he said that contacts with the U.S. Administration are being held in a dilettante way. The prime minister, he said, has lost control. As a case in point, Minister Sharon noted several statements Mr Shamir has made against him and other Inner Cabinet ministers. He repeated his demand that the Inner Cabinet be fully briefed on contacts with the United States.

Report on South African Nuclear Ties Refuted

Shamir, Ambassador Comment

*TA2610120189 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew
1100 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Excerpts] Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir has said that the NBC-TV report concerning the joint development of a nuclear missile by Israel and South Africa is totally unfounded. It is a complete lie, Mr Shamir said in an interview with the Voice of Israel's Arabic department. [passage omitted]

The South African ambassador to Israel has said that he knows nothing of Israeli-South African ties of the kind reported by NBC. Our correspondent Itay Engel spoke this morning to Ambassador Johan Viljoen:

[Begin recording] [Viljoen, in English] Well, I also heard news on the radio this morning, and that is really all I know about this matter. So, I do not have any information or knowledge about such cooperation between Israel and South Africa. These, of course, are allegations which have been made over a number of years, and perhaps that question could best be answered by the Israeli authorities.

[Engel translates and continues] All that Ambassador Viljoen was willing to add on this issue is that the South African defense industry is highly developed. Proof of this can be found in the fact that Pretoria is exporting weapons to 20 countries around the world. The Israeli Government, according to him, is the only authority that can and should comment on the NBC report. [end recording]

Rabin Denies RSA Production Ties

TA2610184989 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew
1830 GMT 26 Oct 89

[Text] Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin also has denied the reports that Israel and South Africa have jointly developed a nuclear missile. Rabin said that unfortunately for us, stories circulate from time to time claiming that Israel is in possession of nuclear missiles. Israel subsequently denies these allegations.

Our correspondent Shay Kreitel reports that Minister Rabin made these remarks at a Labor Party convention in Ramat Gan.

Reports of Nuclear Ties to RSA Anger Defense Personnel

TA2710100889 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
27 Oct 89 pp 2, 3

[Report by Ilan Kfir, Shmu'el Tal, Shmu'el Rosenblum, Oron Me'iri, and Yosi Werther]

[Excerpts] NBC-TV continued to broadcast documentaries on the special defense ties between Israel and South Africa yesterday and last night. These reports also mentioned what the U.S. television network termed "nuclear relations." [passage omitted]

The report on Israel's nuclear relations with South Africa has angered Israeli political sources. [passage omitted]

The fear was expressed in Jerusalem that the leak of these reports from the Pentagon to NBC was intended to harm Israel. These reports present Israel as a violator of public pledges to the United States in which Israel had vowed not to provide military assistance to South Africa, certainly not insofar as the manufacture of combat aircraft and ballistic missiles with nuclear capability are concerned.

The Israel Aircraft Industries [IAI] was also piqued by the NBC reports. A senior IAI source denied the allegation that Israel continues to coproduce the Lavi aircraft with South Africa.

The defense establishment also issued a denial of the report. According to sources, Israel would never, under any circumstances, have risked transferring the Western know-how and technology that it possesses to South Africa, which is subject to an arms embargo.

As for the Israeli engineers who left the IAI or were dismissed, the sources said that every individual who was laid off as a result of the cutbacks that followed the termination of the Lavi project went his own way and presumably still works in the same area. Yet this has nothing to do with any Israeli project, certainly not with the Lavi.

Defense establishment sources have said that instructions governing the export of military know-how and

cooperation with foreign countries in defense development are sensitive issues under close supervision. The sources added that in view of the embargo on the export of weapons to, and the development of weapon systems with South Africa, it would be far-fetched to assume that Israel would have risked the U.S. military and civilian aid it receives, to the tune of \$3 billion per annum, by taking action that contravenes the embargo policy. [passage omitted]

IBM Computer Said To Aid H-Bomb Program

PM0211163389 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 31 Oct 89 pp 1-2

[Husni Khashabah and Muhammad Khalid report: "American Company Contributes to Israeli Nuclear Armament Program"]

[Excerpts] London, Washington— AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that IBM, one of the major U.S. computer companies with vast interests in the Arab world, is participating in the production of an advanced computer for Israel under the Israeli program for the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.

Reports received by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT indicate that the IBM contribution to the U.S. [as published] nuclear armament program will threaten the company's interests in the Arab world. [passage omitted]

In a telephone contact with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT from the company's European headquarters, a spokesman for IBM said that the company's board had applied to the U.S. Government for permission to sell an advanced computer system to Israel.

In reply to an AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT question from London, the spokesman, Alan Gillings [name as transliterated], confirmed the truth of the AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Washington office story.

Asked to comment on reports that Israel will use the system for military purposes, and particularly in the manufacture of a hydrogen bomb, the spokesman said that it was his company's policy not to discuss details of the final uses of its products. [passage omitted]

JORDAN

Paper on Israel's Nuclear Power, U.S. Backing

JN3110121289 Amman SAWT AL-SHA'B in Arabic
31 Oct 89 pp 1, 14

[Editorial: "Why a Nuclear Power in the Middle East?"]

[Text] Reports about nuclear cooperation between Israel and the racist regime in Pretoria, the transfer of U.S. technology from Israel to Pretoria, and the two countries' undertaking of a successful long-range nuclear missile launching are clear evidence that Israel is not stopping at the limits of its current aggression against the

Arab world. Instead, Israel plans for further expansion at the expense of the Arab world with the help of the nuclear threat it holds over the region.

U.S. press sources have affirmed that Israel is capable of producing the hydrogen bomb. This report alone is enough to ascertain what designs of aggression and expansion Israel harbors against the Arab homeland. Israel's designs are far from the current masquerade of searching for a peace in the region, which can never be established between a state that possesses nuclear capabilities and parties that cannot compete with the nuclear option.

In response to the serious reports that are leaked from Washington on Israel's nuclear capabilities, the Arab world can do nothing more than complain and mobilize international public opinion against such a state, which drools after the sources of this power while the two superpowers are doing their best to eliminate these kinds of weapons. However, the truth remains that the United States, the strategic ally of Israel, has turned a blind eye to Israel's nuclear capabilities, and that Israel would not have dared to carry out such a nuclear experiment had it not been for U.S. technology.

PAKISTAN

Daily Welcomes Bush Certification of Nuclear Program

*BK1810125989 Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
9 Oct 89 p 4*

[Editorial: "Nuclear Issue and the Presidential Nod"]

[Text] With the final nod of presidential approval in Washington that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear bomb, the decks have been cleared for finalisation of next U.S. financial year's aid package to Pakistan. That only leaves the two Houses of American Congress to reconcile the minor differences in allocations approved by each earlier in various components of the proposed

aid to Pakistan. According to reports, President George Bush who signed the certification regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme on Friday night, had based his judgement "on all available evidence" in this regard. Although American assistance to Pakistan currently forms part of a six-year \$4.02 billion package, such annual certification by the U.S. president is a statutory requirement before the finalisation of each year's aid chunk. The Pressler Amendment prohibits U.S. aid to any country that possesses or is suspected of possessing a nuclear explosive device. American president's certification thus becomes obligatory.

Irrespective of the immediate relevance of the U.S. president's certification in the aid context, the confirmation by Mr Bush should clear a lot of unnecessary confusion about Pakistan's nuclear programme. The American president's certification is a most responsible act of formal commitment in black and white. It has once again vindicated Pakistan's consistent position that the country does not possess a nuclear device. Unfortunately, the question has been politicised and used by various quarters to cast doubts about the peaceful nature of Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear knowhow. Atomic energy is not just another name for the atom bomb. There can be no justification for anybody's grudging Pakistan's efforts to make use of nuclear energy to meet the country's growing demands in a number of perfectly peaceful fields like power generation.

As for the question of the atomic weapon, Pakistan has consistently adhered to the principle of nonproliferation. Islamabad has never shied away from signing the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] if India—with a demonstrated capability to produce the bomb—also agreed to do so. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has only recently reiterated the country's approach in this regard. Ms Benazir Bhutto has also made it clear that Pakistan could not under any circumstances be expected to renounce unilaterally the nuclear option. It is a welcome development indeed that the American Administration at the highest level has proceeded to accord recognition to Pakistan's principle position.

Commentary on New Conditions, Progress on Disarmament

*90WC0003B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Oct 89 First Edition p 3*

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reviewer Manki Ponomarev: "The Knots Must Be Untied"]

[Text] In recent days we have all become witness to astounding movements in one of the most complex, and perhaps the most complex, problems of international relations—disarmament. Moreover these are significant, fundamental movements, ones pertaining not to some relatively secondary issues but to the most important directions.

Disarmament is what mankind is striving for, because unless we limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate weapons, we will not rid ourselves of war, and dispel the threat of self-annihilation. Some advances have been made in recent years. But if we measure this against the objective need of the people, the insufficiency of what has been accomplished thus far becomes obvious. Unutilized possibilities and constraint and temerity in movement forward are patently obvious.

That is the way things were quite recently. But now we have the grounds for asserting that the situation has begun to change decisively. Evidence of this can be found in the results of E. A. Shevardnadze's talks in the United States of America, in the initiatives proposed by the American president and the Soviet foreign minister at the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly, the good start of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe, and encouraging prospects in regard to a number of other points.

All of this is so important, so serious that it would be useful to dwell on all of these movements in greater detail, see what the topics of discussion are, and determine the direction in which the effort is moving.

First of all concerning reduction of strategic offensive arms. Movements have been especially noticeable in this area. The Soviet Union's readiness to sign a strategic offensive arms treaty, even in the event that agreement is not reached on the ABM problem before the treaty is ready for signing, removed the obstacle that hindered negotiations on 50 percent reduction of these most destructive weapons. Moreover Soviet proposals concerning problems with air and sea launched long-range cruise missiles are also a help. All of this has led to a real probability that a treaty on strategic offensive arms would be signed during the Soviet-American summit talks in late spring or early summer of the next year. Neither the Soviet Union nor the USA rejects such a probability. The London TIMES validly noted that the political will displayed by both sides became the basis for the success of talks on this issue in Washington and Wyoming.

The 12th round of talks on nuclear and space arms began in Geneva this week. Their participants have much work yet to do, but the path has been cleared, the landmarks have been defined, and they can now move boldly forward.

The good start led to noticeable movements also in talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. Both countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries are offering business-like, constructive proposals, and gradually coming closer to each other. We can point out in this area the just recently introduced new proposals of Warsaw Pact states to limit frontal (tactical) warplanes and helicopter gunships. The socialist countries proposed opening up for negotiations all frontal airplanes—bombers, fighter-bombers, attack aircraft and tactical fighters, as well as reconnaissance and electronic warfare airplanes, setting a limit on them of 4,700 airplanes in each of the alliances. Air defense aviation will not be included in this limit, although establishing a certain limit even on it could be a way to go. Helicopter gunships are also the object of new ideas. Compromising with proposals of NATO countries, Warsaw Pact states have agreed to make 1,900 the maximum number of helicopters for each of the alliances.

Movements in Vienna are so noticeable that the Soviet Union has already turned to the USA and other NATO countries with a proposal to convene a summit conference in the latter half of 1990 to sign an agreement on conventional armed forces which could be attended by all leaders of European states. Judging from everything, this proposal elicited a positive response, and it has been deemed to be fully timely and important.

Prospects also look hopeful for the fastest possible attainment of agreement on effective prohibition of chemical weapons. A special joint Soviet-American declaration written during talks in Jackson Hole, Wyoming was devoted to this acute problem. After that, U.S. President G. Bush offered new initiatives during the 44th Session of the UN General Assembly. In particular he announced that the United States is prepared to destroy all of its chemical weapons completely 10 years from the moment all states capable of producing chemical weapons sign a treaty on universal elimination. He also announced the USA's readiness to destroy over 80 percent of its reserves right now, without waiting for completion of the treaty's drafting, if the Soviet Union would reduce its chemical weapon stockpiles by the same amount.

The Soviet Union was not long in answering. E. A. Shevardnadze said in his speech at the same session of the General Assembly that the Soviet Union is prepared to go farther together with the USA, and to assume, without waiting for the signing of a multilateral convention, mutual obligations to halt production of chemical weapons, as we have already done on a unilateral basis, and completely destroy chemical weapons on a bilateral basis. Even George Bush, who tried to amaze the world with his own initiative, found all of this to be so radical

that he rejected the Soviet Union's proposal, indicating that the USA was prepared to discuss the issue of complete destruction of chemical weapons only within the framework of a multilateral agreement. Nonetheless both sides displayed their political will here as well.

I would like to make a slight digression here. Speeches by American presidents at sessions of the UN General Assembly have already become a tradition. And practically each time the Soviet responses have been stereotypical: Everything said in these speeches was proclaimed to be hollow rhetoric covering up imperialist ambitions and aggressive aspirations to one degree or another. This time things were different. The Soviet Union immediately recognized that in its opinion this time the president's speech contained a number of very important ideas of considerable interest. You must agree that quite recently such an assessment would have been completely inconceivable.

But this is by the bye. Let's return to the problems of disarmament. Obstacles hindering implementation of Soviet-American treaties on limitation of underground nuclear weapon testing and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, signed correspondingly in 1974 and 1976, were removed during the talks in Wyoming. Both sides made serious steps toward each other, reaching agreement on some complex technical problems of control. The United States still of course rejects the Soviet proposal on complete prohibition of nuclear testing, asserting that these tests are supposedly necessary to it as a means of keeping its nuclear weapons combat ready. Well, the time will come, and we will hope that these objections will also be answered, in the same way that many other obstacles have been removed from the road to elimination of all forms of weapons of mass destruction. It would be pertinent to note here incidentally that the Soviet Union has already reviewed its nuclear testing program, and reduced the number of explosions and their yield.

The problem of missile weapon proliferation has recently become increasingly more acute. Around 20 countries already possess missiles, and there is the danger that they will spread further. We must try to avoid this; the Soviet Union suggests thinking about creating an international control mechanism like the IAEA. This mechanism could promote limitation in this area and reduction of the threat of the use of missiles in regional armed conflicts, which are still shaking the globe.

A number of other movements in the area of disarmament could also be pointed out. In particular the Soviet Union is actively supporting measures to monitor the military activities of countries, and in particular the American proposal for "open skies"—for allowing flights by unarmed airplanes with the purpose of verifying compliance with obligations adopted by the sides.

These brush-strokes, which are broad in and of themselves, make up an overall picture that includes the

entire spectrum of the problems of disarmament and movement toward their resolution. Of course we should not overstate the accomplishments, and we should not fall into a state of euphoria. The USA is still talking about a threat from the USSR. Here are the words of Secretary of Defense R. Cheney: "We continue to stand face to face with a power capable of destroying the United States and everything we believe in." But no matter how tight and artful the knots that bind international problems, and chiefly the most acute problems of disarmament, might be, they can and must be untied. They can—evidence of this is in the movements of recent times. They must—such is ultimately the will of all mankind, since otherwise it would simply be unable to survive.

SDI Funding Cuts Seen as Positive Steps to Disarmament Efforts

90WC0003A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
6 Oct 89 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Lapin: "The SDI Debate"]

[Text] Despite the fact that the United States had already begun its new fiscal year on 1 October and the time for debating the military budget in Congress has run out, the passions centering on allocations to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program will never die down.

The bill allocating money to specific military programs was accepted by the overwhelming majority of the Senate, though not without angry debate. Ultimately the amount designated for these purposes was reduced by about \$11 billion as compared to the Bush administration's request. Voted in at \$288 billion, it is also \$20 billion less than the proposal offered by the former Reagan administration. Nonetheless in the very last minutes of discussion, under pressure from certain influential senators and an insignificant majority, a decision to return some part of the former cuts from the Star Wars program was passed, such that \$4.3 billion would be allocated to the program (the administration asked for \$4.6 billion). However, the House of Representatives insists on a sum of \$3.1 billion.

Without a doubt, this is an enormous amount as well, though Reagan intended that SDI expenditures would attain \$5.9 billion in 1990. A final compromise will be worked out in committee this week. But some American newspapers are already stating their conclusions without waiting for the compromise to be reached. "SDI is dead," concluded the NEW YORK DAILY NEWS. According to it, this was the direct result of recent talks in Wyoming between the heads of the foreign policy departments of the USSR and the USA, in which the Soviet minister declared that from that day forward, SDI research would no longer be an obstacle to a strategic arms limitation agreement. "Shevardnadze essentially removed the last reason why SDI should be continued."

the newspaper felt, "...and deprived the USA of the possibility for using SDI as an argument in the negotiations."

Perhaps not all people in the American corridors of power are prepared to agree with the newspaper's opinion yet for various reasons. Nonetheless it would be impossible not to note that a line toward a healthy approach to resolving military issues is becoming ever-clearer in the duel between SDI proponents and opponents.

Selective Policy in Renewing Strategic Weapons Recommended

*18120010A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 42, 22-29 Oct 89 p 6*

[Article by Alexei Arbatov, D. Sc. (History): "In Search of Strategic Truth"]

[Text] A discussion has unfolded on MN pages around Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov's article "Minimum deterrent: utopia or a real prospect?" (MN No. 23). It centres on the key problem of military strategy, disarmament and security—what constitutes a sufficient nuclear potential. The authors took the liberty of suggesting a 20-fold unilateral reduction of Soviet strategic offensive weapons—to 500 nuclear warheads—so as to finally extricate us from the arms race against the USA.

The strongest disagreement with this point of view is expressed in the article by Colonels Vladimir Dvorkin and Valery Torbin (MN No. 26).

Regrettably, the military experts' main objections do not rest on facts and logic, but on references to "profound research". Their methodology, incidentally, is not explained even in the most general terms.

We are simply asked to rely upon Dvorkin and Torbin's contention that the mysterious "profound research" shows that a "minimum deterrent" is unacceptable, whereas "the most reliable and approved deterrence is military-strategic parity". It only remains to be guessed: isn't it the same kind of research on the basis of which, in the early 1980s, our military experts estimated that parity had been achieved in nuclear weapons in Europe? And then, as we all know, under the INF Treaty it became clear that we needed to reduce twice as many missiles and three times as many warheads as the Americans did to reach zero.

Or maybe it is the kind of research, proceeding from which—in search of military parity—we have deployed twice as many types of strategic ballistic missiles as the USA, have launched in the past 30 years twice as many missile-carrying submarines, and have continued to this day countering every American weapons system with two of our own? (See "The Military Balance, 1988-1989", pp 18, 33-34)

As a matter of fact, theory is not always responsible for practice. What are the logical arguments used by the military experts?

In trying to give the lie to the viewpoint of their opponents, Dvorkin and Torbin immediately contradict themselves. They write that "the possibility to keep peace for over 40 years was only possible thanks to the achievement of military-strategic parity...." But even a dilettante knows that parity took shape by the early 1970s, i.e., less than 20 years ago. What then did the "maintenance of peace" rest upon in the preceding 20 years? Was it US nuclear superiority, with its horrible plans which the colonels describe in the previous paragraph?

If such logical constructs are the basis of the notorious "profound research", then it's no wonder they are being concealed. I think it's obvious that the claims to the absolute truth are absurd no matter who makes them. Neither experience in practice nor theoretical achievements provide any grounds for this.

As for Bogdanov and Kortunov's point of view, most of their fundamental propositions on strategic stability and sufficiency merit serious consideration. The "minimum deterrent" concept is not new in itself, having been advanced in the USA as early as the 1950s (at the level, among others, of top statesmen and military leaders) and discussed many times there. It took firm place on the liberal flank of the general spectrum of military-political thinking, although it was always severely criticized by conservative politicians and strategists, who invariably referred in so doing to the "sinister plans of the Soviets". It is good that it has now received a residence permit with us as well, although this does not at all mean that the two scientists' specific proposals are beyond dispute.

From the purely practical point of view, besides the political effect, the reduction of our strategic arms to the proposed level (i.e., by 95 per cent) would not yield any big economic gains. All the resources on the existing forces have already been spent and cannot be recouped. The reduction (which itself will entail no small expenditure) would only reduce the appropriations for operation and maintenance, which in the case of strategic offensive weapons are relatively minor in comparison with conventional armed forces.

A modernization of the existing triad, the development and deployment of new weapons systems—this is where colossal sums go and where the main reserve lies for economizing in the given sphere. Being guided by the same "minimum deterrent" logic and even postulating much higher criteria for unacceptable damage, there is a need today to pose the question not so much of reduction as of a more selective policy in renewing strategic offensive weapons. Why do we, having more modest economic possibilities, now counter every new American system with two new systems of our own? Sufficiency at the present stage, I believe, implies the need to counter one with one or, better still, to counter two systems with

one. Moreover, stress must be laid not on destructive capability and quantity, but on invulnerability and quality. More care should be taken to ensure the survival and reliability of the warning, control and communication systems. We would hardly be able to unilaterally extricate ourselves from the arms race by even a 20-fold reduction of the strategic forces. On the contrary, faced with American superiority and possessing so small a "margin of safety" in deterrence, we would be compelled to endlessly modernize and renew our small potential—at a huge expense. After all, it is the development of new systems, I repeat, that takes the lion's share of spending on strategic offensive weapons.

Lastly, not everything is simple on the political plane either. The disarmament talks in the 1970s were not so futile as the authors claim. If something deserves criticism, it is not the institute of negotiations as such, but the way these negotiations were in fact conducted. What prevented much farther advance was both sides' adherence to the predominantly military, instead of political, contractual-legal way of ensuring security.

The unilateral reduction, proposed by Bogdanov and Kortunov, presupposes a truly giant revolution in our approach to sufficiency and security as a whole. A less radical change of views would suffice to considerably improve the present-day policy of modernizing strategic offensive weapons, and our approach to the talks on their reduction and limitation. This would definitely spark reciprocal reappraisal from the American side and make it possible to advance much faster along the path of mutual, equitable and verifiable agreements in the given field.

Pros, Cons of Nuclear Deterrent Doctrine Discussed

18120010B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 42, 22-29 Oct 89 p 6

[Article by Yuri Bandura]

[Text] The discussion that unfolded around Radomir Bogdanov and Andrei Kortunov's article "'Minimum deterrent': utopia or a real prospect?" (MN No. 23, June 4) has become one of the liveliest among those carried out in recent years on the pages of MOSCOW NEWS. Taking part in it were nine authors who had written seven articles. The newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) has also responded to the dispute by printing, in its Issue No. 223 of Sept. 28, a lengthy commentary by Lieutenant-General (res.) Ye. Volkov, Professor D. Sc. (Engineering), Hero of Socialist Labour.

Such an interested exchange of views was triggered primarily by Bogdanov and Kortunov's contention concerning the possibility of the Soviet Union unilaterally reducing its arms by 20 times: to assure the USSR's security against a thermonuclear strike, they believe, it is enough to have a mere 500 nuclear warheads.

This way of posing the question was opposed—in the article "On real sufficiency of defence" (MN No. 26, June 25)—by Colonels Vladimir Dvorkin and Valery Torbin. Their conclusion: the implementation of Bogdanov and Kortunov's proposals can only have the effect that "the nuclear potential left in the USSR would definitely be liquidated completely and many times over". In the colonels' view, "the reduction and liquidation of nuclear weapons will be justified only if this will be done by both sides, simultaneously, keeping a strategic parity at each stage of their reduction".

The question, it would seem, is simple to the extreme: ascertain which of these two polar viewpoints is correct. The development of the discussion, however, leads one to the conclusion that the supposed antithesis between the two viewpoints is an illusion in many respects.

Specifically, in his article entitled "Minimum deterrence—the ultimate objective" (MN No. 37, Sept. 10), Robert McNamara, former US Secretary of Defense, says that in principle the planet's deliverance from the danger of nuclear war can be achieved by both unilateral reductions and negotiations alike, and preference should be given to the strategy which is more effective in the concrete historical situation. Academician Nikita Moiseyev "Both calculation and common sense" (MN No. 28, July 9) poses the question in a different way. [sentence as published] Both points of view around which the discussion has unfolded, he believes, are untenable inasmuch as both sides have been trying to resolve the problem of the defence capability's sufficiency in isolation from ecological, economic and social problems. Like McNamara, Moiseyev believes that ridding the planet of the danger of nuclear war will require consensus on the part of the nuclear powers. Moreover, the Soviet Academician correctly (as we see it) emphasizes: "Its solution will be the result of a long and tough road, and the joint work of many different specialists. It will be not so much military as civilian experts—mathematicians, economists, ecologists—people capable of overcoming the usual stereotypes of thinking."

The discussion thus makes it possible to arrive at the following conclusions. First, in the country's social consciousness today there is no consensus with regard to the possibilities and advisability of advancing towards a militarily safe future by unilateral reductions of the nuclear potential. Second, none of the opposing sides in the discussion has been able to present sufficiently cogent arguments to substantiate its point of view. Only the first steps have been made in the conceptualization of the problem without any visible advance towards a common understanding, meaning that there is a need to carry on the search for the truth. Third, this search in itself can only become productive provided the "monopoly on truth", which military experts and political analysts have still been trying to deny to each other, has been eliminated. Lastly, until the advantages of unilateral reductions have been proved, the Soviet-American negotiations on strategic offensive arms must remain the main instrument for lowering the danger of nuclear war,

even if the methodological principles underlying them do not seem to be undisputable.

In light of these conclusions one can only be puzzled by the assessment of the discussion in MN given by Lieutenant-General (reserve) Ye. Volkov in the central newspaper of the USSR Ministry of Defence.

His conclusions are unambiguous: "the discussion is not conducive to establishing the truth", it is "not merely useless, but even harmful. Harmful because it introduces so far only confusion into readers' minds about questions under discussion".

The sources of the "confusion", the general believes, lie in the fact that a "considerable part" of participants in the discussion are "people who are not specialists in the problem being discussed". However, Volkov is convinced, "research into the field in question is extremely complicated... The execution of such research is only within the power of professional specialists with a high level of competence".

Moreover, the lieutenant-general tells us: such research is "done at many scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defence and other ministries". Making at least part of this research public would undoubtedly contribute to grasping the truth. But, Volkov laments, "it isn't possible to clarify the methods and the findings of research in the given field". As a matter of fact, he believes that this is a mere trifle: after all, "the recommendations of Bogdanov and Kortunov are at variance with those established by foreign researchers". And to prove his point, he cites McNamara's estimates...of 27 years ago, which, incidentally, the former US Secretary of Defense has long renounced. In contrast to what the general says, he has expressed in MN his agreement with the arguments of Bogdanov and Kortunov. Even if with this reservation: "While recognizing the important contributions that unilateral actions can make to arms reduction, I believe that today the opportunity to make major progress through negotiation is so great that unilateral moves, as extreme as those proposed by Bogdanov and Kortunov, may not be necessary." This makes it clear that whereas for Volkov unilateral radical reductions in strategic offensive arms are heresy pure and simple, for the authoritative "foreign researcher" they are a fully permissible alternative.

But it is not this alone that divides the positions of the Soviet general and the American expert. Volkov is a persistent advocate of the nuclear deterrent doctrine (and in this he is at one with Bogdanov and Kortunov, no matter how hard the author of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA may try to dissociate himself from them). McNamara, for his part, sees a way out of the nuclear danger in "removing the deterrent capability of the nuclear force", and therefore he reflects not upon maintaining strategic parity, but upon steps that might lead East and West to a decision to "move away from nuclear deterrence". How impressive the differences in the approaches are can be gauged from the conclusion drawn

by the 27th CPSU Congress: "Security cannot be built endlessly on fear of retaliation, in other words, on the doctrines of 'containment' or 'deterrence'... These doctrines encourage an arms race that may sooner or later go out of control". From this assessment it follows that in the present-day conditions the positions of some "foreign specialists" turn out to be more consistent with the requirements of the new thinking than the views of some Soviet "professionals".

In effect, sharing with Volkov, Dvorkin and Torbin their adherence to the main postulates of the deterrent doctrine, Bogdanov and Kortunov seek nevertheless to use their proposals to wrest social consciousness from the grip of this doctrine. For his part, General Volkov, who, according to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, has for a long time been at the head of collectives conducting research into the field of developing strategic weapons, prefers not to cast doubts on a doctrine which he was guided by in his work. Therefore the discussion in MN is seen by him and those who think alike as an encroachment on basic principles. But is everything that is bad for a general also bad for society? The above-cited conclusions from the discussion, I believe, bear witness to the contrary. The more so that it has mapped out a number of directions in which it is possible to look for new breakthroughs towards a nuclear-free future.

The advance of social consciousness along these lines would be instrumental not only in learning the truth, but also in formulating more precise and accurate guideposts for the country's leadership (including, naturally, the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet) which lays down and implements the state's foreign and home policy.

Development of First Soviet Atomic Bomb Project

Project, Explosion Described

18120011 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
Vol 41, 15-22 Oct 89 p 8

[Interview with Igor Golovin, professor and author of a book detailing Igor Kurchatov's work on the first Soviet atomic bomb, by Leonard Nikishin, date and place not given]

[Text] Four years after the American atomic blasts which singed the planet, a formidable "mushroom" sprouted in the steppes of Kazakhstan. The world entered the uneasy epoch of "nuclear confrontation".

Four decades have already elapsed since then. But the mist of secrecy, which shrouded the Soviet atomic project, has never been fully dispelled. The participants in that darkly heroic epic, its disciples and hostages, have passed away without having said a word. The archives are inaccessible as before.

An MN correspondent talked to Professor Igor Golovin, a first-hand participant in the effort to develop the

Soviet atom bomb in the 1940s, Igor Kurchatov's assistant from 1950 to 1958. He is the author of a book on Kurchatov, which has not yet been published in full. We accompany the interview with the scientist by excerpts from its unpublished chapters.

Who Informed Stalin?

MN: We know much about the Americans' effort to develop the atom bomb, as reminiscences by participants in the Manhattan project and a number of documents have been published. But publications on similar work in our country are still rather fragmentary. Many questions remain. It is not even clear why we made the bomb later than the USA...

I.G.: As early as 1940, at the autumn session of the Academy of Sciences, I.V. Kurchatov made a report on the real possibility of unleashing a chain reaction which could release the colossal energy of the atomic nuclei. But it was then decided that we still knew too little to request the government to allocate large sums for this work. Then the war broke out, and this distracted us. It was impossible to make the "uranium bomb", as it was then called, quickly, which is why its development was excluded from the programme of the institute led by A.F. Ioffe. Preference was given to radar equipment, the development of tank armor, and the protection of ships against mines. Kurchatov went to the Crimea where, together with A.P. Alexandrov, he began fitting out ships with the systems to protect against magnetic mines.

MN: And how did you return to the problem, and when?

I.G.: There is still much that is mysterious and unclear here. To begin with, G.N. Flyorov made up his mind and wrote a letter to Stalin about the need for this work (published for the first time in MN No 16, 1988—Ed.). Secondly, there is the story about a German office killed near Mariupol, in whose notebook entries were found showing an interest in uranium. To my mind, it is hardly probable that these two documents alone persuaded Stalin not to go slow in this field. He must surely have had information on the American project along intelligence lines. After the physicists' well-known appeal, signed by Albert Einstein, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, work on the atomic project proceeded at a rapid pace in the USA. Possibly, the information came from Fuchs, but maybe along some other channels—the archives are silent so far. Whatever the case, in November 1942 Stalin invited four academicians—A.F. Ioffe, P.L. Kapitsa, V.G. Khlopin and V.I. Vernadsky—and asked them bluntly how serious the information he had was concerning the possibility of developing the atom bomb in the next few years. When his guests unanimously confirmed the importance of this work, he immediately suggested that they name a person to direct the project. As I was subsequently told by General Makhnev, an aide to Beria, at first Ioffe and Kapitsa's candidatures were discussed. But Stalin was of the opinion that the effort had to be headed by a lesser known and younger person for whom this would become

the main cause in his life. Then Ioffe named I.V. Kurchatov. His appointment took place in late 1942, and in March 1943 this decision was confirmed by the State Defence Committee. I remember an order of the day issued at the Academy of Sciences: appoint Professor I.V. Kurchatov director of Laboratory No 2. That was all...

Scientists and Prisoners

MN: At this time work in the USA was already in full swing, wasn't it?

I.G.: Of course it was. We, for our part, started real work only after the war was over. At first, the atomic project was under the general supervision of Molotov. Kurchatov carried out all discussions with him, and also from his he received "leading directions". But there was a lot of shilly-shallying, so to speak. An interesting document has been preserved: Kurchatov's letter addressed to Beria. It is handwritten, but it is not known whether it's a copy or an undispached letter. The point is that secrecy did not permit entrusting such texts to typists, and these letters were sent "to the top" in handwritten form. This letter says that Molotov's leadership is utterly unsatisfactory, that a year has passed, but a geological survey of uranium deposits has not yet been organized. It is generally impossible to do anything without uranium, whereas the reserves prospected before the war are patently insufficient. If the letter was sent, this must have happened in late 1944 or early 1945. Whether it was this letter or something else, but in 1945 Beria became the chief administrator of the atomic project.

MN: Why was Kurchatov's message addressed to Beria?

I.G.: Today everyone knows, of course, that he was a bloodthirsty butcher. But at that time Kurchatov addressed a Politburo member, a person commanding immense power and wielding influence on Stalin. And the fact that Stalin subordinated all work on the atomic project to Beria himself attests to the importance which he attached to it.

MN: Did Stalin pin hopes on him to organize the work?

I.G.: Possibly. At any rate, Beria's administrative abilities were obvious for all of us at that time. He was unusually energetic. Meetings did not drag on for hours, everything was decided quickly. The main burden of the work was carried out from 1945 to 1947, and all this time we felt the effect of his leadership. Our memoranda, for instance, were quickly read and returned with his questions and demands for explanations.

MN: Beria's name immediately suggests the question: was prison labor used in implementing the atomic project?

I.G.: On the broadest scale. All construction projects, mines, "atom-towns", even our institute in Moscow (then Laboratory No 2, now the Kurchatov Institute of

Atomic Energy—Ed.)—all these facilities employed the labor of prisoners. Did you see our club? This building used to be a prison, it was surrounded with a tall bare wall, with submachine gunners in its corner towers. All the buildings, including the one in which the first atomic reactor (boiler, as it was called at that time) was commissioned were built by prisoners. And the present-day International Center of Nuclear Research in Dubna. Its first builders were also prisoners... There were many thousands of them at our construction sites. All the specialists there knew about everything.

MN: Didn't they feel oppressed by this?

I.G.: There was a special atmosphere. At that time we thought of just one thing: what we should do to complete the work as soon as possible—before the American atom bomb fell on us. The fear of a new, atomic war outweighed all the rest—anyone who lived at that time will confirm this. When the American bombs exploded, the leadership was greatly upset. Thank God, at least then everyone started to believe in what we were doing, and there was no need to argue whether or not it was possible. Today it seems incredible, but when a shortage of manpower arose and Beria said: well, tomorrow we'll send you an additional contingent, this was taken calmly.

Maybe one of the reasons why Molotov was removed from the leadership of the atomic project lay precisely in the fact that he did not have sufficient manpower at his disposal. And his figure was not as ominous.

At every responsible enterprise there were the so-called authorized representatives of the Council for People's Commissars (later the Council of Ministers)—generals of colonels of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who had a direct telephone link to Beria. His personal emissaries were present everywhere, their job being to ensure continual supervision of the work done.

At the close of 1945, the First Chief Administration was set up with the aim of drafting decisions and providing effective guidance, and was given control of the People's Commissariats (Ministries) taking part in this work. It was headed by B.L. Vannikov, one of the most prominent specialist and organizers of industry. But all the same, overseeing everything was a Special Committee with Beria at its head.

MN: And when did Beria stop exercising leadership over atomic affairs?

I.G.: Only after his arrest. The instructions given by him the day before were still being fulfilled, when the lightning bolt hit him.

Kurchatov's 'Fantasies'

MN: Will you please speak in greater detail about your finest hours?

I.G.: There were two crucial moments. The first atomic reactor F-1 was put into operation on December 25,

1946. Following that, in 1947, Molotov made his well-known statement that the atom bomb was no longer a secret for us. And, of course, on August 29, 1949—the first test of the bomb.

The commissioning of the F-1 reactor was described by me in an addendum to one of the chapters of the book about Kurchatov. So far it is only in manuscript form.

I want to note right away: although the talks described by me were not taken down in shorthand, their sequence and meaning are reproduced from accounts by the direct participants and have a high degree of authenticity.

An excerpt given below is devoted to the demonstration of F-1 to the "patron".

"All workers and laboratory assistants were removed in advance from the territory of Laboratory No 2. A procession of cars drove up, the first of them carrying the guards, who themselves opened the entrance gates in the barbed wire fence surrounding the complex. Kurchatov and General Pavlov, Beria's aide, were waiting for the 'patron' at the gates to the hall.

"Shall we start, Lavrent Pavlovich?" Kurchatov asked.

"Please do," Beria was carefully following the actions of Kurchatov who was personally raising a lever by hand. The distance was measured by knot-markers on the rope.

"The clicks heard from the loudspeaker started quickening, merged into a stream, and became a quiet hum. Kurchatov stopped raising the lever.

"The power now is about 100 watts and there is no need to increase it. We don't know how a boiler of greater power will behave. Now we need to insert into it the uranium intended for the accumulation of new nuclear reactions, which the Americans have called plutonium."

"Beria turned to General Pavlov: "How do you find it, Nikolai Ivanovich? Isn't Kurchatov putting on a show for us here? And can we go to the boiler?"—this already to Kurchatov.

"No, Lavrenty Pavlovich," Kurchatov replied. "You mustn't go there in the next few hours, the radioactivity level is high. This is dangerous to one's health."

"What else can you show us? The clicking in the loudspeaker, a knot on the rope... It's not much. How else can you prove that this is chain reaction?"

"We can measure the radioactivity of the boiler, it wasn't there before, and tomorrow it won't be there. The operation can be repeated and it will reappear. We shall take samples of uranium, radiate them for a month, and chemists will see plutonium accumulating."

"And how much will that yield?"

"Microgrammes."

“Microgrammes... Again we won't see anything. Only under a microscope, perhaps, can one tell whether it's plutonium or something else that you've pawned on us.”

“It will be possible to tell only with the help of instruments which measure radioactivity or by chemical properties.”

“And when can one see that this isn't a deception, just your fantasy?”

“Even now we see that this is not a fantasy. The chain reaction obeys us. We have just accelerated and stopped it at will. And that this is plutonium we shall know only when we explode it. Nothing else explodes with such power.”

“You spoke about a uranium bomb, and now it's plutonium...”

“But we haven't yet got plutonium, whereas we knew uranium even before the war, which is why we concentrated on it. As to plutonium, we know that it works from the theory of Niels Bohr, and also from descriptions of the blast over Hiroshima. According to Bohr's theory, it's better than uranium as an explosive.”

“And Bohr,” Beria remarks, “is a philosopher, they say, a pacifist. Igor Vasilyevich, I've just thought of the following. Comrades, leave. All of you.”

“Only Beria, Kurchatov and Pavlov remained.”

“Let you, Igor Vasilyevich, write a detailed letter to Bohr. After all, he has been to the States, maybe he knows more about the American bomb than you and me. We'll send a reliable person with your letter to Copenhagen, he will visit Bohr and bring back his reply. Prepare the letter.”

“The proposed visit took place a week later. The messenger visited Bohr, who received him loyally and wrote a detailed reply to Kurchatov. But he could not give the necessary details, because he himself had not been allowed access by the Americans to the secrets of the atom bomb's design.”

MN: At that time the Americans, who had monopoly control of the atom bomb, put forward the so-called Baruch Plan for the establishment of international control over the manufacture of atomic weapons and fissionable materials. We rejected it. Why?

I.G.: Experts took no part in deciding this question, it hadn't even reached us. Everything was decided by Stalin. But, I think, it's clear why it was turned down. The Baruch Plan envisaged the presence of foreign inspectors on our country's territory. And this at the time of the spy mania which reigned supreme in those years, when even our own people were sometimes suspected of espionage. All of our work was highly classified, and we were all convinced that secrecy was both necessary and useful. Not everything in our work was smooth sailing, there happened to be mistakes and

miscalculations, and always in such cases the stooges of the “patron” sought to find saboteurs. But Igor Vasilyevich stood up bravely for his staff members, and not a single hair fell from their heads thanks to him. Besides diplomatic considerations, the Baruch Plan was unacceptable simply due to the mentality prevailing at that time.

Everything Will Be OK, Lavrenty Pavlovich

MN: Which part of your book about Kurchatov was omitted when it was published?

I.G.: The chapter “The Culmination” dealing with the bomb's first test. Now it has been brought out as a preprint of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (No. 4932/3—1989). I would like to cite some fragments from it.

“...I.V. Kurchatov, Yu. B. Khariton and P.M. Zernov, the administrative director, gathered in Stalin's Kremlin study, where government officials responsible for the development of the bomb were already present. They had brought with them a nickel-plated plutonium ball in a box—the nuclear charge of the first Soviet atom bomb. Kurchatov said they were ready and requested permission to stage the blast.

“Here is a ready charge for the bomb,” said Kurchatov, pointing to the ball nearly ten centimeters in diameter.

“How many more of them have been made?” Stalin asked.

“There aren't any more, here is all the plutonium we have accumulated.”

“That's bad. And how soon will you be able to accumulate enough for a second charge?”

“So far accumulation proceeds at a slow pace. In about four months we shall prepare the second one, Iosif Vissarionovich.”

“We shall tease the Americans, while we have nothing in reserve in the warehouse, but suppose they press on with their atomic bombs? Tjere will be nothing to contain them. Exploding the first, there is a need to have a second, maybe even a third charge in the warehouse.”

“Stalin fell to thinking.”

“It would be good to make two charges out of this ball. Add chemical explosives, let there be two balls, even if of lesser power.”

“It's impossible, Iosif Vissarionovich,” Khariton replied. “There is a need for a critical mass.” He started explaining that natural phenomena were such that a smaller mass would not explode.

“Stalin lit his pipe and walked pensively round his study.”

“Critical mass...,” he uttered, ‘is also a dialectical concept. In some conditions the critical mass is one, but in other conditions it may be different.’

“‘We don’t know,’ Kurchatov replied, ‘in what conditions a smaller critical mass can be obtained. To learn this, there is a need for research studies. They may take not months, but years.’

“‘No, we can’t wait. Exert every effort to accumulate a second charge as soon as possible.’

“After a pause Stalin said:

“‘And how do we know that this is plutonium, not a sparkling piece of iron? And why this glitter? Why this window dressing?’

“‘The charge has been nickel-plated so that it would be safe to touch. Plutonium is very toxic, but nickel-plated it’s safe,’ Kurchatov replied. ‘And to satisfy yourself that this is not merely a piece of iron, instruct anyone at your choice to touch the ball with his hand. It’s warm, whereas iron would be cold.’

“‘Yes, it’s warm. And is it always warm?’

“‘It always is, Iosif Vissarionovich. The continuous nuclear reaction of alpha-disintegration is under way in it. It warms it up. But we shall excite a powerful fission reaction in it. This will be an explosion of great power.

“‘Stalin gave his consent to the testing.’”

“In May 1949, Kurchatov went to the testing grounds. A settlement had been built on the left bank of the Irtysh River below Semipalatinsk. Further south the road ran along the desert-like, sun-scorched steppe of Kazakhstan. The testing site proper lay 70 km away in a large depression surrounded by hills. In its center there was a steel tower onto which the ‘article’ had to be lifted and then exploded. Right under it there was a shop with large windows and a travelling crane, in which the final assembly was to take place. Ten kilometers away the command point was built—a pillbox with a large glass embrasure looking out on the tower and an entrance on the opposite side. From the side of the tower there was an earthen embankment, which was to cushion the shock wave and throw it over the pillbox cover.”

“There was an observation post 15 km to the north of the tower, and another one the same distance to the south.”

“In the last 28 hours of the assembly work the actions of all participants are strictly scheduled. From a gallery General of State Security Osetrov observes everything that goes on in the hall. Beria and his consort are continually present at the pedestal—a buggy on which the ‘article’ is being assembled. Kurchatov, Zavenyagin, Khariton and Zernov watch every step of the work.

“Upon completion of the last operation there was the minor danger of an explosion. Obeying the rules of explosive work Beria and Kurchatov left the epicenter. Four hours remain.

“Zernov with one of the staff members, K.I. Shchelkin, drove up to the knife-switch for connecting the cable to demolish the ‘article’, guarded by a sentry. This was three km from the tower. They unsealed the box, opened it, checked the absence of voltage on the terminals, then closed and sealed the box and, taking the sentry in their jeep, rushed to the command point.

“In the rays of the rising sun, pushing through openings in the clouds, guinea pigs (horses and cows)—the near victims of the coming test—were visible here and there on the expanses of the steppe. Birds were flying from the waterless desert to a man-made water pool in the center of the bowl. Soon they would be turned into steam, ionized together with the pool and scattered round the steppe. Numerous structures were standing in the depression, right up to the most distant hills in anticipation of zero-hour. Nature was gripped by the oppressive silence.”

“...The last minutes before the blast on the command point. Kurchatov knows that not only he is threatened in the event of failure, that candidatures have already been selected to replace his team. But why should there be a failure? And if it’s a success? Then there will be a second hard stage ahead—making the H-bomb. But there will be trust, there will be support, and a wave of energy fills the young 46-year-old Kurchatov. Muttering his favorite ‘right, right, right’, he paces pigeon-toed from corner to corner of the shelter where all the rest, silently, each with his own thoughts, are waiting for zero-hour.

“The countdown had already started when Beria came with his consort. Kurchatov pulled himself together and stopped near Flyorov, observing the flow of neutrons. Two-three neutrons in 15 minutes. All’s well.

“And suddenly amidst general silence, ten minutes before zero-hour, Beria’s voice resounds:

“‘Nothing will come of it, Igor Vasilyevich.’

“‘Don’t say that. Everything will be OK, Lavrenty Pavlovich,’ Kurchatov exclaimed and continued observing, only his neck turned red and his face became sullen and tense.

“Ten seconds..., five seconds..., three, two, one, launch!

“Kurchatov abruptly turned his face towards the open door. The sky had already grown dark against the background of the sunlit hills and steppe. Kurchatov rushed out of the pillbox, ran up the earthen embankment and, with a cry ‘There it is’, broadly waved his hand, repeating: ‘There, there...,’ and his face brightened up.

"The column of the blast was smoking as it rose into the stratosphere. The shock wave, clearly visible on the grass, was approaching the command point. Kurchatov rushed towards it. Flyorov dashed after him, caught him by the hand, forcibly drew him into the pillbox and closed the door.

"All the others—relaxed and jubilant—were bursting into the pillbox. The chairman of the State Commission (L. P. Beria—Ed.) hugged and kissed Kurchatov with the words:

"It would have been a great misfortune if it hadn't worked."

"Kurchatov knew only too well what kind of a misfortune it would have been...

"But suddenly Beria grew anxious. Was it the same explosion as the Americans'?"

"He immediately demanded to be connected by phone with M. G. Meshcheryakov, who had observed the blast from the northern point. In 1947 the latter together with D. V. Skobeltsyn and Colonel of State Security Alexandrov had been invited by the Americans to the Bikini Atoll and saw an underwater atomic blast there.

"Mikhail Grigoryevich, did it look like the American one? Very alike? We didn't make a slip? Kurchatov isn't pulling our leg, is he? Everything was the same? Good. Does it mean that we can report to Stalin that the test was a success? Good, good."

"Beria ordered a somewhat embarrassed general on duty at the phone to put him through immediately to Stalin by high frequency telephone. In Moscow the receiver was picked up by Poskryobyshev.

"Iosif Vissarionovich has gone to bed," he replied.

"Very urgent, call him all the same."

"A few minutes later a sleepy voice answered:

"What do you want?"

"Iosif, all's well. The blast was the same as the Americans'....

"I already know," Stalin replied and put down the receiver.

"Beria exploded and rushed, shaking his fist, to the general who turned pale.

"Even here you put spokes in my wheels, traitors. I'll grind you into powder."

* * *

"Not a crater, as was expected, but a plate with slightly curled edges was in the place of the tower. The steel tower and the ferroconcrete hall disappeared without leaving a trace—vaporized—rising together with the cloud into the stratosphere. The power of the blast, as the

findings of all measurements indicated, was fully consistent with what was expected."

MN: And we didn't say anything about that event, did we?

I.G.: No, we didn't. Our obsession with secrecy went even to this length. The Americans detected indirect confirmations of the performed blast a few weeks later, and on September 23 U. S. President Harry S. Truman announced that the Russians had exploded an atom bomb. We responded to this with an exceedingly vague TASS announcement of September 25 in which reference was made solely to explosive work in construction using the "latest technical breakthroughs". But we announced our possession of atomic weapons in 1947.

Reports of Explosion Denied

18120011 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
Vol 41, 15-22 Oct 89 p 8

[Text] On September 23, U. S. President Truman announced that, according to the data of the U. S. government, an atomic blast occurred recently in the USSR. Simultaneously, a similar statement was made by the British and Canadian governments.

Following these and other press reports, numerous statements have appeared intended to sow alarm in broad public circles.

In this connection TASS has been authorized to declare the following.

Large-scale building work, as everyone knows, is under way in the Soviet Union—the construction of hydroelectric power stations, mines, canals, roads—which necessitates large-scale blasting operations with the use of the latest technical facilities. Since these blasting operations have occurred and occur fairly often in different areas of the country, it is possible that this could have attracted attention outside the confines of the Soviet Union.

As far as the production of atomic energy is concerned, TASS considers it necessary to state once again that as early as November 6, 1947, V. M. Molotov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, made a statement relating to the secret of the atom bomb, saying that "this secret had long not existed." This statement meant that the Soviet Union had already disclosed the secret of atomic weapons and it had these weapons at its disposal. The scientific quarters in the United States of America took this statement of V. M. Molotov as a bluff, believing that the Russians would be able to master atomic weapons not earlier than 1952. However, they were wrong inasmuch as the Soviet Union had mastered the secret of atomic weapons already in 1947.

As to the feeling of concern being spread by some foreign circles in this connection, there are no grounds whatsoever for concern. It should be said that the Soviet government, despite the possession of atomic weapons,

abides and intends to abide in the future by its old position of an unconditional ban on the use of atomic weapons.

Concerning control over atomic weapons, it must be said that control will be necessary to verify the fulfillment of the decision on banning the production of atomic weapons.

Negotiations on Strategic Arms in Complex, Delicate Phase

90UI0015A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian, 5 Oct 89 p 7

[Article by Grigoriy Oganov, political correspondent: "Agreement and Disagreement"]

[Text] As the visible external features of Soviet-American relations display slow but sure and consistent improvement, the complexity and fragility of the entire group of agreements, or agreements on future agreements, concluded after difficult negotiations, are acquiring the features of a tangled knot of complex and ambiguous contradictions and nebulous statements. This is becoming increasingly obvious even to people who are not experts in the field.

Let us try to find out why.

This complexity is compounded by certain differences in the views of forces active in American politics and pursuing different domestic and foreign policy goals. These differences often lead to disagreements, sometimes over the most significant aspects of American foreign policy.

In any case, the extremely trustworthy British INDEPENDENT newspaper reported that the so-called "conservatives" in the U.S. Congress are suspicious of the new Soviet proposals at the talks on strategic arms limitation. "They apparently believe," a correspondent observed, "that the Russians' carefully calculated position is intended to advance the negotiation of the strategic arms treaty M.S. Gorbachev clearly wants, but without giving the Americans any guarantee that the Soviet Union will observe the treaty."

We will leave the last remark about the "guarantee" on the conscience of the authors of the INDEPENDENT article, especially in view of the fact that the equally authoritative FINANCIAL TIMES reported immediately after the Shevardnadze-Baker talks that the meeting of the Soviet and U.S. foreign ministers was "marked by unprecedented sincerity and the absence of mutual accusations.... Both sides did everything within their power to establish a new climate of trust."

It is precisely the nature of this new climate that aroused serious disagreements in the American diplomatic community.

Of course, the pile drivers here are the rightwing politicians in the United States who are "suspicious" of the

Soviet Union or, in other words, do not trust it. Some of the most prominent of these are representatives of the U.S. military-industrial complex, the generals and admirals who will not tolerate any denials of their requests for sizable sums of money from the budget or any limits on military spending. This forces the administration and officials with as much experience and prudence as Secretary of State James Baker to show discretion when discussing the positive results of the meeting with the Soviet foreign minister. They are obvious, but the difficulties which will still have to be surmounted on the way to a final solution to the problem of strategic nuclear missiles are equally obvious.

We must not forget, however, that the main reason for the difficulties and disagreements in assessing the significance and real value of the meeting of the two officials is the incredible complexity of the topics discussed at the meeting. Furthermore, mankind has not tried and tested method of dealing with these matters, no applicable experience to use as a guide, and no clear and precise formulas to rely on. There are no constant variables in these complex and difficult problems, and mankind might have to pay an appalling price for any mistakes.

The American press and the English-language press in general are full of comments, reports, and interviews analyzing the U.S. secretary's meeting with the Soviet minister, the topics they discussed, and the new and promising approaches they suggested.

There is no question that the so-called "Star Wars" issue—President Reagan's favorite offspring—was the main topic of discussion. It was the main obstacle to a strategic arms agreement. At times it seemed that this problem had erected an insurmountable barrier between the diametrically opposed positions of the two sides. The situation took on such dramatic features that the productive conclusion of the talks appeared to be "out of focus." There was the impression that the talks had reached an impasse.

Suddenly, as if by the wave of a "magic wand," the main obstacle is disappearing, and the reduction of Soviet and American longer-range nuclear missiles by half, the dream of so many people on earth, is becoming completely feasible. We should recall that rightwing forces are never pleased by a turn of events of this kind.

Baker seemed to have this in mind when he announced with visible pleasure that American-Soviet relations are entering a new phase. In any case, the American press has noted that the secretary of state's announcement was not simply a diplomatic courtesy.

It has also noted that each new meeting of the ministers in Jackson (Wyoming), under the leafy canopy in Grand Teton National Park and near the Baker estate extended beyond the timetable in the preliminary protocol and lasted until late at night. The Americans, correspondents remarked, were astounded by the sincerity of the Soviet approach to complex international issues. Up to this

point their ideas about the possible concessions Soviet diplomatic representatives could make were much more modest.

In effect, the resolution of the "Star Wars" problem was postponed, but the Bush administration has already indicated that this kind of compromise seems appealing. Describing it as a "positive point," Washington announced that it would clearly require "additional investigation and clarification." People in the American capital are paying close attention to the matter.

As they say, courage overcomes all obstacles. In this sense, Soviet diplomacy's indisputable courage and Washington's resolve are quite justified. The conclusion of this kind of important agreement between the two great nuclear powers would be a colossal inspiring gift to all mankind.

'Vienna Stage' of Helsinki Process Viewed

18700769 Moscow SLOVO LEKTORA in Russian
No 8, Aug 89 pp 12-19

[Article by L. Anisimov, candidate of historical and juridical sciences, docent: "The Helsinki Process: Vienna Stage"]

[Text] The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Final Act which it approved on 1 August 1975 in Helsinki reflect the political will of states and peoples for an improvement and activation of mutual relationships, for a strengthening of peace and international security.

On an historical plane, the CSCE process represents a continuation of the most important positive developmental tendencies within Europe and beyond its boundaries, ones which had found affirmation in a certain period of reduced international tensions. It was precisely at that time that 33 European countries, the USA, and Canada collectively recognized the futility of a policy deriving from positions of power and of "cold war" and came out in support of reaching mutual understanding in many areas of political relationships and of a strengthening international ties.

Soviet diplomacy and that of its allies, which was the first in postwar Europe to advance the thesis of European security and cooperation, has persistently and consistently advocated the greatest possible advancement and continuity of the pan-European process, the establishment of peace and security in Europe on the basis of mutually beneficial collaboration.

However, the Helsinki process should not be perceived merely as a series of diplomatic meetings. It goes far beyond the framework of the CSCE and encompasses many initiatives that arose in the 1970's, among them the most significant events of the past decade: the Soviet-American ABM treaty, the Soviet-West German Treaty of 1970, the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, etc., including

the Helsinki Conference of 1975 itself. Essentially, what we are talking about now is a search for ways to strengthen European security through multilateral meetings and multi-purpose forums.

In accordance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act concerning additional steps following the Conference on Security and Collaboration of Europe, the CSCE participant states are holding regular meetings and conferences of experts on the level of representatives designated by their ministers of foreign affairs. These measures are important landmarks in the development of the pan-European process. Among these, a special role is played by European-wide meetings of the Belgrade, Madrid, and Vienna type.

The All-European meetings reach decisions on the convocation of intermediate meetings of experts, seminars, forums, and conferences in all areas of CSCE activities. Altogether, besides the three meetings mentioned above, another nine European-wide meetings have been conducted as follow-up steps since the conclusion of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Collaboration.

The first stage of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm-I), which ended in September 1986, is one indisputable accomplishment of the CSCE process. The summary document from the conference for the first time included such important provisions as an annual exchange of plans of military activities that are subject to notification and the carrying out of on-site inspections. The document strengthened as a very important principle the obligation not to use force and also designated specific measures aimed at building confidence and ensuring security in the military field.

The entire range of European security problems was discussed at the third meeting of the CSCE participant states, which ended in Vienna on 20 January 1989. The goal of this meeting was to review the results of the all-European process during recent years and to designate further steps in the area of political-military, economic, scientific and technical, humanitarian, and cultural collaboration.

In the summary document which the Vienna meeting approved and placed into effect the CSCE participant states agree to continue and develop collaboration in all the directions specified by the Helsinki Final Act, and specifically with regard to:

- questions relating to security in Europe;
- collaboration in the area of economics, science and technology, and the environment;
- questions relating to security and collaboration in the Mediterranean;
- collaboration in humanitarian and other areas;
- the human dimension of the CSCE;
- further steps after the conference.

The Vienna meeting began and concluded its work on the level of the foreign ministers of the 33 European

countries, as well as the USA and Canada. This high level indicates a growing understanding of the importance and urgency of taking effective measures in the name of a peaceful future continent. The international situation at the present stage is such that great significance has been and is being attributed to the Vienna forum in terms of advancing a new political thinking that is capable of placing mankind on the path of stable peace and mutually beneficial collaboration.

Such an assumption is a legitimate one. Many people have seen a real possibility for decisive shifts on the path to disarmament in the results of the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykevik and in the Stockholm conference on the eve of the Vienna meeting.

What was it like, this very complex path taken by the diplomatic battalions to reach constructive mutual activity?

From the first round of the Vienna meeting, the socialist countries worked to see that the following stage of the Stockholm conference would develop along two parallel lines: further efforts to work out those confidence-building measures on which agreement had not been reached during its first stage, and also the development of coordinated measures for the establishment of a military balance at a possibly lower level.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries came out in favor of a mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe that would also encompass substantive negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals. Concrete, purposeful proposals were presented in this regard in the June 1986 Budapest Appeal by the Warsaw Pact member states to the NATO members and to all European countries.

Of course, agreement on a mandate for negotiations on disarmament in Europe as well as on the framework within which they should be conducted is by no means a simple problem. The declaration on control of conventional arms, passed at the NATO council session in Brussels in December 1986 in response to the Budapest initiative, bore a like character. While expressing a readiness to enter into negotiations, the US and NATO nevertheless essentially strived to lay the main emphasis on the examination of questions relating to the conventional arms of the two blocs. In doing so, they advanced a series of reservations and conditions, in particular with regard to tactical nuclear weapons, to inspection, and the like.

It was only at the end of June 1987, within the context of consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO side, which began in February of the

same year, that a substantive draft mandate for negotiations was presented concerning armed forces and armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. However, it did not contain adequate answers to the complex of proposals that had earlier been presented by the socialist countries.

The NATO document was based on the well-known concept of "conventional stability," behind which could be seen an attempt to get away from real mutual reductions in the military capabilities of the sides and to exclude as a subject of future negotiations the more destabilizing, aggressive forms of arms—tactical nuclear weapons and tactical strike aircraft. Along with this, the NATO document essentially excluded the possibility of direct participation in future negotiations by representatives of the neutral and nonaligned countries.

Such a direction could not and can not but produce concern, since it is clearly aimed at impoverishing the pan-European process of security and collaboration, of severing from it precisely that area which lies at its core and without which it is impossible to build peace on the continent and to ensure the fundamental interests of all Europeans. Something else was clear. Removal of the problems of disarmament from the Helsinki process would lead to its deformation, to its degeneration, to destruction of its balance as envisaged by the CSCE Final Act.

Altogether, in the course of their work of the Vienna meeting, its participants introduced more than 20 proposals relating to additional steps following its conclusion and encompassing the political-military, international law, scientific and technical, economic and humanitarian areas. Substantive examination of these began at the fifth round of the meeting (21 January-25 March 1988).

We will briefly analyze certain of them and will concern ourselves with the direction of the diplomatic efforts of the socialist countries.

Thus, one proposal, introduced by Poland in concord with her allies in December 1986, has the goal of amending the mandate of the Stockholm Conference so that, along with continuing to discuss measures for increasing confidence and security, it would set about examining questions of disarmament in Europe. It must be said that the United States and certain of its allies, as noted above, initially took a line at the Vienna meeting in opposition to the discussion of disarmament subjects within the CSCE context and against a corresponding amendment to the mandate of the Stockholm Conference. However, under the influence of the diplomatic arguments of the socialist countries, they corrected this position and proposed the idea of two parallel negotiations: one on confidence-building measures, between all 35 countries, and the other on conventional arms, including the 23 states of the Warsaw Pact (WP) and NATO.

Subsequently, at the Vienna meeting, an understanding was reached with regard to reconvening the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm-2) in 1989 and about the simultaneous initiation of negotiations on reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and a mandate for this was worked out at consultations of the twenty-three WP and NATO countries. Thus a possibility was presented for agreeing that the future negotiations, which are now being conducted between the WP and NATO countries (the negotiations of the "23"), are an integral part of the pan-European process and should be carried out within its context. Striving to ensure the maximum possible linkage between the negotiations of the "23" and the pan-European process, the socialist countries have supported allowing the non-bloc countries, which have shown a great interest in this, to participate in them in the future.

In June 1988, at the consultations that we are examining, preliminary agreement was reached on the organizational conditions and procedures for the forthcoming negotiations. The provisions already in effect within the pan-European process were taken as a basis for this understanding: the sovereign equality of states, the principle of unanimity (consensus) in the reaching of decisions, conduct of the negotiations in all six official languages of the CSCE including Russian and others. At the same time, organizational principles were established for the negotiations.

In the process of consultations by the twenty-three WP and NATO countries, difficulties arose particularly with regard to the question of the geographical area of the negotiations. The socialist countries came out in favor of their encompassing the territories of all participant states in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, including their basic territories as well as island groups within the sea and ocean regions contiguous to Europe, and also the territories of Turkey and the Soviet Transcaucasus, taking account of the special geo-strategic characteristics of this region.

The NATO representatives took the position that the area should also include the non-European part of Soviet territory, west of the Caspian Sea and the Ural river. In the case of Turkey, those areas which lie on its southern and southeastern borders would not be included.

Within the context of the consultations of the "23," there were also disagreements on other aspects of the mandate for negotiations. The complexities that arose necessitated a search for compromise solutions.

In June 1988, at a regular meeting in Warsaw of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member states, particular attention was devoted to the situation in Europe. They presented a new, specific program for reducing the level of military confrontation between the blocs.

The "Warsaw Plan" envisages an urgent reduction in armed forces and conventional arms from the Atlantic to the Urals and has three component parts.

The first is to achieve parity in armed forces on a reduced level. This can be accomplished by stages on a European-wide and on a regional scale. In the first stage, attention will be focused on mutual elimination of imbalances and lack of symmetry regarding certain types of the armed forces and arms of the two blocks as a whole. With achievement of success, it would be possible—again on a mutual basis—to substantially reduce forces and arms.

During the second phase, the armed forces of each of the countries would be cut by approximately one-fourth, which would mean demobilization of half a million men by each country, together with their assigned armaments. Reductions would continue in the third phase, and the armed forces of both political-military alliances would be given a strictly defensive character.

A second extremely important component is prevention of sudden attack. This is an integral part of the process of reducing armaments and armed forces. Therefore, with the first stage beginning along the line of contact between the two blocks, it is proposed to establish zones having reduced arms levels, the width of which would depend upon the characteristics of the principle types of weapons, geo-strategic factors, and other criteria. It is proposed to remove (or reduce) the most dangerous, destabilizing types of arms from such zones.

Such steps would of course be accompanied by corresponding concrete measures for building confidence.

Finally, the third component—information exchange and verification. Without this, radical reductions are not possible. Therefore, the proposal has been made, at the very start of negotiations—and, if possible, even before this—to carry out an exchange of initial data in order to uncover the correlation of forces, as well as imbalances and asymmetries. At the same time, of course possibility of verifying these data through on-site inspection would be stipulated. And, to verify that agreements worked out in negotiations are being observed, a system of inspection should be developed utilizing national technical means and international procedures, including such a rigid measure as inspection on site without the right of refusal.

Besides this, the Warsaw Pact participant countries proposed to the NATO countries that they make a comparison of their two military doctrines, taking into account military-technical factors, "with the goal of giving a deeply defensive character to the military doctrines and concepts of both military alliances and their participants." In the process of further discussion of the military aspects of the "common European home," the WP participant countries on 29 October 1988 presented a new initiative in the form of a Declaration of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Concerning Measures for Strengthening Trust and Disarmament in Europe.

As already noted, at the Vienna meeting, the WP countries proposed, for purposes of strengthening confidence and security and disarmament in Europe, the development of a new set of mutually carried-out confidence-building and security measures aimed at a reduction in the danger of military confrontation in Europe. Such measures, in particular, should encompass not only land, but also naval and also military air activity.

Representatives of the NATO countries opposed the extension of confidence-building measures to specific naval and air activities while raising questions of broadening the exchange of information concerning the structure and disposition of armed forces, and also the further development of a system for on-site inspections.

In the final document of the Vienna meeting, the WP member countries affirmed their adherence to the Madrid final document regarding the Conference on Measures for Building Confidence and Security and Disarmament in Europe and agreed to renew the work of the conference within the context of the CSCE in order to achieve further progress on the path toward its goals. At the same time, as the result of a compromise, agreement was reached and finalized in the final document with regard to negotiations of the "23" and a "Mandate for Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" was worked out. In the concluding rounds of the Vienna meeting, a sharp political struggle continued around the international principles of security and collaboration in Europe. The socialist countries came out in favor of strengthening the applicability of all ten principles established in the Helsinki Final Act. The West focused attention on Principle Seven, "Human Rights and Basic Freedoms," to the detriment of the other principles.

The delegations of the NATO countries attempted to emasculate the points relating to Principle Four, "The Territorial Integrity of States," to the benefit of the territorial ambitions of certain of the countries belonging to this political and military alliance.

Within the context of Principle Five, "Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," representatives of the western countries insisted that the text of the final document include the provision that all disputes not resolved with the aid of arbitration, consultations, "good services," mediation, etc., would be resolved by the mandatory involvement of a third party. The delegations of the socialist countries advocated examining the list of this type of disputes at an expert meeting during the period after the Vienna meeting (the proposal of the "N plus N" group, i.e. of the neutral and nonaligned countries). The search for a compromise found expression in the proposal of the coordinator (Austria), to which the Soviet delegation introduced corrections so as to include within it references to reports of the expert meetings in Montreaux (1978) and Athens (1984) concerning peaceful settlement of disputes and also the point that, already at the Vienna meeting, the participating countries had agreed "in principle" to the obligatory involvement of a third

party when such a dispute cannot be settled by other peaceful means. This latter point was also made a basis of the final document within the context of earlier approved documents on this question.

For purposes of carrying out the agreement reached, including as an initial step the obligatory involvement of a third party for the settlement of a certain category of disputes, the participating countries reached a decision to convene a meeting of experts in Valetta from 15 January to 8 February 1991 in order to define a list of such categories and also to establish corresponding procedures and mechanisms.

Diplomatic discussions were complicated with regard to the problem of reaching agreement on the text of a document concerning the struggle against terrorism (within the context of Principle Six, "Noninterference in Internal Affairs"). Here, no agreement was reached concerning the point on "Prevention Within One's Territory of the Activities of Terrorist Groups, Organizations, etc.."

In the context of the principle under examination, in February 1987 the Soviet Union proposed convening a meeting of experts from the CSCE countries concerning problems of collaboration in the fight against international terrorism. The proposals of the Soviet side envisaged examination of problems of the implementation by the CSCE countries of the positions of the Final Act and of the concluding document of the Madrid meeting with regard to taking measures against terrorism in international relations and developing recommendations to the participating countries with reference to effective methods of preventing international terrorism.

This Soviet document was not supported by the western countries.

With regard to Principle Ten, "Conscientious Fulfillment of Obligations Under International Law," it was for a long time impossible to reach agreement on a generally acceptable formulation which affirmed the intention of the participating states to undertake effective steps for implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and other CSCE documents on the legislative plane and in practice.

Certain western delegations, first of all the FRG, were opposed to expressing in the document the readiness of countries who had signed the Helsinki Final Act to conscientiously fulfill their obligations under international law, in particular those which stem from treaties and agreements corresponding to international law.

As a result of sensible compromise, the principles agreed upon by the parties were especially singled out in the section of the concluding document entitled "Questions Relating to Security in Europe."

In the final document, the CSCE countries enunciated the position that security in Europe should be viewed within the broader context of worldwide security, that it

is closely connected with security in the Mediterranean Sea area as a whole, and that, correspondingly, the process of strengthening security should not be restricted to Europe but should be extended to other regions of the world and, in particular, to the region of the Mediterranean Sea. Agreement was reached on calling a meeting on the Mediterranean Sea "for examination of ways and means of further strengthening various aspects of collaboration. ..."

A difficult situation arose in discussion of questions relating to "basket two." On one hand, understanding was reached in principle regarding the expedience, following the Vienna meeting, of conducting three large-scale general European meetings which could provide an important impulse to the development of collaboration in the areas of economics, ecology, and science and technology. A large role in this connection was played by the delegations from the socialist countries.

On the other hand, the United States and its closest allies made an attempt to emasculate the section of the final document that concerns the group of questions comprising "basket two." Thus, the West repeatedly stiffened its position with regard to questions relating to compensation transactions. The US and other western countries also wanted to be given broad access to economic and commercial information, at time when, within the Coordinating Committee for Control of Exports to the Socialist Countries, they were conducting and are conducting a policy aimed at disrupting international economic relations vis-a-vis the socialist countries, which runs counter to the main currents of world commodity exchange.

The topic of industrial collaboration including the creation of joint enterprises, which was discussed at the Vienna meeting, is a source of definite interest. Here, the western countries put the emphasis on specific obligations of the participant states with regard to improving the conditions of joint activity (guarantees of capital investment, transfer of profits, participation in management, and the like). At the same time, striving to avoid mention of incentives for promising forms of collaboration, the West justified this by insisting that state organs could not interfere in the activities of private enterprises. Nevertheless, shifts in the area of economic collaboration, requiring new approaches both on the part of the West and on the part of the socialist countries, were noted. In the concluding document of the Vienna meeting, for example, note is taken that, in the aims of furthering market possibilities, the participating states will facilitate publication and access to full, comparable, and timely economic and commercial information. A pan-European economic conference, which it was decided to hold in Bonn in the spring of 1990, will be called upon to give a new impulse to economic relations between the participating countries and to improve business conditions for trade and industrial collaboration.

The situation developed relatively favorably with regard to questions of collaboration in the area of environmental protection. To a certain degree, this is explained by the smaller number of controversial points than in other sections and also by the high level of activity by countries in the "N plus N" group (principally Sweden, Finland, and Austria), and also Norway.

The final document stipulates specific environmental protection measures that can play a positive role not only in terms on the continent of Europe but also for the planet as a whole. A proposal by Bulgaria that an all-European conference on protecting the environment be convened in Sofia in the fall of 1989 was approved. Recommendations regarding principles and basic directions in this most important area are to be worked out at it.

Complications developed in working out the section of the final document ("basket three") that concerns collaboration in humanitarian areas (contacts between peoples, information, culture, education). As already noted, representatives of the western countries took the line of strict linkage between possible agreements on political-military questions and progress in discussion of human rights and humanitarian collaboration. For example, they stressed individual rights in complete isolation from any kind of obligations with regard to society.

In essence, the delegations from the western countries attempted to reduce the entire set of humanitarian problems to questions of emigration, the activities of so-called "Helsinki groups" and of religious societies, freedom of information, unlimited contacts abroad, etc..

Meanwhile, in the process of the discussions which took place, the delegations from the socialist countries pointed loudly to many specific instances of violations of international agreements specifically by the western countries. The McCarren-Walter Act, limiting the entry of foreigners into the United States, the general policy of increasingly rigid visa formalities, etc.—all this is in crude contradiction to the provision of various documents of the pan-European process.

The delegations of the socialist countries firmly pursued a line of seeking compromises and of completing the meeting as rapidly as possible through balanced results. They introduced concrete proposals concerning an easing of visa and other formalities for the development of contacts on an individual and collective basis, the personal security of individuals participating in events abroad, contacts in the area of sports and among young people.

Viewing such an all-European forum as an important element in the mechanism of the problems under discussion, representatives of the socialist countries also proposed that specific questions of collaboration in this field be discussed at a conference on the development of humanitarian collaboration, which the USSR had proposed be held in Moscow. At the same time, it should be stressed that the Soviet Union had proposed holding a

conference on the entire complex of human rights and humanitarian collaboration. The working document of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna meeting had been introduced as early as in December 1986. Additions and clarifications made to it in June 1987, in particular a statement of intent to center the agenda for the conference around discussion of questions of broadening humanitarian collaboration within the context of the human dimension of the Helsinki process, markedly increased interest in a forum in Moscow. A favorable response was also generated by the readiness of the Soviet side to be guided in the conduct of this meeting by the practices and standards that had developed within the CSCE and, correspondingly, to permit representatives of foreign non-governmental organizations entry into the USSR for this period and also to make the plenary sessions of the conference open.

There was discussion at the Vienna meeting of several ideas for arranging European-wide humanitarian events following its conclusion. In particular, approval was given to proposals by the neutral countries and England to hold an all-European forum on information. Such a forum took place in London from 18 April to 12 May. Many questions were discussed at it: the content and access to information, the working conditions of journalists, the utilization of technology in information, etc.

The sides agreed also to convene a symposium on the cultural heritage of the CSCE participant states. This symposium will take place in Krakow from 28 May to 7 June 1991. Scholars and other figures from the field of culture will attend it.

At the same time, in March 1988, under the "curtain" of the fifth round, a new idea was sketched out at the Vienna meeting for holding a conference on the human dimension of the pan-European process. It was proposed at that time that this be held in three stages (meetings). In the process of negotiations, recognition was in fact given to the universal character of problems of human rights and humanitarian collaboration, i.e. the participating states agreed that this is not a problem of the East alone or of certain western countries, but is specifically a universal problem that demands the same attention and solutions everywhere. As a result, the participating states agree on the convocation of three all-European meetings within the framework of a single conference on the human dimension—in Paris, Copenhagen, and Moscow (correspondingly, the first from 30 May to 23 June 1989, the second from 5-29 June 1990, and the third from 10 September to 4 October 1991).

The next basic meeting of the CSCE, which will take place in Helsinki starting on 24 March 1992, will evaluate the results that have been achieved and will reach appropriate decisions on questions of further strengthening European security and collaboration.

The European-wide agreements worked out in Vienna have begun to be realized in stages within diplomatic practice, within the international relationships of the

countries participating in the Helsinki process. At the beginning of March 1989 negotiations were renewed in the Austrian capital on conventional arms and armed forces and on confidence-building measures. The sides set to work with the considerable burden of accepting suspended compromise decisions. "If the experience accumulated in this process is preserved and developed," M.S. Gorbachev emphasized in his responses to questions from the editors of PRAVDA, "then 'co-development' and 'co-creativity' in the construction of universal peace ... will become the norm of international relations and will make it possible to create the political and moral prerequisites for mankind's survival. ..." (PRAVDA, 17 January 1989).

COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo "Znaniye", "Slovo lektora" 1989

Unilateral Disarmament Needed; Military Must Use 'Common Sense'

*18120009 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 36, 10-17 Sep 89 p 6*

[Article by Pyotr Gladkov, Cand. Sc. (History): "Is Nuclear Arms Superiority a Good Thing?—Looking for Common Sense Amidst a Palisade of Missiles"; first paragraph in boldface as published]

[Text] Resolute steps are needed in nuclear disarmament, including unilateral. But, traditional fears and prejudices are in the way. Military experts warn that if we disarm unilaterally, they'll take us with their "bare hands".

Fundamentally, there exist two main ways of implementing military superiority. The first is to use it to pressure the enemy at any point where a rival's interests conflict with one's own so as to reap economic, political or other benefits and counter the spread of the other side's influence.

Let's see what we've achieved in the world by arming to the teeth. Our friends and allies are economically poor states. The military support we give them costs us a pretty "kopek" which could very well be used for our own needs. Today, when the economic factor is all-important, it would be much more useful to spend this money to develop our own country. Ultimately, such a policy would repay us with increased political influence in a world of real and flourishing socialism with a human face.

The second way is to use military superiority to capture territory and enslave nations. Let's imagine, just for a moment, that America decided to invade the USSR. What would it get? A vast country in economic shambles, with a flimsy and morally retrograde technical base and contaminated environment, a population most of which has unlearned how to work, and ethnic conflicts any one of which could lead to civil war.

And what about our natural resources? The America of today doesn't need them. If they were needed in the

industrial age, they are not needed in America's information age. A huge market? Our market cannot match what US economy can offer.

We see that military power is not needed today either for deciding issues in the international arena—because much more powerful factors have appeared—or for the national defence since nobody wants to attack us and assume all our economic problems.

Therefore R. Bogdanov and A. Kortunov (MN [MOSCOW NEWS] No 23) are not so "incompetent" when they suggest our own unilateral version as the first step in serious nuclear disarmament. And, if we announced anything of the sort, it is likely that the US Congress and public opinion would pressure the US

leadership to give a positive answer. It is hard to imagine that the notorious military-industrial complex would be able to resist this.

Finally, what about irrational governments, nuclear terrorists, etc.? Here, apparently, we should think along the lines offered by Academician N. Moiseyev (MN No. 28) on establishing a system of international monitoring, under the aegis of the UN, with the participation of all the interested sides, during the period of nuclear disarmament and afterwards.

Common sense is returning to many fields of our domestic life and foreign policy. One would like to see an era of common sense in the military as well.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meeting Ends

*LD2510214689 Lisbon International Service
in Portuguese 1930 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] The meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group [NPG] ended today at an Algarve hotel. Some important points stand out in the final communique. Humberto Ricardo of Portuguese Radio, Faro, who followed the proceedings, reports on the outcome.

[Begin recording] [Ricardo] The communique of the NATO meeting, which ended a short while ago, was distributed after the press conference. It reconfirmed what had been decided at the NATO Summit in Vienna, above all the modernization of the nuclear systems, bearing in mind the reinforcement of the Soviet arsenal. Despite the fact that the NPG members expressed satisfaction at the changes in the East, questions remain about the future.

Anyway, four points should be highlighted from this communique. Joao Soares.

[Soares] Well, the main point is the intention to maintain a certain level of nuclear dissuasion, including short-range missiles, even if cuts in conventional forces to balanced and lower levels are agreed in Vienna. This is one of the fundamental points.

Another was the decision to give the high-level group the go-ahead with its work to restructure NATO's nuclear forces. Well, any decision on this subject is still dependent in part on the outcome of the Vienna talks, (?as specified) at the summit of the heads of state last May.

A third point pertains to the speeches of U.S. Secretary of Defense Cheney briefing his NATO allies on the direct US-USSR START talks in Geneva on strategic nuclear arms cuts as well as talks on space defense and nuclear tests.

A fourth point—and this is one of the curious things that took place at this Algarve meeting—also involves U.S. Secretary Cheney, who referred to progress made in the SDI program commonly known as Star Wars. In his view, technological advances allow the project to be maintained and developed and are compatible with U.S. Congress spending cuts. This U.S. effort to develop this project would in part be justified by the development of an equivalent Soviet project to also militarize space. [end recording]

AUSTRIA

No Legal Inquiries Into Steyr Company Arms Sale

*AU1910111889 Vienna DER STANDARD in German
19 Oct 89 p 7*

[APA report: "Steyr Company: No Legal Inquiries at Present"]

[Text] Vienna/Linz—Currently, there are no plans to conduct legal inquiries against the Steyr company in

connection with alleged tank supplies to Iraq while the country was waging a war against Iran. This was announced by the responsible official in the Justice Ministry, Manfred Schausberger, following a meeting with the public prosecutor in Vienna. The whole matter was described as "extremely vague," because it was not even clear when the tanks have allegedly been supplied. For this reason, the Justice Ministry asked the public prosecutor to carry out "internal investigations" and did not order any legal steps. Once these investigations are concluded and a report is submitted, the Justice Ministry will decide whether further steps are required.

CANADA

Restatement of Canadian Arms Control Objectives

*52200001 Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English
14 Sep 89 p A24*

[Text] It's time for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to reaffirm Canada's policy on arms control and the superpower arms race. A strong statement is needed to reassure Canadians that he still supports the principles he spelled out in 1987 at a North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Quebec city.

Mulroney urged the Americans and Soviets to abide by the Strategic Arms Limitation and Anti-Ballistic Missile treaties. U.S. research into Star Wars, the space-based missile defence system, was acceptable, Mulroney said, but it must not undermine arms-control talks.

He urged radical cuts in nuclear forces, more curbs on nuclear proliferation, bans on chemical weapons and nuclear-weapons tests, no arms race in outer space and reductions in conventional forces.

There's been progress toward these goals. With the Cold War thawing and the Iron Curtain rusting, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are reducing their armed might in Europe.

The two superpowers are scrapping intermediate-range missiles, and talking of halving their long-range strategic nuclear arsenals. Nuclear-weapons tests continue, but a global ban on chemical weapons is close to fruition.

Yet in Washington, the idea of a space-based defence system persists. President George Bush, seeing Star Wars gobbling up more money than he's willing to give the Pentagon, is considering a cheaper program called Brilliant Pebbles.

Such a system is said to be able to protect U.S. missile sites by releasing swarms of mini-missiles to track attacking rockets; it probably could not defend a city from nuclear attack.

Like Star Wars, the new system could violate the AMB treaty if it moves beyond research into deployment. That would certainly put a hamper on strategic arms talks.

A restatement by Mulroney of Canada's arms-control objectives wouldn't just please Canadians; it might even help Bush in budget battles with Pentagon brass.

Arms Control Talks Offer Hope for Defense Spending Relief

52200002 Toronto *THE GLOBE AND MAIL* in English 28 Sep 89 p A6

[Text] For most of the past 40 years, the industrialized world has been trapped in a struggle between political systems that sometimes threatened to crush all humanity. Though there are always some who insisted that the cause of peace or stewardship of the earth transcended the rival claims of the capitalist West and communist East, they were all but drowned out by the rhetoric of belligerence.

Less than a decade ago, the ideological conflict appeared to be dramatically worsening. Under Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet empire was cruelly repressive at home and murderously irresponsible abroad. The American people, fearful that their country was losing its international influence, elected a self-professed cold warrior to the presidency. In Ronald Reagan's cinematic consciousness, the Kremlin was the dark command centre of an "evil empire."

The abrupt and deeply founded changes in East-West relations that have occurred since then have been driven to a great extent by necessity. The arms race has bankrupted the disorderly and inefficient economies of the Warsaw Pact nations. Militarism has become a luxury they can no longer afford. In the NATO nations as well as the Eastern Bloc, the fear of nuclear war and environmental degradation has profoundly influenced mainstream politics. Global concerns are undermining regional and ideological allegiances.

But something even more basic has happened to accelerate the change in relations between West and East. As the leaders of competing, hostile systems met to negotiate the new reality that had been forced upon them, they discovered common human bonds not previously acknowledged or explored.

Mr Reagan's epiphany in Moscow—where he saw the world from Soviet eyes for the first time—is well documented, as is his surprising political courtship with Mikhail Gorbachev. Greater experience with the West has taught Soviet leaders that their fears of NATO aggression were founded on lies concocted by Joseph Stalin. Eduard Shevardnadze has said the Soviet drive for disarmament reflects a new realization that NATO forces are not poised to launch an assault across the steppes.

There is even a view espoused today by many Marxists (who yesterday claimed that capitalism was on the brink of collapse) that socialist and capitalist economies are compatible in a single, global marketplace. Mr Gorbachev's vision of Greater Europe is founded on the conviction that the hostile competition of the past can be transformed into cooperation in the future.

These changes will not, and should not, soften the bargaining over conventional or strategic arms. It is too early in the confidence-building process to suggest, as some have done, that progress has been too slow and that the West should make dramatic concessions. Disarming a ticking bomb is at least as tricky as setting it to explode. But it is abundantly evident that both sides are ready to hammer out solutions to problems that confounded negotiators less convinced that the future would be peaceful.

An opportunity has arisen for both sides to divert a substantial portion of their mammoth annual expenditure on defence into more productive investment. Such savings will be easily absorbed by emerging environmental problems and the need to get new aid to the deeply indebted nations of the south.

The challenges of the future are unlikely to be any less critical or threatening than those of the past. But if the present era of co-operation endures, the industrialized nations of the East and West will be able to commit more of their energies and resources to tackling those challenges than ever before.

Wyoming Meeting Helpful To Stalled Missile Talks

52200003 Ottawa *THE OTTAWA CITIZEN* in English 26 Sep 89 p A8

[Text] The image-makers knew what they were doing when they sent American Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze off fishing together on the weekend. Even people who didn't follow the superpower meeting in Wyoming will presume the two men at least got along.

For once, the image isn't too far removed from reality. The most significant announcement during the meeting was the Soviet decision to drop their insistence on linking the U.S. strategic defence initiative or "Star Wars" with an agreement on long-range offensive ballistic missiles.

This unilateral move makes the Soviet Union look good and it isn't a big concession; the American Congress is unlikely to approve vast amounts of new money for more SDI research in any case. That said, however, the new Soviet position will rejuvenate the stalled missile talks, improving prospects for a treaty.

The other half-dozen agreements concerned such issues as limitations on chemical weapons and the need for a

superpower summit. The Soviets also responded positively to President Bush's "open skies" proposal that would allow unarmed aircraft from NATO and Warsaw Pact nations to fly over one another's territory. Canada expects to host a conference to discuss this proposal.

But what made the Jackson Hole meeting really new and different was the atmosphere of openness and cooperation and the attention given to environmental issues, the domestic situation in the Soviet Union, and terrorism. For years, arms control issues dominated the East-West agenda and acted as the barometer of superpower relations.

Baker and Shevardnadze didn't trip over their fishing rods in a rush to end 40 years of hostility. But they did provide a glimpse of better times to come.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Commentary Views Impact of Army Reduction

AU0311150889 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Nov 89 p 1

[Commentary by Karl Feldmayer: "Impulse From Bonn"]

[Text] The decision to reduce the Bundeswehr in peacetime to 420,000 active soldiers has been prompted by shortages. In view of the government's priorities, there are no longer sufficient personnel and funds. This measure, however, will have a considerable political effect.

The decision taken by the Defense Ministry will not settle the domestic controversy but will trigger a security-political discussion. The Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] will hardly be satisfied with the extent of the reductions. Arguments for this can easily be found in the development of East-West relations and in progress at the Vienna disarmament talks. There have been suggestions among SPD officials aimed at reducing the Bundeswehr to 250,000 men in peacetime. The Free Democratic Party [FDP] will at least be sympathetic to this position, because FDP officials also want a more tangible reduction. There have been statements by FDP officials suggesting a reduction to 350,000 men and 12 months of military service instead of 15. Many members of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Bundestag group would also support this position. After all, elections are scheduled for the near future, and such a step would not only please young voters.

It would also be welcomed by the public that is mesmerized by the decrease in the threat from the East and the emergence of a political landscape with democratic structures, and is asking whether the defense efforts that have been necessary so far are still justified at this point. The Soviet leadership is publicly discussing the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, stating that it has no objections against the withdrawal of member states and that it is not basically opposed to a unification of the two German

states. This will make it difficult for the government to stick to the defense and security policy it has pursued so far.

For NATO, the situation will not become easier as a result. It will not only be facing problems resulting from developments in the East, but also concerning the assessment of these developments by the member states. On the one hand, NATO welcomes changes in Eastern Europe, on the other these changes are assessed as a destabilizing factor. On the one hand the alliance points out the need to orient its defense efforts toward the still superior military potential of the Warsaw Pact—which means that defense efforts must be maintained—but on the other important members of the alliance have started to reduce their defense efforts. President Bush has even announced that he intends to withdraw part of the U.S. troops from Europe.

Given this constellation, the reduction of the Bundeswehr is not primarily of military significance but will rather affect policy within the alliance. Bonn has sent a significant signal for the allies who maintain troops in the FRG. There is a difference of at least 15 percent between the Bundeswehr's old and future strength. The allies will probably take as much advantage of this as of the partial conversion of the Bundeswehr from an active service army into a training army with a larger number of cadres. They might follow the German example.

The emerging reduction of the military presence will be welcomed as a relief by politicians and the public. Moreover, it will promote additional disarmament steps. The forum in which this can be achieved is Vienna, where disarmament talks are making such good progress that even skeptics are becoming optimistic.

Yet, there the topic of arms and soldiers is only superficially discussed. More important are the changes of the political structures in central and East Europe, which accompany the disarmament talks. These are aimed at overcoming the division of Europe. This approach secures for the USSR the political initiative, although it was NATO that worked out and submitted the disarmament proposals that have become the basis for the negotiations.

Being a defensive military, yet politically demanding, alliance NATO cannot approve of this. It can change this situation by reactivating and practicing its political program, which was laid down in the Harmel Report on 1967. The essence of the Harmel Report is the intention to create "a just and lasting state of peace in Europe" by assured defense capability and dialogue with the East. As a precondition for this, the Harmel Report mentions that the divisions of Europe and Germany must be overcome. After having rejected this for decades, the USSR now seems to be beginning to accept this idea.

This might provide new possibilities if NATO were to accept the challenge that is linked to it. It would then have to strive for understanding with the members of the

Warsaw Pact not only in the sphere of disarmament, which it is currently doing in Vienna. It is called upon to use its abilities to reconcile interests beyond the arms sphere.

Reducing the Bundeswehr may be an impulse for this, because it makes it clear that in the long run it is not sufficient to limit oneself to maintaining one's own military position. Military planning, security policy, and the political new order of central Europe are closely interconnected.

Ministry on Withdrawal of U.S. Chemical Weapons

*LD1710160389 Hamburg DPA in German
1517 GMT 17 Oct 89*

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Next year the U.S. Army, according to plan, will begin the withdrawal of its chemical weapons stored in the Federal Republic. The Bonn Defense Ministry said on Tuesday that the U.S. chemical weapons are "capable of being stored and transported without limitation." Assertions that the chemical weapons are currently being stored in "rusty canisters" or are being replaced by new, binary weapons are incorrect. The chemical weapons will be "withdrawn completely and without replacement," according to the ministry.

FINLAND

Marshal Akhromeyev: Treaty Revision Possible

Depends on NATO

*36170123A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in
Finnish 15 Sep 89 p 15*

[Unattributed article: "New NATO Link to YYA Text: Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev Hints That Mention of Germany May Be Deleted From Text if Soviet Union Gets Statement of General Reconciliation From Western Defense Alliance NATO"]

[Text] At this moment there is no reason to alter the text of the YYA [Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance] Treaty, but the situation is different if the Western alliance NATO consents to sign an agreement that states that the Soviet Union and its allies are not the probable enemies of the West.

This was the assessment of Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev on Thursday at a Parliament meeting that had been arranged by the Finnish-Soviet Friendship Society (SNS).

The idea for some sort of official we-are-no-longer-each-other's-enemy agreement between NATO and the Soviet Union was new to at least certain Finnish experts on Thursday.

It is also HELSINGIN SANOMAT's impression that Finnish officials are hardly eager to open discussions of the YYA text when the benefit obtainable from such discussions is not obvious beforehand.

"We have a lot of other, more concrete issues to discuss (with the Soviet Union)," said one expert.

Question for Marshal

Now that East-West relations are improving, Marshal Akhromeyev was asked on Thursday, "Isn't it time to delete the word 'Germany' from the two paragraphs of the YYA Treaty in which it occurs?"

"At this moment there's no reason for any changes. Our relations with West Germany have improved considerably, but the NATO treaty is still in force. West Germany's membership in NATO is a fact," replied Akhromeyev.

He pointed out that NATO and the United States have declared the Soviet Union their probable adversary.

"We (the Soviet Union) are ready to sign an agreement to the effect that we are not the opponents (of NATO). If such (an agreement) is signed, then the situation changes," said Akhromeyev.

The marshal did not say whether the proposed agreement was an official offer to negotiate with NATO.

Akhromeyev is one of the best known negotiators on security matters for Soviet president and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

At the SNS meeting on Thursday, the marshal lectured on present-day Soviet domestic affairs and answered questions afterwards.

He had met with Finnish President Mauno Koivisto earlier on Thursday. After his visit to Parliament, Akhromeyev gave the General Staff a detailed account of current disarmament talks. Marshal Akhromeyev's 4-day visit to Finland ended late Thursday.

What Perestroika Is

Akhromeyev began his lecture in Parliament by stating pithily that "perestroika is under way in the Soviet Union. The political system is changing."

He described the changes in this way: At the national level, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has now relinquished "all power" to the congress of representatives and the Supreme Soviet.

At the local level, the same thing will happen in 1989-90 after local elections are held.

"Even in the future, the CPSU will be the most important political force in society," but it will "influence society by political means. The methods employed to manage the country's economy will likewise change.

Ownership structure and the way in which means of production are owned will also change," said Akhromeyev.

"In many business firms the workers have become the owners of the firms. In agriculture, it is becoming common to lease farms. The number of cooperative firms is growing. But, despite all these changes, there is one thing we don't accept: exploitation.

"All these changes occur in circumstances that are characterized by broad publicity. Glasnost (openness) and democratic methods guarantee that the changes are irreversible."

Three Principles of Foreign Policy

According to Akhromeyev, fundamental changes have also occurred in Soviet foreign policy. Now the key principles are demilitarization, democratization, and deemphasis of ideology.

The first of these means "complete renunciation of the exercise of power." Democratization in foreign policy means that "every people and every country has an equal right to participate in the discussion and resolution of all international issues."

Deemphasis of ideology means that ideological disagreements do not enter into relations between countries.

Ideas Should Not Be Forced on Others

"Let each country live according to its ideas and principles, but don't let them be forced on others. Relations between countries must be based exclusively on the principles of international relations," explained Akhromeyev.

He added that "the Soviet people have made their choice. We will continue to be a country whose social system is socialist and which has its own values. And we are of the opinion that others must honor this choice.

"We for our part will honor every other nation's choice of social system. We fervently believe that each nation—no matter what its choice—needs peace and has an incontestable right to security."

Reduced Troops on Finnish Border

Akhromeyev also tackled the question of Soviet armed forces on the Finnish-Soviet border. The same issue was discussed by Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov during his visit to Finland not long ago.

According to Akhromeyev, there are no large pools of land forces on the Finnish-Soviet border. The strength of Soviet land forces corresponds roughly to the strength of Finnish land forces, or about 30,000 men, said Akhromeyev. On the other hand, he did not vigorously define the concept "Finnish-Soviet border."

In the discussion following his talk, he was somewhat more specific. The troop strength, according to him, is 5-10 percent of wartime strength. There is a troop reduction, in other words.

He pointed out that it is beneficial to maintain small forces because sudden activity is not expected from either side.

Antiaircraft Defense in Baltics

Akhromeyev characterized as significant the Baltic countries' military importance to the Soviet Union. He alluded to the West's cruise missiles, saying that the Baltic countries are needed to avert the threat these missiles pose and that that is why antiaircraft weapons are placed there.

Neutrality Essential Issue

36170123A Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Sep 89 p 2

[Editorial: "The Marshal and the YYA Treaty"]

[Text] During President Mauno Koivisto's visit to the Soviet Union in June of 1983, the YYA Treaty was renewed, ahead of time, unchanged for another 20 years. It remains in force until the year 2003, when it reaches the age of 55. So, at the present stage, there are no formal reasons to introduce changes in the treaty's wording or to seek alternatives to the treaty itself. On the other hand, discussing the treaty against the background of a changing Europe is a timely pursuit, as indicated by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, who visited Finland.

According to Akhromeyev, reference to Germany can be deleted if NATO consents to reach an agreement that the Soviet Union and its allies are no longer the probable enemies of the West.

Akhromeyev was guessing when the topic was military alliances, but he strove to speak as a soldier. The same thing is done by political leaders who talk about abolishing European alliances as part of universal disarmament. A dissolution of alliances and a statement of reconciliation between military alliances would render the working of the Finnish-Soviet YYA Treaty utterly obsolete and prove that the treaty is a relic of the past.

People on the political front have come very close to drawing the same obvious conclusion. During a visit to Bonn in June, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, together with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, signed a communique in which the countries pledged to end European disunity. "They have firmly decided to jointly seek routes that lead to a Europe of peace and cooperation, to the creation of a system of European peace, to a common European home where there is also room from Canada and the United States."

During a July session of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Gorbachev said: "Now is the time to file away the cold war arguments in which Europe is seen as

divided into 'spheres of influence' and 'spheres of interest.'" And, he continued: "In the present world of practical politics, where everything depends on everything else, the geopolitical concepts begotten by another era prove to be just as clumsy as the laws of classical mechanics in quantum theory."

These speeches suggest that the Soviet Union assumes West Germany will no more attack directly than it will through Finnish territory.

Military history confirms the statement that the Soviet Union's old fear of a third country's attack against Leningrad through Finnish territory is unjustified. If the Soviet Union had succeeded in conquering Finland during the Winter War, then in all likelihood Germany would have struck Leningrad through Finland the same way it struck through the Baltic countries. But Finland, which preserved its independence and control of its territory, refrained from striking Leningrad during the Continuation War and did not allow Germany to attack the city through Finnish territory. This also shows that the YYA Treaty boils down to repeated assurances—on paper, not in the real world—reminding us of a "sphere of interest" acquired by the Soviet Union.

As cold war prejudices recede elsewhere, the YYA Treaty seems more and more solitary. It is an assurance of eternity that should not cast shadows on third countries. The most important thing from the Finnish standpoint is that the Soviet Union honor Finland's declared neutrality. Akhromeyev said in Helsinki he holds in high esteem the "magnificent" neutrality policy of Finland and Sweden. Finns expect this to be written into future documents between Finland and the Soviet Union.

FRANCE

New Nuclear Test Reported in South Pacific

*AU0111080789 Paris AFP in English
0036 GMT 1 Nov 89*

[Text] Wellington, Nov 1 (AFP)—France conducted another underground nuclear bomb test Wednesday in the South Pacific, the second in what is expected to be a new series of four, New Zealand seismologists said.

The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research [DSIR] said the 20-kiloton blast was the 109th since underground testing began in French Polynesia in 1975.

The blast, recorded at the department's seismological station in Rarotonga, was probably detonated at the testing site on Mururoa Atoll, the statement said.

The French have been criticised by New Zealand, Australia and South Pacific island states for their testing program, but have insisted it is vital to maintaining their nuclear deterrent force.

The DSIR said the latest blast went off at 5:57 a.m. New Zealand time (1657 GMT Tuesday).

"This is the second test in French Polynesia in the current series," the DSIR said. "The first was of 25 kilotons on October the 24th."

"A series of four were held in May and June, and on the basis of the past five years, we can expect another two tests in the current series, before the end of the year," the department said.

New Zealand and Australia quickly condemned the latest French nuclear test.

"There is no justification whatever for these tests to be carried out in our part of the world," said New Zealand Science Minister Peter Tapsell.

"They cannot do any good and clearly do a great deal of harm," the minister said. He said Wellington would lodge a formal protest with France.

"In view of the other anti-nuclear initiatives in the other part of the world, we certainly believe that the French should cease testing in our part of the world."

In Canberra, a spokesman for the Australian Foreign Ministry reiterated his government's strong opposition to French nuclear testing.

"We are disappointed that they are continuing the program," the spokesman said.

New Zealand Seismologists Report Nuclear Test

Mururoa Atoll Blast Detected

*BK2510001689 Hong Kong AFP in English
0006 GMT 25 Oct 89*

[Text] Wellington, Oct 25 (AFP)—France tested another nuclear device at its underground test site in the South Pacific on Wednesday, its fifth explosion recorded there this year, New Zealand government seismologists said.

They said the blast estimated at 25 kilotonnes occurred at 0530 New Zealand time (1730 GMT Tuesday) on Mururoa Atoll, one of two atolls being used by the French military for the nuclear program.

Government Seismological Observatory Director Warwick Smith said the test suggested that a fresh series was under way.

He said it was "right on time and we can expect another three in the next couple of months."

Mr Smith said the largest test this year was a 70-kilotonne blast on June 10, with smaller blasts on May 11, May 20 and June 3.

"This is precisely the pattern of the past five years," he said.

Wednesday's explosion was "in the small to medium range" of tests, which had been as small as one kilotonne and ranged up to 150 kilotonnes.

The latter occurred in July 1979 and was the largest ever conducted at the atoll test centre.

Mr Smith said that France seemed to be using the Mururoa site for smaller tests.

The latest test brought to 108 the total of underground tests conducted at the site since underground testing began in 1975.

Anti-Nuclear Groups Protest

*BK2610054589 Melbourne Overseas Service
in English 0500 GMT 26 Oct 89*

[Text] The start of a new series of French nuclear tests in the Pacific has drawn strong protests from anti-nuclear groups. The environmental group Greenpeace and Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War say the tests will increase the health and environmental risks in the region.

Radio New Zealand reports that Greenpeace says people living near the test site continue to bear the cost of the tests through radiation related illnesses and poisoned food supplies.

Greenpeace says every test also increases the already obvious damage caused to the atoll as shown in French environmentalist Jacques Cousteau's recent report.

The physicians say it is only a matter of time before there is a repeat of a bomb blasting out into the ocean as occurred in 1979.

Mobile Antiaircraft Defense System Scuttled

*90ES0005C Paris LE MONDE in French
28 Sep 89 p 12*

[Text] Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Chevenement has decided to abandon the Santal program for mobile antiaircraft defense against planes and helicopters attacking at low altitude. He made his decision with the agreement of the Army General Staff, which had been planning to order from 90 to 100 launch units and 2,500 missiles to meet the antiaircraft protection requirements of the Rapid Deployment Force (FAR).

Budget savings are the reason behind the scuttling of the Santal program. The Army General Staff is currently studying ways of organizing antiaircraft protection for its units at less cost.

Designed for very short-range antiaircraft defense (about 3 kilometers) to counter the threat from subsonic planes (at altitudes of less than 2,000 meters) and from armed helicopters at very low altitudes, the system consisted principally of six Mistral surface-to-air missiles mounted on light armored vehicles such as Panhard's Sagaie ERC [armored reconnaissance vehicle] or Renault's VAB [front armored vehicle]. The missile-launching turret, built by Hispano-Suiza, was linked to a Rodeo-2 radar (Serge Dassault Electronics), which detects the attack and designates the target for the missiles. The Matra

group was industrial prime contractor in designing the missiles. Another advantage of the system is that orders can be transmitted from that vehicle to mobile launch crews, since the Mistral missile can be launched separately by two men carrying a tripod-mounted launcher and the corresponding ammunition. In that case, the Mistral functions like the U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles which the Afghan underground used to combat Soviet aircraft—very successfully, as we all know.

Now that the Santal program has been abandoned, the General Staff is seeking substitute solutions for providing the FAR with antiaircraft defense. The solution might be to establish a liaison network to coordinate launches from a van equipped with radar and supplying information to six launch units.

For their part, the manufacturers concerned might recommend mounting the Samantha radar produced by Thomson-CSF on Peugeot JP-4 vehicles or Panhard VBL's (light armored vehicles), with each vehicle carrying a light launcher for two Mistral missiles. That new system, called Albi, would be designed to meet the needs of the French Army. Those same manufacturers would continue to offer the Santal system, whose development they have almost completed, for export. The new Santal system would be mounted on armored vehicles produced in the customer countries themselves.

Details on Helios Spy Satellite Provided

*90WC0004 Paris LE FIGARO in French
29 Sep 89 p 10*

[Article by Jean-Paul Croize: "Helios: Our Disarmament Spy"]

[Text] Helios, the spy satellite France plans to build, will be an "open" satellite. At least that is what General Armaments Delegation (DGA) engineers indicate in outlining space activities French defense officials have planned for the future. In addition to "sharing" observations made by our reconnaissance satellites with a growing number of European partners, these activities are to have an original application: serving disarmament.

"The idea of turning Helios into a satellite to oversee peace agreements is gaining ground," says senior engineer Jacques Bousquet, head of the Satellite Administration, the DGA department which, working with the National Center for Space Studies (CNES), plans French military space projects. Set up within this framework in 1987, the Helios program will orbit several observation satellites whose platform, built by Matra, will be derived from the Spot civilian reconnaissance satellites.

One fundamental difference, however, is that the "eye" of Helios will be much more penetrating: "We shall easily have ten times the capability of our civilian satellite," predicts Jacques Bousquet, implicitly confirming that Helios' vision will make it possible, from an orbiting altitude of some 600 km, to spot details smaller

than a yard long on the ground because Spot, equipped with a theoretical resolution of 10 meters on the ground, actually sees objects less than 7-8 meters in length.

Now practically the chief customer for our civilian reconnaissance satellite, the Armed Forces will now be prepared to operate spy satellites by learning to derive the maximum information from Spot photos. "But while we can spot silos being built at a specific site or big transport planes at an airport, we still have to identify such objects, meaning distinguishing the builders of such aircraft," Bousquet says.

Defense Means

Between now and the launching of the first Helios satellite by late 1993 (the eventual plan is to operate three simultaneously), the Armed Forces will continue to work hand in hand with Spot. As DGA officials estimate, the latter could become an important diplomatic argument by initiating the principle of "disarmament satellites." "Europe has to take its rightful place" with such satellites, Bousquet says. When spy satellites are in widespread use, they could be partially operated within the framework of an institution such as the United Nations or the WEU and make it possible to supply countries involved in a disengagement or disarmament agreement with observations proving beyond the shadow of a doubt that strategic weapons have been installed in a given place, or vice versa.

"There can be no question of a country the size of France making the same military use of space that the United States or the Soviet Union would," Bousquet emphasizes. Our country, the leading European investor in space activities, has an annual budget of some 10 billion francs, compared with the United States, which spends 150 billion. "Two-thirds of that amount goes for military programs, while our Defense Ministry's space budget this year amounts to no more than 2 billion francs," he admits. Under such conditions, there can be no question of plunging into "Star Wars."

And yet, France's goal is to make space the first major phase of the unification of Europe's means of defense. It is true that the cost of satellites is more in keeping with the needs of a continent than a single country. This explains why Italy and Spain have already agreed to participate technically and financially (14 and 7 percent respectively of a total budget of 7.5 billion francs) in the Helios program in exchange for satellite operating time proportionate to their commitment. But it is France's ambition to at least bring West Germany and perhaps even Great Britain into the club.

Radar Observations

As far as Great Britain is concerned, however, hope is very slender. The military says that our allies across the Channel have access to and are content with observations made by American satellites. It is true that photos supplied by American space spies, which can descend to altitudes as low as 150 km if necessary, make it possible

to spot details smaller than 20 cm. Nevertheless, faithful to its policy of independence, France prefers to look at anything it wants to, even if its space eye is a bit myopic compared with that of the Americans or even the Soviets, which can make out details 50 cm in size.

For its part, Bonn remains very cautious, admitting the Europeans' interest in having means of space surveillance but relying on a technical argument to reject involvement in the Helios program: The German military prefers to have a radar observation system, the only type that can see through clouds. It is true that reconnaissance satellites, meaning those equipped with a vacuum-type optical observation system like the future Helios, will be blind in bad weather, able to see only above the clouds. But for the time being, observation satellites equipped with radar offer little interest to the military, inasmuch as their resolution does not exceed a good 20 meters.

"We are already thinking about the satellites that will come after Helios," Bousquet reveals. These second-generation satellites, which could be available by the end of the century, will very likely be equipped with a dual mode of vision: optical and radar. In his opinion, a major research effort must be launched in the meantime to lead to the development of a system of high-performance radar imagery that will make it possible to distinguish details no larger than a yard long on the ground, even through the densest clouds.

Naturally, these "superspies" of the cosmos must be built in as European a framework as possible. On the heels of Italy and Spain, the Netherlands have just signaled their intention of participating in France's endeavors. However, our main hope is that the Federal Republic of Germany will soon express interest in a European system of military observation. In that connection, the disarmament control role which Helios could play should have a very positive effect on the West German decision, DGA officials believe.

GREECE

Charges Filed for Transporting Radioactive Substances

Briton Arrested

*NC1110230589 Athens Domestic Service in Greek
1930 GMT 11 Oct 89*

[Text] The Athens prosecutor at the court of first instance has brought charges concerning the transporting of radioactive substances against Briton Derek Smith, aged 41. Smith was arrested this morning while he was delivering 2 and 1/2 kg of uranium to the director of the Dhimokritos Institute for examination. The accused will make a statement tomorrow; until then he will remain in detention.

Uranium 'Destined for Libya'

NC1210185289 Athens ATHENS NEWS in English
12 Oct 89 p 3

[Text] A Britisher was arrested yesterday and charged with illegally possessing 2.5 kilograms (5.5 pounds) of pure uranium he claimed was a sample destined for Libya.

Police identified him as Derek Smith, 41, of Britain who lives temporarily near Preveza, on Greece's west coast.

Smith told police that the uranium, type 238, was a sample from 250 kilograms (550 pounds) sitting in South Africa and offered by a South African friend at 180,000 US\$ per kilogram. He said his South African source also had several kilograms of uranium type 235 for sale.

Uranium, a radioactive metallic chemical element, is important in work concerning atomic energy.

A police official, who asked not to be named, said that Smith told investigators that the uranium was delivered to him at an Athens hotel earlier this year by a messenger said to be from South Africa.

The unidentified South African was said to be representing Malcolm Forbes, also of South Africa, who Smith said was an old friend.

Smith told police that Forbes, in phone conversations, asked him to visit Libya with the samples to see whether he could put a deal together with Libyan officials for the sale of the 250 kilograms of uranium.

Unsure of what the two small packages contained, Smith told police that he went to the British Embassy who turned him away saying they were not the competent authority to conduct a test of the contents.

He next went to the U.S. Embassy where he said an employee took a small sample of the package's contents for testing purposes. Smith said that he returned a week later to be told that it was not uranium.

Unconvinced about the U.S. Embassy's claim, Smith took the packages yesterday to Ioannis Papazoglou, director of the Dhimokritos Atomic Energy Research Center, where a test confirmed the contents were pure uranium. Papazoglou then summoned police who arrested the Briton.

The police official was unable to shed further light on the case.

ITALY

Arms Export Controls Paralyze Industry

35280200 Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian
19 Jul 89 pp 508-510

[Unattributed article: "Italian Exports Blocked; Serious Remedies Needed"]

[Text] The situation of Italian companies involved in defense and advanced technology is running the risk of becoming more serious with each passing day. This is due to delays and bureaucratic restraints caused by the Formica Decree of 1986. This decree was originally designed to help protect foreign exports, but, in reality, it is causing them great harm. Deliveries are thus hindered, causing clients to seek business elsewhere. They leave Italian markets, observed INTERARMA, because the markets lack trustworthiness, and others are taking advantage of the benefits offered by international competition. But that is not all: As if those disastrous delays were not enough, Venice Judge Casson recently sent judiciary briefs to select members of the Interministerial Committee. This Interministerial Committee is charged with advising the Ministry of Foreign Commerce on the matter dealing with exporting licenses for weapons and strategic materials. As of 25 May, the date Judge Casson sent the legal briefs out, meetings of the committee had been suspended. This meant that requests for export permits are no longer processed, gathering dust in archives. This has the effect of paralyzing the market, postponing deliveries to a "date to be later established," and shutting Italy out of this business sector. But the worst is yet to come; at present, in addition to losing many clients, Italy has already lost several markets. It is one thing to lose clients because they can be eventually recouped, but it is very difficult to regain whole markets. The damage is much greater than one can imagine because it not only involves the actual manufacturers of weapons systems, which, to be sure, constitute the lion's share as major sources of income. But the weapons manufacturers themselves are just a small part of the overall picture. The problem lies in the fact that all the numerous ancillary companies manufacturing defense-related components also have to submit requests for export permits. These include all those companies that manufacture precision tools (lathes, milling machines, etc.) as well as woodworking machinery, machines producing plastic and chemical products, as well as electronic industries that manufacture defense-related products, computers, counting machines, and power-served mechanisms. This also includes special models of pressing machines. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand the damage being done to Italy by this state of affairs. An ugly prelude of what is to come can be observed with the episode involving Iraqi warships. The ships were built by FINCANTIERI and were partially paid for by the Iraqis. They were embargoed because of the Iran-Iraq war, and, notwithstanding the fact that the war has been over for more than a year, they have yet to be delivered. While negotiations are taking place to clear up the matter, it still is not known if they will be delivered at all. This was the first major blow that damaged the image of dependability of Italian manufacturers, and, even if the embargo were a matter over which they had no say, those who invest tens of billions of lire to purchase needed materials have the right to demand, and, rightfully so, the ordered goods they need. INTERARMA notes that delivery time, even in the best of cases and in conformity with existing decrees, was

generally estimated (before 25 May) at about four months. These, however, are rare cases. On average, it normally takes between 8 months and 1 year, particularly when dealing with actual weapon hardware. Consequently, the near-term results are felt almost immediately. For example, after the "Iraqi affair," not only did the bottom fall out of naval construction programs, but also other companies were heavily penalized, particularly electronic companies, which already this year have experienced a 40-percent export shortfall. This is happening despite the fact that Italian products are in heavy demand abroad. Moreover, the damage is not limited to halting deliveries of materials, shall we say of high demand. In fact, it is even worse if one considers deliveries of spare parts agreed to in signed contracts. The aircraft industry is another that is hit hard. If, in fact, a country were to purchase 10 transport aircraft and manage to acquire them relatively soon, the problem starts all over again when the need to export spare parts or parts needed for scheduled maintenance occurs. On the other hand, France, for example, has again begun selling military materiel to "risk countries" such as Libya (see INTERARMA 13/89, p 492). Furthermore, from the United States comes news that the Department of Commerce has taken another step toward liberalizing its policy on exports of high-tech materials to allied countries. American companies, in fact, will be able from now on to export computers, integrated circuits, and several models of machine tools to the 16 COCOM countries, which includes Italy, without having to wait for approval from the Department of Commerce. With the exception of supercomputers, these products will be able to circulate freely within COCOM countries. This legislation furthermore does away with restrictions applied up to now on exports of these products to two nonmember countries, Switzerland and Finland. These two countries, do, nevertheless, have very restrictive laws concerning exports to the Eastern bloc. The legislation, notes INTERARMA, will allow doing away with the need for thousands of export licenses every year, without compromising the security of the United States, according to a government spokesman. In the meantime, while our situation remains paralyzed, efforts are being made to reach an understanding and begin talks aimed at encouraging the government to take steps to solve the impasse. In the past few days, Piero Fiocchi, president of ANPAM (National Association of Arms and Ammunition Producers) and Rosolino Orlando, president of CONFINDUSTRIA's Studies and Foreign Commerce Committee, acting in the name of those companies harmed by the deteriorating situation, have initiated a series of talks with the Foreign Ministry. The foreign minister's office is charged with drawing up political evaluations of dealings with client countries. This is done with the hope of initiating a process leading to a successful solution. In an interesting interview sponsored by INTERARMA, Senator Fiocchi shed light on some of the less clear aspects of this precarious situation.

INTERARMA: President Fiocchi, could you talk to us about the present situation since the Formica decree took effect?

FIOCCHI: The situation affecting companies that are part of ANPAM is particularly difficult with regard to exporting products. In fact, since the time the 12 April 1986 Ministerial Decree took effect, procedures for permitting export authorizations, lengthy and complex to begin with, have become even more so because of new and numerous bureaucratic requirements. A case in point is the certification of the entry of goods into the importing country. Our national operators abroad are not only obliged to produce documentation translated into Italian, but also the documents need to be certified by the local Italian diplomatic authorities. Approval of permits usually requires from four to eight months, while the competition in the European Common Market (EEC) can produce them in just a matter of weeks. The translation of the Formica Decree into various languages, including Arabic, circulated by the international competition, demonstrates how damaging this legislature is to our national industry by making us appear unreliable to foreigners on matters of timeliness and certainty of deliveries.

INTERARMA: What can you see in the future if there are no significant changes in the near term?

FIOCCHI: For all those companies in fields of heightened technological competition, the outcome can be very damaging in terms of losses of contracts, markets, and image. I would say that we run the risk of compromising the very survival of many national enterprises whose exports represent a large percentage of overall totals and are indispensable for companies remaining solvent. Unless action is taken to normalize the release of export permits and restore the flow of exports, I cannot exclude the possibility of several companies having to make heavy demands on Workers' Unemployment funds as well as severe personnel cuts.

INTERARMA: During the meeting on 12 July with the foreign minister, what results were obtained and which proposals were rejected?

FIOCCHI: The goal of the meeting with the Foreign Minister was to sensitize the department to the problems of this sector of the industry; I detailed, in fact, the difficulties faced by our national industry and the advantages enjoyed by foreign industries. I found it useful to present in detail a framework highlighting operational aspects whose aim was to provide a picture illustrating the need for a law that conformed more closely to that of the other countries in the Community, particularly in light of what is scheduled to happen in 1992. Needless to say, any evaluation of a political nature on this subject falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the minister of Foreign Affairs.

PORTUGAL

Defense Official Suggestion on NATO Weaponry

PM2010151689 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 14 Oct 89 p 4

[Unattributed report: "NATO Should Send Portugal Materiel, Says Eugenio Ramos"]

[Text] A reduction of conventional weapons in Europe could contribute to the modernization of Portugal's Armed Forces, Secretary of State for Defense Eugenio Ramos said in Washington.

At the end of a meeting of NATO's European Group in the American capital Eugenio Ramos told LUSA that an accord on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe "could permit a reallocation of weaponry within NATO."

An eventual agreement resulting from the Vienna talks should set limits on the quantity of weapons present in certain areas of Europe. "Instead of destroying military equipment to meet the ceilings, the more modern countries' most sophisticated weaponry could be moved to countries such as Portugal, whose Armed Forces are being modernized and which could in turn destroy their own oldest weapons," Eugenio Ramos said.

Such a transfer would be advantageous to NATO, because "it could lessen the imbalances between the various allies' response capabilities and give the alliance a more consistent military capability," the secretary of state explained.

Eugenio Ramos said that this possibility is not guaranteed, but "a trend that is beginning to take shape" and that was mentioned by a number of participants in the NATO European Group meeting.

An agreement on conventional weapons could also help to resolve the dispute over the distribution of risks and tasks within NATO.

The secretary of state said that an accord entailing a reduction of American troops in Europe could lead to a reorganization of the structure of forces which, from America's viewpoint, "could result in a more satisfactory European participation in collective defense," he added.

The problem of inadequate participation by the European countries in the continent's defense is being broached in some sectors of the U.S. state and economic authorities which, at a time of budgetary constraint, are demanding a reduction of military expenditure.

Eugenio Ramos described such positions as "natural," adding that "we are witnessing, in Europe too, pressures in the direction of the containment of defense budgets." Such pressures are related to the perception that the Soviet Union no longer represents a threat to European security.

The Portuguese secretary of state stressed that "the impression exists that the problem is more political than financial" and that it could be resolved through cooperation within the Atlantic alliance and from the harmonization of its 16 members' interests.

Saying that he did not fear "unilateral action by the United States," Eugenio Ramos added that he "believes that the trend is toward a greater cooperation effort in order to strengthen NATO's European pillar."

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Committee Criticizes New Antitank Missile

PM1810134489 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 18 Oct 89 p 2

[Robert Fox report: "British Missile 'Useless' Against Russian Tanks"]

[Text] The Army's latest anti-tank weapon was criticised by the Commons Defence Committee yesterday as too expensive and probably ineffective against the latest Soviet tanks, after entering service with infantry units five years late.

Full development of the shoulder-launched LAW-80—light anti-tank weapon—was begun in 1977 by the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment, Hunting Engineering and Royal Ordnance.

In 1987, 20,000 were ordered followed last year by a further 40,000 at a cost of 390 million pounds for the programme.

The missile was to replace the Carl Gustav 84mm and the American M72 LAW as the infantry's main short-range anti-tank weapon, and complement the Milan medium-range missile.

Development costs were 40 per cent above the original budget. The committee is critical of contractors and the Ministry of Defence in monitoring progress.

Delays and extra costs were incurred by the need to improve fusing and warheads to counter the latest developments in Soviet armour, known as Explosive Reactive Armour, or ERA.

This consists of explosive plates which detonate the war-head of an incoming missile before it can penetrate the tank.

The committee says a mid-life update of the LAW-80 should be given "active consideration".

Western defence departments appear to have seriously under-estimated the speed and success with which the Soviet army has developed ERA. Latest reports suggest the Russians' new T-72 and T-80 tanks have three layers of explosive armour.

This would render new "tandem" warheads for Milan missiles—where the projectile carries a double charge to go through a first layer of ERA—all but useless.

Evidence from the United States Congress last week indicates that two out of three of the British Army's main battlefield anti-tank missiles are likely to be ineffective head-on against new Soviet main battle tanks.

The same sources suggest that the latest improvements in Soviet explosive armour calls into question the 3 billion pound development of the Trigat anti-tank missile by Britain, France, and West Germany for the end of the 1990s.

Defense Secretary on NATO, Warsaw Pact

LD1810211989 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 1711 GMT 18 Oct 89

[By James Hardy, PRESS ASSOCIATION parliamentary staff]

[Text] It is crucial to retain NATO—but also in the short term the Warsaw Pact—to see Europe through the "incredible" changes in the Eastern bloc, Defence Secretary Tom King said today.

He told the Commons this was a time of optimism in world affairs—but it was also a time of great tension which needed stability in other areas.

Opening a two-day debate on defence, Mr King also announced:

—Five new defence support agencies to give sections of the MOD [Ministry of Defense] greater managerial independence

—A new defence studies center at London University, largely funded by the government.

Mr King attacked Labour for approving a motion at their conference which, he said, would slash British defence spending.

Labour would negotiate away Britain's nuclear capability and "leave this country defenceless". They continued to back policies that Eastern Europe was increasingly abandoning.

"It is a time of great optimism. It is a time of hope in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union," said the defence secretary.

"It is a time also when the West must show great responsibility and must be prepared to help at this very dangerous and difficult time."

Tensions were growing within the Soviet Union, within the Warsaw Pact and inside individual Eastern bloc countries. It would be particularly dangerous to assume the changes were gathering an unstoppable momentum.

"The truth is the dread warning that lay in Tiananmen Square could exist elsewhere in the face of the very real tensions," he said.

"A totalitarian state can change direction very much faster than any democracy and it would be grossly irresponsible to dismantle our defences at the present time."

A strong NATO had preserved peace for 40 years. To break up either NATO or the Warsaw Pact ran the risk of halting reforms by removing stability and increasing uncertainty. Mr King said: "If we want the process of freedom in Eastern Europe to develop, there is a strong argument to say that in the short term, the structure of the Warsaw Pact needs to remain as some assurance of stability on that side. It is important that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact have to remain in post."

10

22161

40

NTIS

ATTN: PROCESS 103
5285 PORT ROYAL RD
SPRINGFIELD, VA

22161

This is a U.S. Government publication. Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government. Users of this publication may cite FBIS or JPRS provided they do so in a manner clearly identifying them as the secondary source.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) publications contain political, economic, military, and sociological news, commentary, and other information, as well as scientific and technical data and reports. All information has been obtained from foreign radio and television broadcasts, news agency transmissions, newspapers, books, and periodicals. Items generally are processed from the first or best available source; it should not be inferred that they have been disseminated only in the medium, in the language, or to the area indicated. Items from foreign language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed, with personal and place names rendered in accordance with FBIS transliteration style.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by FBIS/JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpts] in the first line of each item indicate how the information was processed from the original. Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear from the original source but have been supplied as appropriate to the context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by the source. Passages in boldface or italics are as published.

SUBSCRIPTION/PROCUREMENT INFORMATION

The FBIS DAILY REPORT contains current news and information and is published Monday through Friday in eight volumes: China, East Europe, Soviet Union, East Asia, Near East & South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and West Europe. Supplements to the DAILY REPORTS may also be available periodically and will be distributed to regular DAILY REPORT subscribers. JPRS publications, which include approximately 50 regional, worldwide, and topical reports, generally contain less time-sensitive information and are published periodically.

Current DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are listed in *Government Reports Announcements* issued semimonthly by the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, Virginia 22161 and the *Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications* issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The public may subscribe to either hardcover or microfiche versions of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications through NTIS at the above address or by calling (703) 487-4630. Subscription rates will be

provided by NTIS upon request. Subscriptions are available outside the United States from NTIS or appointed foreign dealers. New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.

U.S. Government offices may obtain subscriptions to the DAILY REPORTS or JPRS publications (hardcover or microfiche) at no charge through their sponsoring organizations. For additional information or assistance, call FBIS, (202) 338-6735, or write to P.O. Box 2604, Washington, D.C. 20013. Department of Defense consumers are required to submit requests through appropriate command validation channels to DIA, RTS-2C, Washington, D.C. 20301. (Telephone: (202) 373-3771, Autovon: 243-3771.)

Back issues or single copies of the DAILY REPORTS and JPRS publications are not available. Both the DAILY REPORTS and the JPRS publications are on file for public reference at the Library of Congress and at many Federal Depository Libraries. Reference copies may also be seen at many public and university libraries throughout the United States.